The Arab revolts of 2010 and 2011 brought about a radical shift in the functioning of various Islamist movements in the Middle East and North Africa, including Tunisia and Egypt. They also opened new fields of analysis, as it became possible to assess not only Islamist plans and ideologies, but also how these plans were implemented and what Islamists did with the power they had gained. Individual Islamists and Islamist movements faced several dilemmas when making strategic decisions. The dilemmas of involvement in mainstream politics and the dilemma of expanding their activities beyond the socio-religious sphere were two of the most important ones they had to face during the protests against Ben Ali and Mubarak's rule and after their regimes’ collapse.

This chapter examines the key dilemmas faced by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia during and after the Arab revolts, as well as how the key strategic decisions they made influenced their current situation. Thus, it investigates the major reasons that enabled one of the examined Islamist movements, Tunisian Ennahda, to reach political compromises and remain an important actor on the national and international political scene, while pushing another major actor, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, out of this scene, with numerous leaders and members imprisoned (including President al-Sisi). It proposes to shift away from structural models (e.g., political process theory) of investigating the dynamics of transformations of Islamist movements in the context of Arab revolts and toward strategic analysis of the micro foundations of political action, emphasising the role of human agency over structures.

The research for this chapter is based on an examination of existing materials as well as extensive fieldwork conducted by the author between 2014 and 2018 in Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. As part of the fieldwork, the author interviewed over 50 people from the five groups listed below: a) members of Egypt's and Tunisia's Islamist parties; b) state administration representatives dealing with the broadly defined management of religious affairs in Egypt and Tunisia; c) civil society representatives, with a particular emphasis on institutions linked to Islamist movements; d) selected leaders of minority groups (particularly religious minorities) and women's organisations; and e) experts and researchers of Islamist movements and religious policy. The field research material has been supplemented with notes from participant observations (e.g. spending time with representatives of Ennahda during the presidential election campaign in December 2014).