The decolonisation process of Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia has been invariably characterised as one of the most traumatic episodes in the history of British imperial decline and withdrawal from its former colonial possessions. “In the whole history of British colonial rule only one other case of withdrawal was marked by such degree of conflict, namely that from the USA in 1783,” argues Halliday. But apart from the unprecedented extent and tenacity of active local resistance to British policies, which arguably lasted for more than a decade (the first state of emergency in Aden was declared by Sir William Luce in 1958), Britain's withdrawal on 30 November 1967 also constituted for many a “shameful retreat from solemn undertakings”. These two aspects of the events at hand have indelibly defined collective memory and popular understandings of the reasons behind Britain's failure to relinquish its only colony in the Middle East on its own terms and with a friendly successor regime in place.

Fifty years after South Yemeni independence, our sources of first-hand information from the last decade of colonial rule in Aden remain partial. For their most part they consist of both political and military memoirs of British officials who served on the ground. Written usually after the authors’ retirement, their main intent is the ex post facto justification of personal actions and policy decisions, and the explanation of failures either because of the backwardness of local society, or due to misguided decisions in the metropolis. More importantly, they are characterised by the persistent refusal to recognise, or even acknowledge, the historical and political agency of the local population. South Yemenis are at best presented as misguided by the rhetoric of their own political leaders; at worst they are mere pawns in the hands of Nasserist Egyptian propaganda. Apart from notable exceptions, they generally fail to capture the political climate of the time because of their over-representation of colonial narratives.