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  • 11 - So Close and Yet So Far

  • from Part III - Reinach and Legal Concepts
  • Edited by Marietta Auer, Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory, Paul B. Miller, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, Henry E. Smith, Harvard Law School, Massachusetts, James Toomey, University of Iowa
  • Book:
    Reinach and the Foundations of Private Law
    Published online:
    20 July 2025
    Print publication:
    07 August 2025, pp 277-304
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  • Summary

    The chapter compares the two remarkably similar and yet importantly different theories of promises, developed by Adolf Reinach and Margaret Gilbert, respectively. Margaret Gilbert claims that promises can be explained in terms of joint commitments borne by the promisor and the promisee to the decision that the promisor will φ. On this view, the promisor’s obligation and the promisee’s claim are grounded in the commitment they have jointly entered. By contrast, Adolf Reinach submits that promises do not have substantial explanation and that they generate promissory obligation and claim in virtue of their nature. By using insights from Reinach’s theory, this paper argues that Gilbert’s account of promises is to be rejected and suggests abandoning the idea that progress in our understanding of promises requires submitting them to substantial explanations.