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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2025

Mary Anne Madeira
Mary Anne Madeira
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Lehigh University, Pennsylvania
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Every Firm for Itself
Corporate Lobbying and the Domestic Politics of Intra-Industry Trade
 , pp. 199 - 214
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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  • References
  • Mary Anne Madeira, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania
  • Book: Every Firm for Itself
  • Online publication: 21 July 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009651271.014
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  • References
  • Mary Anne Madeira, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania
  • Book: Every Firm for Itself
  • Online publication: 21 July 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009651271.014
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  • References
  • Mary Anne Madeira, Lehigh University, Pennsylvania
  • Book: Every Firm for Itself
  • Online publication: 21 July 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009651271.014
Available formats
×