Hussein Ali Agrama suggested in an article written in the interim period between the fall of Hosni Mubarak and the presidency of Mohammad Morsi in Egypt that one of the defining characteristics of the January 25, 2011 uprising was its ‘asecularity’, the sense being that it was not driven by the problem of secularism. He did not mean that the uprising was ‘post-secular’, ‘nonsecular’, or even ‘anti-secular’, but that the sensibilities and stakes associated with the question of secularism (the ‘problem-space of secularism’) were not its governing logic. As much as this observation is correct, it is also true that the events following the uprising, particularly during Morsi's one-year presidency, dragged Egypt into the problem-space of secularism. The proper relationship between religion and politics, as well as the appropriate demarcation between them, came to dominate Egyptian politics. Thus, many liberals’ participation in the Tamarrud movement and subsequent support for the military coup were motivated by the belief that Egypt's ‘secularism’ had been eroded under Morsi's presidency.

The Egyptian military and a large number of secular liberal activists justified the coup and subsequent ban on the Muslim Brotherhood as ‘a way to stop the Islamization of Egypt’. A self-described ‘secular liberal’ Egyptian interviewed by this author stated that he supported the July 3 coup because ‘secularism in Egypt was in danger’, a sentiment shared by many other liberals both inside and outside Egypt. But was Egypt secular before Morsi came to power? In what ways did the Brotherhood pose a threat to secularism? Did the fact that the Brotherhood was not secular imply that it was not democratic? So, how should we interpret the Brotherhood's concept of ‘Islamic democracy’ and its call for a ‘civil state within an Islamic frame of reference’?