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1 results

  • Chapter 11 - Suárez’s Partial Pluralism About Substantial Form

  • from Part IV - Corporeal Substance
  • Edited by Shane Duarte, Sydney Penner, Asbury University, Kentucky
  • Book:
    Suárez's <i>Metaphysical Disputations</i>
    Published online:
    13 October 2025
    Print publication:
    30 October 2025, pp 201-220

  • Summary

    Recent scholarship presents Suárez as falling in a broadly Thomist tradition regarding the question of how many substantial forms a material substance can have. Scholars present Suárez as endorsing a unitarian view of substantial forms due to Thomistic concerns about substantial unity. I argue that this interpretation is mistaken, and that it obscures an important difference between Suárez’s brand of unitarianism and Aquinas’s. Suárez does not have a unity argument against plurality of substantial forms because he has the metaphysical resources to account for the unity of a substance with multiple substantial forms. It is also a mistake to claim, as some scholars do, that Suárez was a unitarian in the same sense that Aquinas was: unlike Aquinas, Suárez thinks that non-human organisms contain multiple substantial forms. Paying close attention to the differences between Suárezian and Thomistic unitarianism results in a more nuanced picture of the plurality of forms debate.