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2 results

Knowledge-First Epistemology

Knowledge-First Epistemology
  • A Defence
  • Mona Simion
  • Published online:
    20 March 2025
    Print publication:
    27 March 2025
    • Element
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      • Open access
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  • Knowledge-first epistemology places knowledge at the normative core of epistemological affairs: on this approach, central epistemic phenomena are to be analyzed in terms of knowledge. This Element offers a defence of an integrated, naturalistic knowledge-first account of justified belief, reasons, evidence and defeat, permissible assertion and action, and the epistemic normativity of practical and theoretical reasoning. On this account, the epistemic is an independent normative domain organized around one central etiological epistemic function: generating knowledge. In turn, this epistemic function generates epistemic norms of proper functioning that constitute the epistemic domain, and govern moves in our epistemic practice, such as forming beliefs, asserting, and reasoning. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

  • Chapter 4 - Explaining Knowledge from Non-Knowledge

  • Federico Luzzi, University of Aberdeen
  • Book:
    Knowledge from Non-Knowledge
    Published online:
    26 July 2019
    Print publication:
    01 August 2019, pp 85-120

  • Summary

    In this chapter challenge cases to Knowledge Counter-Closure discussed so far are distinguished from cases of transmission failure and easy knowledge. I explain how these challenge cases work and argue that Knowledge Counter-Closure can be replaced by a plausible principle phrased in terms of justification, rather than knowledge. I then discuss Murphy's claim that inferential knowledge can arise from unjustified belief and from non-belief. I close the chapter by showing that rejecting Knowledge Counter-Closure avoids substantial costs.