Chapter 2 focuses on practical and theoretical problems in the identification of emotions in the field. An outline of basic concepts - emotion, feeling, mood, intentionality - leads into discussion of the complexity of natural emotions. Hardnosed behaviourist objections to ‘mind-reading’ and the ‘inaccessibility’ of emotion are rejected in favour of a dramatic, and therefore publicly accessible, characterisation of emotion. I consider the challenges to a cross-cultural definition of emotion (a concept without equivalents in many linguistic traditions), and question the notion of a distinct emotional domain. I argue for a compromise between sceptical relativism and a scientific realism that makes emotions independent of our theories, arguing for an inclusive approach compatible with open-minded ethnographic reporting and complementing current work in psychology. In drawing on evidence, I introduce some fieldwork anomalies that challenge standard understandings of emotion. To frame the debate and suggest a way forward, I outline the rival positions of Jamesian ‘feeling theories’ and cognitivist appraisal theories, showing how each camp fastens on a different aspect of the emotional sequence, while both underrate vital biographical elements - which returns us to the odd cases that cry out for deeper ethnographic engagement.