This bibliography collects sources on the independence and accountability of judges serving on international tribunals and domestic apex courts by focusing on selection, terms of service, and discipline and removal. It includes books, book chapters, and articles, primarily in English, with reference to some French-, German-, and Spanish-language materials. The ensuing text also discusses some logistical difficulties in compiling a bibliography on such a large topic, describes the contours of the subject matter, and concludes with some thoughts on the direction of the scholarship and the possible use of AI in international research such as this.

Contemporary political science research suggests historically low public faith in judicial institutions. However, modern years have seen a proliferation of “court-watching” groups that harness volunteer observation to increase accountability in the courts. While these trends may seem in conflict, this article suggests that, in the absence of faith in traditional judiciary systems, court watching acts as a decentralized, grassroots method of legal participation, allowing engagement in the American socio-legal system. We address this relatively under-analyzed area of legal activism by establishing an original dataset (n = 59) that tracked court watch groups as of 2024. Our dataset includes the mission, jurisdictional focus, and major accomplishments of each court-watching group, providing a useful starting point for the analysis of court watching as a growing area of legal socialization. We also establish a four-part definition of “court watching,” which builds on existing scholarship. We proceed with descriptive analysis of our database and findings, providing brief vignettes of well-established or unique court-watching groups and preliminary observations. Based on these preliminary findings, we assert that these volunteer organizations are well positioned to increase civic engagement and democratic faith in US legal proceedings among broad populations and thus deserve further attention from socio-legal scholars.

This Article analyzes the role played by international actors, indigenous peoples, and independent lawyers as guardians of democracy in a context where democratic backsliding, abusive judicial review, and institutional takeover has taken place. Using the Guatemalan 2023 electoral process as a case study, this Article sheds new light on authoritarian constitutional practices, evidenced through the judgments of the Guatemalan Constitutional Court and activities of its Criminal Prosecutor’s Office. This Article also considers how foreign governments, international organizations, indigenous peoples, and independent lawyers came to play a guardianship role in the face of the decline of core institutions of constitutional democracy. Techniques such as transnational sanctions, judicial challenges, diplomatic “shaming,” and protest movements were successful in upholding constitutional democracy by discouraging attempts by the courts and government officials to derail the transition of power and annul the electoral results. This Article analyzes how and why these techniques had an impact in the Guatemalan context and extracts lessons and insights, both positive and negative, for dealing with abusive constitutional practices in theory and in practice.

Zambia has recently witnessed the removal of four High Court judges within a period of less than two years, raising questions about the country’s commitment to judicial independence. This article examines the extent to which the current legal framework governing the removal of judges in Zambia coheres with the principles of judicial accountability and independence. Drawing upon insights from relevant international standards and scholarly literature, the article posits that the removal of judges is not only a necessary mechanism for judicial accountability but should also be seen as an essential safeguard for judicial independence. Its analysis suggests that some of the grounds for removal and the lack of adequate procedural safeguards within the current legal framework pose threats to both judicial accountability and independence. The article concludes with a call for necessary legal reform, urging policymakers to bring the framework in line with relevant international standards.

This article focuses on the appointment of judges in Malawi. It explores the constitutional provisions governing judicial appointments and finds that the system established by Malawi's Constitution has manifest weaknesses. For example, the composition of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) is narrow and not representative of Malawian society; there are also no procedures for the JSC to follow in its operations. The article argues that the system for appointing judges has a bearing on the eventual character and integrity of the judiciary itself, hence it is important to align it with the constitution's ideals. In conclusion, the article makes recommendations for improving the system, including by broadening the JSC's composition, adopting a law to stipulate clear and transparent procedures for the JSC and also curbing presidential powers in relation to judicial appointments.

In recent years there has been a trend towards independent and more transparent ethical regulation for sitting judges, which is said to promote public confidence in the judicial institution, and reflect a move towards accountability and transparency as judicial values. However, regimes governing sitting judges largely fall away when the judge retires from the bench. Increasing longevity and rising numbers of former judges raise complex ethical regulation questions. Drawing on judicial ethics regimes in England and Wales, Australia, the United States and New Zealand, and instances where the conduct of former judges has reflected poorly on the integrity of the judiciary, this article argues that there are strong reasons for extending ethics regulation beyond judicial retirement. By reference to the principles that inform the rules regulating the conduct of sitting judges, we investigate the extent to which misconduct and disciplining regimes should extend to former judges, and whether there is a stronger role for soft instruments and more formalized processes for regulating former judges. In doing so, we propose a model for the development of ethical regulation for former judges.