In his book How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory, Andrew T. Guzman writes:

The goal of this book is to contribute to both aspects of this transformation – theory and social science methodology. We develop a rational legal design theory of international adjudication, which attempts to explain an important part of cooperation in the international system: the creation and expansion of international courts. In particular, we ask why states create new international courts and why states join pre-existing international courts. We argue that an interesting intersection of domestic and international law occurs when international courts are formed. After accepting a basic premise that states can benefit from bargaining with the potential assistance of an adjudicator, we contend that not all adjudicators are created equal. Different courts are created to suit the interests of a particular group of states. States have incentives to create international courts in their own legal image to reduce uncertainty in future bargaining situations. Thus, the initial negotiators of new courts, who we call the “originators,” design institutions in ways that are optimal from both a political and legal standpoint.