In Tusculans 2 the interlocutors discuss the value of physical pain. They swiftly agree that it is not the greatest evil but take longer to consider whether it is bad or, as the Stoics think, merely indifferent. Enduring pain is taken to be an indication of courage and manliness (virtus) and this is undermined by the claim that physical pain is not bad. Therefore neither the Epicureans nor the Stoics provide a wholly satisfactory account of the value of physical pain and its relationship to virtue.

The work of the first four chapters demonstrates that Nietzsche’s genealogical accounts can liberate us from our moral prejudices by exposing and bringing to light: that our experience is ordered by evaluative templates; how one framework came to subdue other alternatives; why morality enjoyed its factual success; and why it still holds a very tight grip on us. The work of Chapter 5 is to substantiate these conclusions. I achieve this end by way of my reading of “the psychological type of the redeemer,” which shows the links between On the Genealogy of Morality and The Anti-Christ. After clarifying what the type is, I argue that, thus understood, it enables us to notice that Nietzsche uses genealogical methods beyond 1887 and to better appreciate the central roles that feelings of shame and powerlessness, as well as longings for efficacy, play in conceptual reevaluations. Although this reading does not represent a common interpretive strategy, I show that it is one that Nietzsche himself recommends.

In Chapter 4, I explore another way in which morality functions to serve psychological protective functions: the will to “self-tormenting” (GM II 22). By attending to this inwardly directed form of “self-ravishment” (GM II 18), I conceive of the protective, defensive functions of morality thus: To stave off, moderate, disavow, or dissociate a painful affect that is “becoming unendurable” – for instance, helplessness, impotence, “depression, heaviness, [or] weariness” – one turns to oneself as the “sole cause of [such] suffering” (GM III 20). Such self-recriminations thereby: (1) drive “out of consciousness at least for the moment” the painful feeling (GM III 17) and (2) restore a sense of efficacy, a sense of power (GM III 15). After distinguishing between two prominent ways in which such cruelty turned inward may be felt – namely, through guilt and shame – I argue it is shame that plays an underdeveloped and underappreciated role in the Second Essay. In this evaluative framework, our shame, that familiar form of self-reproach, is shown to serve psychological protective functions as it renders us ever more obscure to ourselves.

In Chapter 6, I zero in on one of Nietzsche’s “granite sentences” (EH “The Gay Science”) – “What is the seal of having become free? – No longer to be ashamed before oneself” (GS 275) – to demonstrate that Nietzsche’s genealogical investigations offer one possible pathway to such liberation; to freedom, that is, from the shame we feel when in front of ourselves.

Genealogical inquiries – most broadly – give us an account of why we have become self-estranged, so far from being at home with ourselves, so that we might yet become more self-aware. For this reason, as I show in this Introduction, genealogical investigations hold out a distinctive promise: to bring into reflective awareness the systems that organize our subjective experiences but do not even threaten to cross “the threshold of consciousness,” as Nietzsche puts it (GM I 1). I then set out the main claims of the book: Nietzsche’s genealogical work aims to render us less obscure to ourselves, to liberate us from those value systems that no longer serve our interests, and to show us how we might come to feel differently about ourselves, even less prone to shame. How is this to be achieved? This book provides an answer to that question.

In this chapter, I argue that a comprehensive picture of Platonic autonomy must be balanced by attention to mutual interdependence and the ways that ideas arise through interpersonal dialogue. Philosophical ideas arise in a social context, and to this degree, even ideas that are now ‘my own’ have come to be mine in part through the reasoning of other persons. Moreover, as a result of human fallibility, even the fully developed Platonic philosopher still requires conversational partners to both learn and to test out ideas. Rather than overvaluing self-sufficiency, a philosophical life includes being open to challenges to one’s ideas, tolerating a state of not knowing fully, and learning that one needs others due to the limits of individual reasoners.

The emerging awareness of self and other, especially with regard to compatible and conflicting aims, opens up dramatic new meanings for the toddler. Being able to be deliberately contrary gives the child experience with disruption and repair of the relationship and lets them explore the boundaries of appropriate behavior. The toddler also has a beginning capacity to control impulses and manage behavior, but doing this adequately requires continued scaffolding and guidance from parents. Meanings surrounding parental reliability brought forward from infancy impact how readily children now accept parental guidance. At the same time, clear, firm, and warm guidance can increase the child’s confidence regarding parents. This is how the transactional model works.

Describe how children develop fairness, spite, and helping behaviours; understand the role of emotions, punishment, and reputation in moral development; explore cross-cultural differences and similarities in morality.

In this chapter we examine the difficult problem of trying to offer help and support to a friend or loved one who has Hoarding Disorder. Many people with Hoarding Disorder are reluctant to admit that they have a problem. This may be due to shame and the stigma surrounding the condition, or may be due to a lack of insight as the individual has become so accustomed to this way of living and denies there is a problem. Family members and friends need to be empathetic, patient, and tolerant. Constant nagging is likely to increase resistance and so it is a difficult path between urging them to get help but not causing them to feel persecuted and to cut ties with those trying to help them. If their own health and safety, or that of others is at risk, then we suggest ways in which you can ensure they receive the help they need. At the end of this chapter, we list some of the agencies that can offer help and advice for family, friends, and people living with hoarding problems. While helping a person with hoarding it is imperative you also consider your own health and safety as well as that of the person with hoarding.

The story in Genesis 38 about the salvation of the line of Judah by Tamar inspires the Widow and the Unjust Judge parable. The widow in the parable evokes the oppression experienced by the widow Tamar, who was the victim of Judah’s failure as head of family to implement the levirate duty to reestablish her dead husband’s estate. The Pharisee and the Tax Collector parable depicts a Pharisee extolling his own virtue who would not be “acquitted of his sins,” and a tax collector who berates himself for his sinfulness who would “be exalted.” In the background is Judah’s acknowledgment that Tamar had been more righteous than he because he had not compelled his son Shelah to fulfill the levirate requirement, a neglect that, in turn, prompted her to prostitute herself with Judah to attain a much desired child.

This chapter of the handbook asks whether, and in what ways, emotions can be designated as “moral”. Several emotions have been shown to be associated with moral judgments or moral behaviors. But more than association must be shown if we label some emotions characteristically moral. The author guides the reader through a voluminous literature and applies two criteria to test the moral credentials of emotions. The first criterion is whether the emotion is significantly elicited by moral stimuli; the second is whether it has significant community-benefiting consequences. This second criterion, less often used in past analyses, tries to capture the fact that moral norms, judgments, and decisions are all intended to benefit the community, so moral emotions should too. From this analysis, the author concludes that anger clearly meets the criteria, contempt and disgust less so. Guilt passes easily, and shame fares better than some may expect. Among the positive candidates, compassion and empathy both meet the criteria but are somewhat difficult to separate. Finally, elevation and awe have numerous prosocial consequences, but awe is rarely triggered by moral stimuli.

This chapter begins with a discussion of Avishai Margalit’s misrecognition-based theory of political humiliation. For Margalit, humiliation is primarily understood as the culpable denial of self-respect. Margalit notes that political humiliation usually takes one of three forms – removing people from the human community (as when we liken them to animals), the negation of control (as in torture), and ignoring or looking through others. After providing an account of this theory, we argue that Margalit does not sufficiently consider the contagious nature of political humiliation nor the possibility that the feeling might be present even when recognition is offered or, conversely, that we might be humiliated even by those whose recognition we don’t want. We also look at the conceptual differences between humiliation, shame, and embarrassment. We note that despite these clear differences the way these emotions are experienced sometimes feels similar. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of the effect of technology and, in particular, social media on the character of contemporary political humiliations.

I went back to work in the hospital in Edinburgh, as my previous employers could not give me part-time work. Experience as a psychiatric trainee in this hospital was hard. Passed MRCPsych Part 2.

Around 30% of women worldwide have been subjected to either physical or sexual intimate partner violence (IPV) in their lifetimes. In Europe, one in 20 women over the age of 15 has been raped. Meanwhile gross misogyny and sexual violence against women is becoming more normalised in society. When women have been victims of physical, sexual violence, emotional abuse or coercive control the impact on their mental health can be severe.The sense of shame can be overwhelming. Mental health problems are not an inevitable consequence of IPV but anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, self-harm, substance misuse and getting a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder (BPD) are all more common. Domestic violence can also result in suicide and is linked to murder-suicide and ‘honour’ killing. However, women who have killed abusive men have been repeatedly denied justice. Mental health services need training about IPV and sexual violence and to make strong links with organisations in the community. Each of us needs to ensure that we would know what we would do to help a friend, family member or colleague who is experiencing domestic violence or sexual assault.