Introduction

Norms of equality, equity and fair division shape the outcome of bargaining generally and of collective wage bargaining in particular. Sometimes appeal to a norm of distribution facilitates agreement, both in labour–capital bargaining and in labour–labour bargaining. Norms of fairness can force agreement on the division of earnings between shareholders and workers. The task of coordinating separate labour–capital negotiations is itself a bargaining problem which can sometimes be resolved by appeal to a norm of equity or equality. But norms can also be an obstacle to agreement. In the presence of competing norms that favour different groups, the selfrighteousness conferred by belief in a norm can lead to a bargaining impasse.

The role of norms in bargaining, therefore, is twofold. On the one hand, norms can help us overcome the problem created by a plurality of cooperative arrangements. On the other hand, the plurality of norms may in turn create new problems. In some cases, therefore, norm-free bargaining – negotiating from credible threats – is more likely to force agreement. All parties might then benefit from a tacit agreement to abstain from appealing to norms. If one believes, as I do, that such cases are becoming increasingly frequent, one might even wish for a social norm against the appeal to norms of distribution.

I shall consider norms regulating labour–labour relations as well as those governing labour–capital relations. Among the former, two norms stand out. On the one hand, there is the norm of equality – equal pay for everyone, regardless of type of work.