The small scale tribal insurrection in Oman's southern province of Dhofar which began in the early 1960s was, by the end of that decade, a much graver and more pressing problem, especially in the context of what J.B. Kelly called the ‘debacle at Aden’ and the consequent arrival of a Marxist-led government in South Arabia. Britain's announcement of its intention to withdraw ‘East of Suez’ in January 1968 further complicated an increasingly messy and dangerous picture in an unstable region. In light of its decision to pull out of the Gulf militarily, the threat posed by the growing Marxist inspired rebellion in Dhofar to Britain's remaining interests in the Gulf region could not be left unchallenged if London wished to avoid a repeat of the South Arabian disaster.

This chapter focuses on the formulation of policy towards Oman during the earliest period of the Conservative government which came to office in June 1970. In particular it examines the change of emphasis placed on defence and ‘East of Suez’ matters by the incoming government and how this affected policymaking towards Oman. This chapter argues that the unfolding disaster of Britain's ‘scuttle’ from South Arabia in November 1967 impacted Britain's formulation of short, medium and long term policy objectives for its engagement with the unrest within the southern province of Dhofar in the Sultanate of Oman. Drawing on extensive archival research it demonstrates that the immediate consequences of the abrupt departure from Aden had a galvanising effect on policymakers and politicians and that there was a clear determination to learn lessons and to try to mitigate the consequences of the fallout from the capture of South Yemen by Marxist forces. The chapter explores these processes not only through the prism of high politics in Whitehall but also briefly highlights the role of key individuals whose direct experience in Aden was transferred to Muscat in myriad ways.

Despite economic hardship in Britain and a wide range of other challenges and priorities facing London at the time, combined, of course, with perennially limited resources and a policy of withdrawal from the Gulf, a commitment to Oman was forged between 1968 and 1972 which had profound effects upon the region's history and politics. In this sense, Britain's withdrawal from Aden and its immediate consequences affected a policy change in which a carefully balanced and calculated form of greater engagement in the short term, underpinned by targeted longer term support, ensured that the statebuilding process in Oman would, despite extremely limited pre-existing foundations and an escalating insurgency, prove to be much more successful than prior attempts to achieve similar goals in Aden and South Arabia.