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This chapter analyzes the popular dimensions of Egypt’s 2013 counterrevolution, using an original dataset of protests during the post-revolutionary transition. It shows that Egypt’s revolutionaries were unable to consolidate the social support of the revolution, and that this failure allowed counterrevolutionaries to channel broad disaffections with revolutionary rule into a popular movement for restoration. The dataset covers the final eighteen months of the transition and includes approximately 7,500 contentious events sourced from the major Arabic-language newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm. These data reveal, first, the extent to which social mobilization persisted after the end of the eighteen-day uprising. The transition period was awash with discontent and unrest, much of it over nonpolitical issues like the deterioration of the economy, infrastructure problems, and unmet labor demands. Second, statistical analyses show that this discontent came to be directed against Mohamed Morsi’s government. The earliest and most persistent anti-Morsi protests emerged in places where the population had long been highly mobilized over socio-economic grievances. Later, they also began to emerge in places with large numbers of old regime supporters. Ultimately, these two groups – discontented Egyptians and committed counterrevolutionaries – came together to provide the social base for the movement that swept the military back to power.
There is a long history of forest activism in Finland, including both contentious protest like blockades and more conventional actions like negotiation. There is a new generation of activists stemming from Extinction Rebellion and other environmental groups, who have extended occupations beyond logging sites to company headquarters and pulp mill entrances. This chapter focuses on this latest generation of resistance and the ways those involved have approached forestry activism in Finland. The protests against state-sponsored logging in different parts of Finland are used as examples to unpack the current contentious politics of forests and especially the sentiments of these rising youth activists. The overall actions of several Finnish forest movements since the 1980s have contributed to more and more people starting to defend forests, questioning the forest industry’s story that clearcutting is a sustainable way to interact with the forest. This chapter is based on extensive interviews with experts and activists and the author’s lived experiences and many years of ethnography in Finnish forests, especially in the most heavily logged forestry frontiers in the southeastern part of the country.
The second political service provided by firms is to supplement the state’s societal control efforts. When public grievances arise over a project, infrastructure, or plant, the state may politicize the associated firms by demanding their assistance in managing social unrest. Firms play two distinct roles in societal control: serving as allies when the state employs suppression strategies against protesters or acting as scapegoats when the state opts for appeasement strategies.
Private firms are more suited to serve as scapegoats, while SOEs, particularly large and powerful ones, are stronger allies. This distinction arises from differences based on ownership and extent of political capital available to firms. Private firms typically have narrower and more limited sources of political capital than SOEs. In sectors where protests become increasingly frequent and intense, suppression strategies often replace appeasement, leading to a decline in the standing of private firms as large SOEs gain dominance.
Using comparative case studies, process tracing, and in-depth interviews, this chapter builds on Chapter 6 to examine the mechanisms connecting protests, societal control strategies, and outcomes for firms in the solid waste treatment sector. Process tracing is first applied to Wuxi, a city with multiple incineration plants, to illustrate how escalating protests gradually shifted the city government’s strategy from appeasement to suppression. This shift in strategy made private firms less effective in providing societal control services, leading to the transfer of the city’s incineration plants into the hands of SOEs.
Next, a most-similar case study compares an incineration plant in Wuxi with another in Qinhuangdao, highlighting how differences in political capital, linked to firm ownership, influence the outcomes of societal control efforts. The weaker political capital of private firms means they are less equipped to assist local governments during protests, making them less favorable. This comparison sheds light on how Chinese local governments perceive protests and firms, explaining why SOEs increasingly dominate a sector as protests within it become more frequent and intense.
Why do some revolutions fail and succumb to counterrevolutions, whereas others go on to establish durable rule? Marshalling original data on counterrevolutions worldwide since 1900 and new evidence from the reversal of Egypt's 2011 revolution, Killian Clarke explains both why counterrevolutions emerge and when they are likely to succeed. He forwards a movement-centric argument that emphasizes the strategies revolutionary leaders embrace both during their opposition campaigns and after they seize power. Movements that wage violent resistance and espouse radical ideologies establish regimes that are very difficult to overthrow. By contrast, democratic revolutions like Egypt's are more vulnerable, though Clarke also identifies a path by which they too can avoid counterrevolution. By preserving their elite coalitions and broad popular support, these movements can return to mass mobilization to thwart counterrevolutionary threats. In an era of resurgent authoritarianism worldwide, Return of Tyranny sheds light on one particularly violent form of reactionary politics.
This chapter uses the short but toxic ownership tenure of American businessmen Tom Hicks and George Gillett (2007-10) as a window onto the tensions between activism and commercialism, and between the local and the international, at LFC in the twenty-first century. Drawing on testimony from members of the supporters’ union Spirit of Shankly, Chapter 13 analyses the power, and the limits, of fan protest in ‘the age of football’.
This chapter provides a political and cultural history of the Hillsborough disaster, focusing on its role in both the ostracising and rebirth of the city of Liverpool. Much has been written about the causes of Hillsborough, and the cover-ups and miscarriages of justice that ensued. Chapter 10 focuses on the disaster’s local and international impact on the LFC fan base, for whom it became the touchstone of club loyalty and anti-establishment identity.
The last chapter offers a comparison of protest movements in the territories: some appeared to be less politically motivated and more concerned with land rights and economic grievances; other movements, such as the march in 1949 in the BVI, openly called for greater political rights and autonomy. Yet, none of the campaigns by local pro-autonomy activists managed to achieve widespread public support or electoral success. This final chapter assesses local independence groups and their political discourse. It explores their interactions with the local population, existing political structures, and regional anticolonial movements. It is inaccurate to suggest that the non-sovereign status of these territories was a result of a lack of popular protest or a total absence of nationalism. Rather, through the relationship between popular protest movements, local politics, clandestine independence activists and the response of the colonial state, no widespread call for independence emerged.
Extensive research showcases that authoritarian propaganda can cultivate support and deter protest during “normal” times. This study examines authoritarian propaganda’s efficacy during crises and policy changes when the regime needs it most. We posit that various propaganda strategies, including “hard” and “soft” rhetoric, have significant limitations during crises. Hard propaganda’s heavy-handed slogans could signal regime strength but may also legitimize “rightful resistance” against local authorities, limiting its protest-deterrence effects. Soft propaganda may lose persuasiveness due to presenting contradictory arguments during policy changes. We leverage the turbulent period of China’s COVID policy reversal to conduct an original survey experiment in December 2022. Our findings reveal that pro-reopening hard propaganda weakens its protest-deterrence effects by reinforcing belief in protest righteousness. Moreover, inconsistent soft propaganda lowers public evaluations of China’s COVID response, diminishing its persuasive effects. Our study highlights significant limitations of authoritarian propaganda during crises and policy changes.
This chapter discusses the stances of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox Churches towards the increasing persecution of Jews and other targeted groups (such as disabled people or Roma), the splits within some of these hierarchies and between hierarchies (including the Vatican), and grassroots reactions.
Abstract: Anne attended medical school at Johns Hopkins University. She met Jack, a member of her cohort who caught her attention – notable for having smelly feet and being politically outspoken yet shy and quiet in most other circumstances. A friendship ensued between them. Together, they caught the solar eclipse and attended Vietnam War protests, eager for the possibility of applying their medical student skills to help injured protesters. Anne faced difficulties as a woman among a male majority in the medical field. Despite this challenge, she had notable female role models. Jack stood Anne up to watch the Kentucky Derby. Later, they fell in love. Anne met Solomon Snyder, known as Sol, and joined his lab for the summer. Anne visited Jack’s family’s farm in New Hampshire. Her work in the medical lab pertained to neurotransmitters and whether amino acids qualified. Invigorated by the summer’s work in Sol’s lab, Anne asked if she could pursue her PhD in his laboratory in the Department of Pharmacology. She used her charm, determination and credentials to gain approval from deans and faculty.
This chapter traces social medicine to Shibli Shumayyil, a medical doctor and key figure of the Nahḍa, an intellectual and cultural movement that spanned from the late nineteenth century to the outbreak of the First World War. He envisioned social medicine as a tool for social reform, diagnosing its social ills, and proposing a cure. Shumayyil and his successors rejected the colonial justification of social medicine, instead promoting social medicine as a means to free people from all kinds of oppression, ignorance, and injustice. Throughout the twentieth century until today, as poverty, authoritarianism, and social conflicts escalated in the Arab world, doctors increasingly became advocates for the marginalized, the poor, and the oppressed. The chapter examines the work of several revolutionary doctors in Tunisia, Sudan, and Egypt, who used their practice as a form of protest, praxis, and critique. Not only did these doctors embody the meaning that Guérin originally gave to social medicine but they also incorporated Shumayyil’s idea of medicine as a form of progressive clinical sociology.
This study examines the influence of mass obstruction tactics within the new climate movement on public support for activists and their goals. Using a survey experiment that manipulates different protest scenarios, we analyze the impact of obstructive protests with and without vigilante intervention on public opinion. Our results suggest that while obstructive tactics are perceived negatively by the public, they do not significantly affect support for climate activists’ goals. Vigilante repression does not moderate reactions to radical protests. The study highlights the complexity of using radical tactics in social movements and the challenges activists face in building coalitions and sustaining mobilization efforts.
This Article analyzes the role played by international actors, indigenous peoples, and independent lawyers as guardians of democracy in a context where democratic backsliding, abusive judicial review, and institutional takeover has taken place. Using the Guatemalan 2023 electoral process as a case study, this Article sheds new light on authoritarian constitutional practices, evidenced through the judgments of the Guatemalan Constitutional Court and activities of its Criminal Prosecutor’s Office. This Article also considers how foreign governments, international organizations, indigenous peoples, and independent lawyers came to play a guardianship role in the face of the decline of core institutions of constitutional democracy. Techniques such as transnational sanctions, judicial challenges, diplomatic “shaming,” and protest movements were successful in upholding constitutional democracy by discouraging attempts by the courts and government officials to derail the transition of power and annul the electoral results. This Article analyzes how and why these techniques had an impact in the Guatemalan context and extracts lessons and insights, both positive and negative, for dealing with abusive constitutional practices in theory and in practice.
This chapter explores the possibilities and dilemmas that civil society actors face in resisting and reversing democratic backsliding through examples from around the world. It examines the conditions that shape civil society activism under backsliding and the roles it has played in containing or reversing autocratization. As it shows, in a number of cases civil society resistance has been critical in restraining and reversing backsliding. But it has been better able to counter backsliding when popular support for the backsliding leader has eroded and the opposition is able to work through institutions rather than having to work against them. As backsliding proceeds, institutional channels for influence deteriorate. As a result, there is a critical window during which civil society resistance stands a better chance of containing backsliding: before electoral processes and institutional constraints on executives are fully captured. Once capture occurs, civil society resistance moves to the much more dangerous and difficult task of confronting rather than preventing dictatorship.
The September 11, 1973 coup that overthrew Salvador Allende’s Unidad Popular government signaled the end of a radical political experiment, a “democratic road to socialism.” In its 1,000 days in power, Allende’s coalition state instituted a series of substantial political and economic changes, including the socialization of industries, agrarian reform, and the redistribution of wealth and authority. Unidad Popular faced fierce challenges from an increasingly mobilized opposition, who mounted campaigns in congress and in public space that fomented a climate of crisis in which the military might intervene. It also faced pressures from its own supporters, who occupied factories, lands, and city spaces in an effort to convince the state to radicalize the pace of change. Ruthless military intervention sought to “turn back” the political gains of the twentieth century that had reached their apex under Allende, and the military regime headed by Augusto Pinochet turned again and again to state-sponsored terror to entrench a “foundational project” that couple political authoritarianism with a neoliberal economy.
A startling 13 young workers attempted or committed suicide at the two Foxconn production facilities in southern China between January and May 2010. We can interpret their acts as protest against a global labor regime that is widely practiced in China. Their defiant deaths demand that society reflect upon the costs of a state-promoted development model that sacrifices dignity for corporate profit in the name of economic growth. Chinese migrant labor conditions as articulated by the state, are shaped by these intertwined forces: First, leading international brands have adopted unethical purchasing practices, resulting in substandard conditions in their global electronics supply chains. Second, management has used abusive and illegal methods to raise worker efficiency, generating widespread grievances and resistance at the workplace level. Third, local Chinese officials in collusion with enterprise management, systematically neglect workers' rights, resulting in widespread misery and deepened social inequalities. The Foxconn human tragedy raises profound concerns about the working lives of the new generation of Chinese migrant workers. It also challenges the state-driven policy based on the use of internal rural migrant workers, whose labor and citizenship rights have been violated.
A victim is most obviously under the effective control of another where he or she has been formally deprived of liberty by the State and the perpetrator is a legal custodian. But a state of powerlessness may also arise in an extra-custodial law enforcement setting in certain circumstances. This chapter explores that dynamic, addressing the regulation of unlawful extra-custodial use of force by the police and other law enforcement officials, first as a manifestation of torture and then, in the more common alternative, as other proscribed ill-treatment.
By 1849 the kindergarten spread across the German Confederation as an alternative space of revolutionary politics and protest. I argue that the kindergarten worked alongside the barricade as a key location to protest traditional forms of state and religious authority and cultivate a new humanity that centered on women's gendered labor and children's education. For the founder of the kindergarten Friedrich Fröbel and his supporters, the classroom was a garden for the future in which educators and children alike could “perform utopia.” For female revolutionaries, the kindergarten provided a forum to make political claims in ways not open elsewhere. This article provides insight not only into the history of Central Europe in the Age of Revolutions, but also into the histories of emotions, gender, and education. I argue that historians should examine how ideas of “utopian hope” have been utilized in moments of upheaval to create new spaces of opposition.
On July 28, 2021, Okinawa Prefecture's governor authorised coral transplantation at the construction site of the controversial Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) in Henoko. Two days later, he revoked this authorisation. The coral have become a contested political issue, linked to the larger conflict between the Japanese government and Okinawa Prefecture. Diving into the waters of Ōura Bay and the history of the base issue, this article explores how Japanese authorities have ignored Okinawan protest, science, and the life of other species during the construction. This political strategy of ignorance aims at frustrating opposition and framing the FRF as inevitable.