One evening against the backdrop of a parliamentary campaign, D. Ravikumar elaborated on an enduring friction between minority representation and electoral reservations, and how they relate to a political constituency. Although electoral reservations were first conceived on the basis of community to ensure the presence of specific groups in elected bodies, elections are conducted on the basis of territory, in a geographically demarcated, socially segregated joint electorate, where Dalit voters are insufficient in number to elect their preferred candidates. As Ravikumar asserts, these representatives are rarely selected by Dalits—the presumed beneficiaries of reservation—but, instead, by an upper caste majority that often prefers Dalit candidates who will, to quote another longtime VCK leader, “take a soft corner on Dalit issues.”2 Ravikumar questions whether electoral reservations produce “genuine” representatives of Dalit communities or, alternatively, if these figures are simply individuals from Dalit communities, emphasizing that these classifications are not always mutually inclusive. Elections in a joint electorate generate contradictory pressures for Dalit politicians, who are expected to champion their community's interests despite their reliance on higher castes that may not share Dalit priorities. Stressing the longevity of this dilemma, Ravikumar guides our conversation to B. R. Ambedkar's well-documented concerns on how the institutional design of electoral reservations would impact the character of minority representation.

In his writings and speeches, Ambedkar grappled with electoral reservation at both theoretical and practical levels, deliberating over how to best ensure democratic institutions support substantive minority representation. Anticipating that caste would shape voting behavior, he predicted that Dalits, a permanent minority, would fail to garner sufficient imperative in joint electorates where representatives are elected by popular vote. Although Dalits, if politically consolidated, may possess the clout to impact election outcomes, they nonetheless lack the capability to select their own representatives. In his view, Dalits elected in a joint electorate would be accountable to a caste majority that selected them and, therefore, only “nominal” representatives of their community. Ambedkar anticipated that the mere presence of Dalits in elected bodies would be insufficient to ameliorate their condition. He argued that a handful of legislative seats would not suffice for India's Dalits because, he cynically asserted, “a legislative Council is not an old curiosity shop” but, instead, an institution that holds “the powers to make or mar the fortunes of society.”