This chapter analyses the international science collaboration between scientists in Chulalongkorn University (CU) in Bangkok and scientists and managers from Kawasaki Heavy Industry (KHI), Japan. The Chapter argues, first, that the integrity of national regulations is violated through international science collaborations, including by the governments whose regulations are violated. As there is no credible regulatory mandate on a global level, such violations receive little attention. Second, in contrast with notions of science collaboration that view collaboration as a bond between two or more partners to attain a shared goal by pooling resources, the chapter’s examination of the collaborative project shows that its goals are shared in different, often incompatible ways. And, third, observing how regulation in international science collaboration is treated as a form of ‘regulatory capital’, the chapter argues that international collaboration and competition form part of the same process. This study of regulatory capital explains why the examination of science collaborations does not just pertain to exchanges of scientific know-how and technological expertise; it also requires the investigation of the ways in which socio-economic, political and regulatory conditions enable available resources to be used to satisfy a range of goals, many of which are mutually incompatible.

This chapter considers the following two questions about the future of freezing injunctions. First, what changes should be made to the jurisdictional preconditions of freezing injunctions in order to effectively fulfil the international function of the rules of jurisdiction? Second, by what means and on what basis should we allocate regulatory authority in this field? A ‘bold proposal’ for an international agreement is considered. While that would be the ideal solution in this field, some modest solutions are then proposed. Modest solutions rely on the implementation of changes only at the domestic level. The counter-arguments to the proposals based on functional theories of jurisdiction are also considered. The functional theories are heavily dependent on the principle of territoriality. The role of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is discussed in the context of modest proposals.

The international community realizes the possible benefits and contributions of mediation as a means of settling international investment disputes, most notably, its unique trait to deal with sensitive claims relating to national regulatory authority.Discussions to introduce and facilitate mediation in addition to or in lieu of present ISDS proceedings are taking place in various fora at the moment including UNCITRAL and ICSID.These discussions are not intended to replace the ISDS regime with a non-binding mechanism. Rather, the purpose is to supplement the existing system with the addition of a new avenue, where the disputing parties can pursue an amicable resolution. The focal point in the current discussions is how to introduce mediation into international investment agreements in a more structured and systematized manner.Various experiments are being undertaken at the moment.Traditionally, Asian countries have been regarded as being more receptive of the harmonious resolution of disputes and less litigious in settling disputes. This traditional legal culture stands in line with the recent focus on mediation as a means of settling international disputes and, in particular, international investment disputes. Mediation is one of the ISDS reform subjects where Asian countries can contribute their experience and legal culture.