With trade and the environment becoming increasingly interconnected, environmental impact assessments (EIAs) of trade negotiations help to integrate environmental considerations into trade-related treaty making by evaluating potential risks and opportunities, addressing public concerns, and facilitating the introduction of response measures. Despite international efforts, such ‘trade EIAs’ have not yet been universally adopted. At the domestic level, the United States, Canada, and the European Union have pioneered the use of EIAs through their institutionalized procedures for over 20 years. This article examines and compares the relevant practices of these three jurisdictions to identify major patterns and to discuss the pros and cons of existing differences in this area. It argues that the time-tested experience of these jurisdictions could provide benchmarks for consideration in promoting the widespread implementation of trade EIAs through global and regional trade regimes.

Our paper sheds light on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) cooperation among trading countries. We contribute to the existing literature a data-driven analysis on the effectiveness of various forms (in monetary value, duration, and diversification) of SPS related technical assistance received by 33 countries from 1993 to 2015. The World Trade Organization's (WTO's) SPS Agreement encourages biosecurity for countries through technical assistance, to safeguard human health and productivity from contamination by biological hazards (pests, pathogens, or invasive species). Our panel model finds that WTO's SPS program encourages simultaneously agricultural trade and biosecurity. We implement a Multiple Indicator Solution (MIS) to correct bias from the endogenous technical assistance. The effectiveness of technical assistance depends on geography and the level of development among the heterogeneous countries referred to in our data. This investment in biosecurity benefits both donors and recipients of technical assistance. Based on our results donors should be encouraged to invest in countries with below average resources and abilities.

This article argues in favour of broadening the trade and environment debate in the World Trade Organization (WTO) to include a developmental perspective. WTO litigation involving environmental regulation touches upon the issue of global justice and the power asymmetries structurally embedded in the global economy. The recognition of the WTO as a legitimate global institution, therefore, depends on its ability to reconcile the respect for the right to regulate with the need to give due regard to the interests and concerns of foreign constituencies affected by domestic regulation. By imposing other-regarding obligations, WTO law can act as a mechanism of external accountability of powerful states vis-à-vis affected foreigners, especially where asymmetric relations and different stages of economic development are involved. The article applies this framework to analyze the legal reasoning of the Appellate Body in the US-Tuna II dispute between the US and Mexico – a dispute illustrating the complex intertwinement between economic, environmental and developmental issues. It concludes that the use of the concepts of ‘even-handedness’ and ‘calibration’ under Article 2.1 of the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement and Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade did not enable the Appellate Body to strike an adequate balance between the right to regulate and external accountability. While in the original report the Appellate Body used ‘even-handedness’ to impose only a minimal level of external accountability on the US, in the compliance report, the Appellate Body has gone too far by failing to defer to the US risk assessment amidst scientific controversy and uncertainty.

This analysis presents a theoretical model of firm response to border enforcement and evaluates both the intended and unintended effects under two enforcement regimes: destruction versus treatment of contaminated shipments. The results indicate that importers may respond to increased inspection by reducing shipments and decreasing due care. In response to increased pest populations, firms may reduce shipments and increase due care, indicating that an enforcement response may not be necessary. The analysis reveals the importance of the nature of the due-care technology, as well as the relationships underlying the probability of detection, in determining the effects of enforcement.

International negotiations for an agreement to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases have not produced cost-effective policies for reducing emissions, not least because they are unlikely to prevent ‘leakage’ through a re-location of carbon-intensive activities to poorer countries. An alternative or supplementary approach that is more likely to achieve at least some emission reductions, and at the same time generate national and global economic benefits rather than costs, involves lowering coal subsidies and trade barriers. Past coal policies have encouraged excessive production of coal in a number of industrial countries and excessive coal consumption in numerous developing and transition economies. This paper documents those distortions and outlines the circumstances under which their reform (currently under way in some countries) could both improve the economy and lower greenhouse gas emissions globally. It then quantifies the effects on economic activity as well as global carbon emissions, using the G-Cubed multi-country general equilibrium model of the world economy. Both the gains in economic efficiency and the reductions in carbon dioxide emissions that could result from such reforms are found to be substantial—a ‘no regrets’ outcome or win–win Pareto improvement for the economy and the environment.