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Why are populist radical-right party activists intensely motivated to become involved in their party? These activists combine disaffection with politics, anxiety and the emotion dynamic known as ressentiment on the one hand, with high-intensity, low-reward political activism and a sense of long-term political efficacy on the other hand. This article contributes to a better understanding of the expressive, emotional and identity-based incentives behind party activism. It proposes a Spiral of Ressentiment model. In this model, individuals’ complex emotions of ressentiment are transformed into collective ressentiment through relationships within the party. The party relieves this ressentiment by providing a sense of belonging and hope for the future, but party messages and stigmatization then reignite ressentimentful feelings. This study uncovers the feedback loop through which populist radical-right parties both alleviate and encourage ressentiment emotions by analysing 50 in-depth interviews with Vlaams Belang local activists and party representatives.
Radical right behavior and support for radical right parties have increased across many countries in recent decades. A growing body of research has argued that, similar to the spread of other extremist behaviors, this is due to an erosion of political norms. This suggests that re-stigmatizing radical right parties might be an effective way of countering their growth. We use a survey experiment in Spain that compares the effectiveness of three theory-driven interventions aimed at increasing political stigma against a radical right party. Contrary to expectations, we fail to validate the efficacy of vignette-based attempts at stigmatization, instead identifying some backlash effects. Methodologically, our findings underscore the importance of validating treatments, as we show that simple attempts at re-stigmatization can produce null or opposing effects to their intended purpose. Theoretically, our results support the idea that normalization is a “one-way street,” in that re-stigmatizing parties is difficult after a party has become normalized.
This article contributes to the ongoing debate on reactionary internationalism by linking it with scholarly discussions on civilisation and civilisationism, which have mostly been running in parallel trajectories. By doing so, it attempts to address the question of how the radical right, rooted in numerous particularisms, such as cultural, national, and religious, has managed to foster a global movement with an internationalist ideology that poses a significant challenge to the liberal international order. Through an analysis of the relevant literature and a case study of the Serbian radical right, this article tries to elucidate this question and bridge the gap between the two debates by demonstrating that civilisationism forms the core of reactionary internationalism, unifying the radical right from the West to the East. This article examines the Serbian case and its history of civilisational and geopolitical reactions as a possible paradigm for the contemporary radical right in general. Furthermore, it explores the role of Russian revisionism and war in Ukraine in shaping this civilisational discourse, specifically considering the narratives built around the Serbian foreign fighters’ network in Ukraine. An additional contribution of this article is that it provides a non-Western perspective on civilisation, religion, and nationalism.
Contemporary research on far-right politics has relied predominantly on the use of binaries between the ‘far/extreme/(populist) radical right’ and the so-called ‘mainstream’, and a ‘waves’ metaphor to historicise different eras of the post-World War Two far-right. In this article, we probe these categories and binaries, problematising hegemonic depictions, the consequent assumptions underpinning them, and what this means for resistance to reactionary politics. By reflecting on the current state of the field, summarising dominant approaches and their potential limitations, we arrive at our key contribution: a revised definition of the term ‘far right’ which shifts the focus away from categorisation towards an understanding of far-right politics as a political position. In turn, our approach also presents both a challenge to and evolution of the ‘waves’ metaphor which accounts for processes of mainstreaming and rests on a critical account of the mainstream itself. Our conceptualisation problematises traditional binaries while pointing to a ‘fifth wave’ of far-right politics in which the identities of the mainstream and far right are mutually constitutive. To illustrate our conceptual contribution, we conclude our article with a case study on the interaction between the far right and mainstream in UK politics.
In recent decades, Latin America has experienced a resurgence of the political right after the “left turn” of the 2000s. The introduction argues that right-wing parties have adapted to social and political changes by emphasizing cultural issues, mobilizing voters along salient political cleavages, and crafting distinctive party platforms and political identities. It also introduces a typology of right-wing parties and movements that captures the diversity of the post-2000 Latin American right in both ideological and organizational terms. Looking at the demand side, the introduction sets the stage for our analysis of the changes and continuities in the attitudes of Latin American electorates. On the supply side, the introduction sets the groundwork for mapping the programmatic features that distinguish the post-2000 political right from right-wing parties created in previous eras. Finally, the introduction presents an outline of the book and summarizes its main findings.
There has been much scholarly attention for the radical right, especially in political science. Unfortunately, this research pays less attention to the discourse of the radical right, a topic especially studied by scholars in discourse studies. Especially lacking in this research in various disciplines is a theoretically based analysis of ideology. This Element first summarizes the authors theory of ideology and extends it with a new element needed to account for the ideological clusters of political parties. Then a systematic analysis is presented of the discourses and ideologies of radical right parties in Chile, Spain, the Netherlands and Sweden. From a comparative perspective it is concluded that radical right discourse and ideologies adapt to the economic, cultural, sociopolitical and historical contexts of each country.
This book analyzes the transformation of the political right in Latin America in response to the strengthening of left-wing parties and movements throughout the region. While Latin America's post-2000 left has been widely studied, little is known about right-wing political formations during and after that time. There is a paucity of research on recent phenomena associated with the reorganization of the Right: the polarization of Latin American electorates and elites; the rebranding of pre-existing conservative parties; the creation of new right-wing parties; and the rise of the radical right. This volume provides a comprehensive account of the strategies used by the political right since 2000. It analyzes both the supply side (parties, movements, and personalist vehicles) and the demand side (voters and public opinion) to provide a description and explanation of how the right has recast itself as a new political force across the entire region of Latin America.
Whether a topic is seen in a moral or moral-emotional light has significant political implications. Yet, we lack knowledge about the process of moralization: Who defines the way topics are communicated about? Where prior research has investigated the relative power of different actors to place a topic on the agenda or shape opinions, we study who sets the moral and moral-emotional tone of debate. To do so, we zoom in on immigration discourse in Germany and analyze fine-grained social media data from politicians, political parties, newspapers, and members of the public over a period of more than four years. After employing a transformer model to identify moral and moral-emotional appeals, we use structural vector autoregression models to demonstrate the important role of radical-right challengers in shaping public discourse in a negative moral-emotional direction. The results inform theories of moralization and political entrepreneurship.
The introductory chapter argues that the near universal rise of the radical Right is more than a series of national coincidences and that despite differences in their ideas and policies, a globally connected Right is emerging. One indication of this is the emergence of global networks and events such as the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), the NatCon Conferences, and the Madrid Forum. However, the globality of today’s radical Right goes beyond mere transnational networks, and requires a wider rethinking of its relationship to the global in two ways. First, the radical Right is constituted by transnational interactions operating at multiple scales. Second, it defines itself and is co-constituted by its relation to the global, not just to the national. The chapter also discusses the vexed issue of defining the Right and the difficulties of studying the Right.
Democracies generate norms prescribing what behaviours and preferences are deemed acceptable. But what keeps these political norms in place? We expect that they are enforced by observers who disapprove of norm-breaching behaviour and are willing to apply sanctions that make it socially costly. We test this expectation with a survey in Spain, where respondents were shown pictures of individuals with different political views. We focus on norms against radical-right preferences, one of the most established political norms. In line with our expectations, individuals disapprove of radical-right preferences more than other political preferences. This makes them more likely to socially sanction those preferences, which they do mainly in indirect ways that do not force interaction with the person breaching the norm. We provide evidence on the individual-level predictors of norm enforcement. Our findings highlight the micro-level mechanisms by which social influence affects the behaviour of democratic citizens.
This chapter examines how the refugee crisis was framed and portrayed by right-wing actors. Its main puzzle is how the initially sentimental, humanitarian approach to the coverage of the refugee crisis was gradually transformed to present refugees as an existential threat to European societies. We track the frames and themes utilized by mainstream and radical right parties in their official speeches, documenting that utilizing a framework focusing on security and identity, they slowly managed to shift the perceptions on immigrants arriving at European shores. Furthermore, their rhetoric aimed at actively downplaying the humanitarian element, claiming instead that the search and rescue operations had perverse effects, motivating immigrants to make the crossings into the EU and worsening the refugee crisis. Therefore, in Hirschman’s terms, a rhetoric of jeopardy and perversity dominated the right's reaction to the refugee crisis, slowly eroding sympathy toward migrants.
This chapter studies the dynamics of elite support, which varies considerably across time. This temporal fluctuations are explained by three different sets of variables: the changing political and problem pressure that governments face, the contextual characteristics that may moderate this relationship, and the endogenous dynamics unfolding between different elite groups. Far from the elite closing ranks behind government proposals as the “rally-around-the-flag” perspective may suggest, nongovernment elites rather use the strategic opportunity offered by mounting problem pressure to articulate opposition to these proposals and signal distance from governments as a result. This dynamic is mostly confined to destination and transit states, and it is more prominent during debates on border controls and in the early phase of the crisis. By contrast, the impact of political pressure is largely in line with our expectations: In response to the growing strength of the radical right, the elite steps up dissent, with the strongest effect found, again, in destination states. In addition to responding to external pressure, elite groups were also shown to engage in strategic behavior with respect to each other.
Across advanced industrialized democracies, the political centre is collapsing as politicians on the far right and far left enjoy increasing electoral success. Recent research links import shocks to voter support for far-right parties. However, we know comparatively less about how these shocks impact individual legislator ideology, especially that of mainstream politicians. Do import shocks drive economic or cultural ideological shifts among mainstream legislators? If so, to what extent do local competitive contexts shape these shifts? Using a dataset of French Senate roll call votes, we find that localized increases in import exposure moves elite ideology to the left economically; this is magnified in departments with majoritarian electoral systems. We show that legislators shift their cultural positions in response to import shocks, but only when faced with extremist political competitors focused on cultural issues. Our results suggest the value of attending to how political and economic geography intersect to shape elite policy positions.
The entry of populist radical right parties into positions of power has generated anxious debate regarding the potential consequences for liberal democracy. Their activities in local government, however, have been largely overlooked. This comparative analysis of populist radical right-led local governments in Western Europe makes an important contribution to a crowded field through the study of so far uncharted terrain. Comparing cases in Austria, France, Italy and Switzerland, Fred Paxton details the extent of ideological impact in local politics and the various restraints that are placed on their radicalism. Drawing from a wealth of new data, he explains the varying degree of radicalism with recourse to two principal factors: the constraints of the local government institutional setting and the national party leaders' strategies towards the local arena. This book broadens our understanding of populist radical right parties in Western Europe and the sub-national processes through which they are developing.
This chapter analyses the policies of populist radical right party-led local governments in Austria, France, Italy and Switzerland. It assesses the extent to which their party ideology is evident. The analysis concerns three forms of policy: policy agendas, budgetary spending and policy designs. Each enables a different form of comparison to be made, through which the impact made by the parties and its cross-national variation is assessed. First, analysis of agendas reveals their policy priorities once elected into local government. These are compared with mainstream parties in similar contexts. Second, analysis of budgets shows the extent to which these priorities were realized in the form of spending. Comparison here is made with the preceding mainstream party-led local government in the same context. Third, analysis of their policies’ framing of target populations, policy tools and policy rationales demonstrates the varying extent to which they generate social constructions that align with party ideology. The leadership of local government by populist radical right parties in Western Europe is shown to lead to contrasting degrees and forms of policy impact.
This chapter provides an explanation for the different approaches to local government taken by populist radical right parties in Austria, France, Italy and Switzerland, and their different degree of radicalism. It conducts a systematic exploration of the process by which these parties govern at the local level. The empirical basis for this analysis is interviews with 57 local government actors, semi-structured in order to investigate the two overarching themes that are theoretically expected to influence their approaches to governing. The chapter unveils the mechanisms through which moderation is imposed (or radicalism is facilitated) by, first, various institutional constraints, and, second, cross-level party linkages. As a final step, it reconstructs the process by which each populist radical right-led local government responded to the European migration crisis during the 2010s. The institutional constraints and cross-level party linkages particular to each of the four cases can explain the varied (multi-level) governance configurations that emerge, and as a result the varying degree of radicalism in their approach.
Integration into the democratic system may induce the moderation of radical parties. This chapter assesses the extent of mainstreaming of populist radical right parties that follows their entry into local power. It does so through analysis of their discourse before and after attaining the leadership of the local government and considers four dimensions of mainstreaming. First, programmatic expansion and the relative salience of issues outside of their ideological core. Second, de-radicalization, in terms of the positioning towards and framing of the issue of immigration. Third, a softening of anti-establishment discourse and behaviour, considering both conflicts with other political actors and institutional reforms. And fourth, the self-presentation as normal and responsible, as opposed to a prior reputation for extremism and/or incompetence. To analyse changes across these dimensions, it draws from a range of data sources: council meetings, Facebook posts and newspaper articles. The chapter reveals cross-national differences in the extent of mainstreaming and suggests that institutional and party-strategic differences are crucial determinants of the extent and form of such change.
This chapter provides the theoretical underpinnings for an analysis of the impact made by populist radical right parties in local government. This theoretical framework is grounded not just in theories particular to the party family, but also ones more general to the analysis of party politics and institutions. Four main questions are addressed. First, regarding the policy goals of the populist radical right: what do they want? Second, regarding partisan influence over government policy, do parties matter – even in local government? Third, regarding the mainstreaming of the populist radical right, are they tamed by power? And fourth, regarding the strategic uses of local government made by parties, are such localities laboratories of radicalism? Before the subsequent chapters analyse the different routes taken by populist radical right-led local governments in Western Europe, this chapter provides several explicit expectations for how their impact is likely to vary cross-nationally according to two main factors: institutional constraints and central party strategies.
This concluding chapter discusses the findings of the study and its contributions to the analysis of populist radical right parties and their impact on (local) government. It goes into further depth regarding the novel perspectives it offers regarding the study of three topics in particular: the policies of populist radical right parties in government, party politics at the local level of government and the threat to liberal democracy from populist radical right parties, as well as the restraints imposed upon them at the local level of government that mitigate such a threat.
The entry of populist radical right parties into positions of power has generated anxieties regarding the potential consequences for liberal democracy. Yet while these parties have also gained control of local governments, activities at that level have been largely overlooked. This longstanding neglect is surprising when we consider the development of populist radical right parties in Western Europe, which has been a provincial phenomenon from the beginning. Prior to their breakthrough on the national stage, crucial strategic innovations and electoral successes took place at the local level of politics. This chapter introduces the topic of populist radical right parties in local politics and positions the book in existing debates on their impact on government and strategies for governing. It provides a clear conceptualization of impact, in both indirect and direct forms, and summarizes the various strategies that they have pursued in government. It then outlines the various forms of populist radical right-led local government, distinguished by the radicalism of their impact and the involvement of the central party. The chapter ends by presenting a plan for the chapters to follow.