In building their institutions, European representatives sought to present themselves as agents of democratization in the European Community. To that end, they sought to acquire more prerogatives and influence, and they did so with considerable success. They did so in the face of adversity, yet above all, their story is one of conformity – with the guiding pro-European spirit of these institutions, with the mechanism of depoliticized technocratic governance that underpinned the European project, and with the written and unwritten rules that governed their institutions. Their harmonious relations with the Commission and the Council of Ministers allowed for a considerable degree of competence creep. It also meant, however, that European representatives were more enveloped in aligning themselves with supranational power than in fostering arenas for transnational European politics.

In seeking to establish themselves as supranational actors, the European representatives inadvertently perpetuated and legitimated the depoliticized character of the European Community rather than challenging it. This left the representative institutions and their dynamic with other Community institutions under-politicized (Mair 2013: 99–125). Scholars have remarked upon this under-politicized character of Community governance, yet its dynamics are less well documented. This book has shown how within a generation, European representatives settled firmly into a political culture that favoured consensus over contention and allowed little room for politicizing internal and external relations. Even considering the muted postwar political climate in which they emerged, these institutions were remarkable exemplars of concordance, prudence and stability. That is not to say that this status quo did not have its discontents, only that it was rarely challenged. On the political left especially, European representatives often felt constricted in their room for manoeuvre to pursue their ideal of a more social and democratic European Community.

Rather than accentuating the differences that might exist between the collectives they represented, the European representatives underlined what they now all had in common: they were Europeans. MEPs especially bought into the idea, vented by the likes of Jean Monnet and Walter Hallstein, that the representative institutions were crucial in permeating a European spirit throughout European society from the top down. In concordance with that ideal, they fashioned themselves as extensions of supranational Europe rather than as platforms for channelling interests from below.