Chapter 2 begins with an overview of existing definitions of art and connects these definitions with philosophical ideas about the fundamental nature of reality – including the arts – in the form of ontologies or worldviews. It analyzes the properties of those ontologies in the context of the visual arts and concludes with the introduction of process ontology (readers who don’t like philosophy and definitions might wish to skip this chapter, or read it later once they have come to think that philosophy and definitions are not uninteresting after all).

A conceptual foundation for a process approach in psychology is provided, including the characteristics of a ‘process’ and a process ontology (or metaphysics) and its philosophical roots. We describe how this approach contrasts substantialism and a substance ontology. Here, we introduce what our envisioned process-approach implies for realism, where we discuss the stance that the construal of reality is constructed. With this, we position ourselves as critical realists.

This chapter demonstrates how concrete practices align and form a praxis, using the field of self-esteem research as a case study – as one of the most popular concepts in both academic and pseudo psychology. The mainstream praxis of self-esteem research is dissected in the context of enacting a substance ontology. Here Aristotle’s distinction between particulars (i.e., primary substances) and universals (i.e., secondary substances) is applied as a way of making sense of various dominant practices in self-esteem research. The tendency to reify self-esteem is discussed, including how this relates to objectivist measurement-standards of self-esteem, an emphasis on predicting ‘levels’ of self-esteem, and a societal need and felt-responsibility to ‘boost’ self-esteem. I discuss how the mainstream praxis of self-esteem research demonstrates an attempt to position our field (and individual scientist identities) as ‘scientific’, thus revealing a (inaccurate) natural-science envy.

This chapter discusses the practice of measurement in psychological research. Here, where we cast doubt on the basic assumptions and endeavours underlying the act of measuring in mainstream psychology. Next, we introduce the processual alternative, which stresses the study of activity as situated and coupled with an environment. This chapter explains how a process approach to ‘measurement’ is thus fundamentally different from the standard one, and can remedy existing issues related to non-ergodicity and the ecological fallacy. These ideas are illustrated by means of the concept of intelligence, which is undoubtedly one of psychology’s show-pieces of measurement.

A conceptual foundation for a process approach in psychology is provided, including the characteristics of a ‘process’ and a process ontology (or metaphysics) and its philosophical roots. We describe how this approach contrasts substantialism and a substance ontology. Here, we introduce what our envisioned process-approach implies for realism, where we discuss the stance that the construal of reality is constructed. With this, we position ourselves as critical realists.