The U.S. government considered the Genoa Conference a sideshow - a misconceived British conjuring trick to deal with the superficial features of trade depression on the Continent before agreement was reached on the political prerequisites for European economic reconstruction along sound lines. American policymakers perceived three such political prerequisites. The West European countries had to agree to write-down reparations to a figure that Germany could manage financially and accept without endangering political stability. The former Allies, chief among them Great Britain, had to fund their war debts to the United States on reasonable terms. Last, but not least, all European countries had to drastically reduce expenditures on land armaments along lines comparable to what the main sea powers had agreed to at the Washington Naval Conference. A realistic approach to international indebtedness and the transfer of military resources to civilian needs, so went the line in Washington, would promote balanced budgets, end inflationary excess, and foster respect for obligations at home and abroad. With comity among nations restored, trade would revive naturally, without hothouse schemes. The United States would provide adequate credit at market rates. Revived markets would create their own inducements.