In recent years, scholars argue that, although the principle of fair play is able to establish obligations to reciprocate for benefits received, these do not include political obligations. They contend that recipients themselves should be able to determine the form their recompense takes. I examine different cases of benefit provision and identify instances in which the principle of fair play does not allow such discretion. An important consideration is epistemic difficulties that can be avoided only if citizens accept the judgment of law and follow it. In familiar political obligation cases, disagreements about benefits and burdens should be resolved by democratic procedures. Following decisions arrived at is necessary to avoid problems of two kinds: moral, making sure burdens of cooperation are distributed in ways that are fair to all participants; and empirical/sociological, making sure important benefits are provided.

Organizations have neither a right to vote nor a right to life. But we can owe them to keep our promises or show them gratitude. So we owe some things to organizations, but not everything we owe to people. What explains this? Individualistic views explain it just in terms of features of organizations’ individual members. Collectivistic views explain it just in terms of features of those organizations. Neither view works. Instead, we need to synthesize these approaches. Some individual interests are distinctively collective. Individuals have an interest in participating in successful collective action. This explains organizations’ apparently fragmented moral status.