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4 - Doctors and Hospitals

Can We Please Get Along?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2025

Mark V. Pauly
Affiliation:
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
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Summary

The typical American nonprofit hospital does not fit well with the economic theory of the firm. That theory, as explained by Ronald Coase, imagines that a firm is an organization in which a manager directs the allocation of capital and labor already contracted with the firm. In contrast, US hospital management historically did not employ physicians, supplies of a key input. Physicians were a parallel entity, the medical staff, who billed separately and could issue orders for deployment of other hospital inputs (such as nursing staff). More physicians are not salaried hospital employees, but they still bill separately and have independent control. This chapter outlines a model of the nonprofit hospital in which the objective is maximization of net income of the medical staff and argues that this theory explains much of hospital behavior. Care coordination, tax advantages for nonprofits, and community benefits are also discussed.

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Type
Chapter
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Applied Healthcare Economics
Unexpected Insights for Management and Policy
, pp. 48 - 70
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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  • Doctors and Hospitals
  • Mark V. Pauly, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
  • Book: Applied Healthcare Economics
  • Online publication: 26 September 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009606967.005
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  • Doctors and Hospitals
  • Mark V. Pauly, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
  • Book: Applied Healthcare Economics
  • Online publication: 26 September 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009606967.005
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Doctors and Hospitals
  • Mark V. Pauly, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
  • Book: Applied Healthcare Economics
  • Online publication: 26 September 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009606967.005
Available formats
×