The COVID-19 pandemic threatened to worsen pre-existing economic inequality in China. This chapter discusses how the Chinese party-state used distinctive “ultra-heterodox” measures to alter or nullify contractual terms in contractual disputes during the pandemic that raised serious concerns about inequality, social unrest, or systemic financial risk. Specifically, courts would refer such disputes to either mediation, insolvency, or a “macro-prudential” proceeding that involved courts collaborating with government agencies, party officials, and stakeholders of firms experiencing financial distress to negotiate and implement resolutions of disputes. These procedures allow the party-state to achieve its objectives of preventing market disruption, social unrest, and financial crisis triggered by unfair and unequal contracts. The “negotiated legality” reflected in these measures works in China because of the dominance of the party-state, widespread acceptance among contracting parties of a communitarian understanding of liability and responsibility, and the efficiency of postponing risk allocation to the enforcement stage from the contract formation stage in an emerging market.