In this chapter, the focus is on negative states of affairs, on their corresponding judgments, and on the connection of these with Reinach’s jurisprudence – something that has not yet been done in the extant literature on him. The position advanced is that it is because the law frequently turns on what appears to be negative states of affairs; Reinach’s legal training may have contributed to his insistence on their very being and their having the same ontological status as positive states of affairs. Reinach was rather unique in the Munich and Göttingen phenomenological circles because he was a law student in addition to being a student of descriptive psychology and phenomenology; the ways he combined the various teachings from these fields opened up for him distinctive ways of seeing the world – in all its modes of being and not being. Consequences of the position include restoring these entities to their rightful place in his ontology (negative states of affairs have received far too little attention and serious inclusion in his work) and the potential for making Reinach whole again – by bridging his early law education with his phenomenological ontology.