The first chapter explores the background to the 1600 Charter setting out the conditions for the establishment of the East India Company. Here I am interested in the rights of acquisition inherited from the exploratory age of the Tudor state rather than the more familiar story of its formal constitution. The language of charters granted to trading companies revealed something of the discursive complexity shaped by European powers striving to legitimize claims to overseas territory. England had few jurists of note and so the state drew partially and selectively on Roman and common law to foreground the precept of possession, not least because it conveniently rendered obsolete all challenges to the means of acquisition. The chartered companies of unprecedented size, capital and ambition which rose to power in the second half of the sixteenth century inherited this repertoire of legal pluralism but found in practice that the quest for conquest of overseas territory was compromised by geography and the existence of rival European powers with similar ambitions.

This chapter explores the terms of letters patent for early colonies, particularly in their economic dimensions. It shows the textual basis for colonial autonomy in these patents as grants from the crown. In particular, patents granted long-term control of colonies to private actors, protected their control over colonial economic operations, and obliged minimal sharing of their economic output with the crown. The chapter presents the theory of contractual imperialism to explain why these contract terms solved an important incentive problem: To induce colonial agents to identify profitable resource endowments, despite great cost and risk, and to exploit them fully.