Introduction

Following the 1970s oil boom, the Saudi state was able to gather income from oil production and distribute it throughout the economy and society. As Champion argues this was compatible with traditional Arabia values and allowed the ruling family to enhance its:

… unique blend of religious and political ruling legitimacy with a comprehensive system of largesse known as the ‘Saudi social contract’. This ‘unwritten’ contract committed the state to taking charge of the welfare of its population in return for acceptance of the established political order.

Nowadays, in Saudi Arabia a new generation of leaders led by Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is transforming the traditional state-society relationship, specifically with the launch of Saudi Vision 2030. In turn, this has resulted in the Kingdom’s predominantly youthful, and often well-educated, population reexamining the existing social contract at a time of significant socio-economic change. This is because the economics of the social contract have come under increasing strain as a result of low oil prices thereby impacting on Saudi Arabia’s economy; in particular the related issues of employment and housing. Moreover, due to the low oil price, the Saudi government has started to impose fiscal restraint and this presents a significant challenge since its citizens are accustomed to government largesse. Indeed, the participants at a 2016 Chatham House workshop on “The Social Contract in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)” agreed that as GCC governments respond to the challenges of falling revenues and the need to diversify their economies away from hydrocarbons, the impact of contemporary socio-economic realities on the existing social contract will require “new strategies of consulting and communicating with the various domestic stakeholders and managing public expectation”. Indeed, as Hertog notes, each economic crisis in Saudi Arabia creates pressure for ‘radical’ reform and/or a redefinition of the Saudi ‘distributional’ system or ‘social contract’.

However, the usage of the term ‘social contract’ is often criticized as being eurocentric – as well as not being understood in the same way when translated to Arabic – and thus, does not explain adequately the relationship between the governing and governed in the Kingdom. In addition, in the Saudi context, the English language usage often has negative connotations as it suggests ‘cooptation’ of diverse societal constituencies by the Saudi government. Hence, according to Saudi academic, in the domestic context the idea of a social contract is best understood as “mutual benefits” between authorities and citizens. That is the government benefits from this contract as the citizen pledges loyalty to the political system and in return the government provides welfare and, for example, a job for life. Thus, as Belbagi argues, the force holding the social contract together is “the good citizen”. Nonetheless, how do young male Saudis interpret this ‘mutual bond’ between the government and citizens? Furthermore, does their interpretation of these mutual benefits match that of the authorities? Because if a ‘mismatch’ exists then this would require a revision of the role of the state in the economy or in fact a shift in the government’s economic relationship with society.