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In the Introduction, the key considerations, scope, and structure of the book are outlined. The chapter sets the stage for a comprehensive exploration of Mind Datafying Technologies (MDTs) and their regulatory landscape. The primary themes and objectives are introduced, providing readers with an understanding of what to expect in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for the subsequent legal analysis. Following the fundamentals, the chapter highlights ongoing global policy discussions and initial regulatory efforts, with particular emphasis on the latest developments within international organisations such as UNESCO, the OECD, the Council of Europe, and the EU. It also addresses relevant legal scholarship, ensuring a comprehensive understanding of the evolving regulatory debate surrounding these technologies.
Under what conditions citizens accept public institutions as legitimate authorities is a key question in political science. Recent accounts suggest that populist citizens reject international organisations (IOs) as distant, elitist, and undemocratic. Conversely, technocratic citizens should favour IOs as they represent the pinnacle of depoliticised, expertise-driven decision-making. In this article, we provide the first joint analysis of technocratic and populist attitudes as drivers of attitudes towards IOs. We analyse a unique survey conducted in five European countries that covers four IOs and ask how individual populist and technocratic attitudes influence attitudes towards IOs. We find only conditional evidence for a structural association between technocratic and populist and IO attitudes, and credible evidence that country-specific experiences with populism in power moderate these associations. Our contribution has important implications for our understanding of citizen attitudes towards various forms of political representation and the legitimacy of IOs.
It is a truism that legitimacy is relational inasmuch as an international institution’s legitimacy hinges on how it is perceived by relevant audiences. What is less discussed is that legitimation practices may have another strong relational dimension as well, in which institutions portray themselves as being related to respected others. While the idea that international institutions associate themselves with others to borrow their legitimacy is not new, it has not as yet been thoroughly theorised. This article therefore brings together insights from research on the legitimation of international institutions and relational sociology, as well as from related fields, to theorise the notion of ‘relational legitimation’. It also presents a case study on the Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council. Based on qualitative content analysis of annual thematic reports, the paper suggests that relational legitimation is a common practice among the Special Procedures, and possibly also among other international institutions. It shows that relational legitimation relies on a number of different frames – alignment being the most important one – and that association is sought primarily with epistemic authorities, especially those from the West, and other ‘family members’.
International organisations (IOs) hold important governance functions and power. Yet, they are several steps detached from the constituencies that have entrusted them with functions and resources to carry them out, even as accountability expectations remain significant for their legitimacy. This article presents a broadly generalisable theoretical framework for understanding the variable accountability of IOs, seeking to advance the understanding of international accountability in three new ways. First, it elaborates on the concept of the scope of IO accountability, which can vary across organisations, over time, and across contexts. The idea of a scope of accountability moves beyond the dichotomy of accountable versus non-accountable power holders and advances an understanding of accountability as a multi-layered phenomenon, whereby both the expectations and practices of accountability can evolve over time and with respect to different audiences. Second, the article identifies three political factors – namely the formal and informal excercise of power, institutional structure, and public salience – that can shape, in important ways, the variable scope of IO accountability. Finally, it critically explores the tensions and contradictions between these political dynamics, and the implications for access to and the efficacy of accountability systems.
This concluding chapter reflects on the volume’s contributions to how we see, think, and do international organisations. The editors of this volume draw a sharp distinction between doing international organisations law and thinking about international organisations, and propose that the discipline must ‘start seeing international organisations differently’. Yet the sequence could just as easily be reversed: what one sees will inevitably be shaped by what one thinks, how one imagines the world, what one expects to see. This chapter begins with ‘ways of doing’ scholarship on international organisations – crudely divided into ‘deconstructivist’ and ‘(re)constructivist’ approaches – and proceeds to reflect on the diverse ways of seeing and thinking suggested by the preceding chapters, before making some tentative suggestions about possible ways forward.
In the shifting context of global policy making, International Organisations (IOs) have become powerful sources of expert authority and central sites for the exercise of power in global governance. While we have a clear understanding of how IOs deploy expertise, there has been relatively little effort among legal scholarship and International Relations to critically examine the processes by which such institutions produce and validate knowledge claims about governance objects and, in doing so, authorise certain solutions as the only ‘viable’. This chapter examines the way in which the World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and UNICEF acted as central vehicles in defining the contours of ‘hidden hunger’ as a ‘matter of fact’ – or as a medicalised and economised object of governance. It shows how this problematisation largely validated the prioritisation of short-term responses and easily measurable programmes such as food fortification and vitamin supplementation in Global South countries. Rather than addressing the underlying socio-economic determinants of the problem, such responses acted as political analgesics providing temporarily relief. In highlighting how IOs’ ‘ways of seeing’ are connected to the practice of governing, the chapter sheds light on the everyday politics of rule-making.
This chapter proposes to study the making and stabilisation of expertise in global governance. While doing so, it questions mainstream approaches in international law and International Relations, which see international organisations’ reliance on expertise as a rationalisation of global politics. The approach taken here proposes, instead, to examine the political processes and decisions that participate in the production and assembling of ‘expertise’ in global governance. It proposes that the power–knowledge nexus in global fora can be explored by taking the following (complementary) entry points: focusing on sites and networks of knowledge production, studying infrastructures of knowledge production, or analysing relations between people and/or between people and the material.
Like any other institutions, international courts are both constrained and free, structured and open-ended in their production of legal outcomes. Yet, after decades of investigation, the driving forces behind international adjudication remain somewhat elusive. If international norms are textually indeterminate, then what guides their interpretation and application to concrete cases? To what systemic pressures are courts subject? And what forms of discretion do they enjoy? This chapter begins to answer these questions by focusing on the micro-level practices, relationships, and struggles of the legal experts populating international judicial institutions. On the one hand, these socio-professional dynamics are constrained by existing social arrangements, including the institutional design of courts, the networked interactions among individual actors, and the competent performances that punctuate the adjudicative process. On the other hand, existing social arrangements are open to contestation, renegotiation, and contingency, thereby creating opportunities for unorthodox and creative lawyering. As such, the socio-professional dynamics that take place inside international courts are both the vehicle of reproduction of legal outcomes and the source from which legal change originates.
In the post-World War II era, international lawyers have occupied the front seat in the study of international organisations (IOs). During the past decade, this disciplinary hierarchy has grown to feel increasingly unsatisfying. This chapter offers an anthropological take on the study of IOs building both on the past decade of anthropological work and my ethnography at the UN Human Rights Committee. IOs are frequently accused of ineffectiveness embedded in endless paper-pushing techniques. In this chapter, I engage with these criticisms and ask: can we find another perspective from which to assess effectiveness? What happens if we stop investing our analytical attention in what we think IO operations and their desired ‘impacts’ should be and instead engage in non-normative inquiries into what IOs actually do? I explore what can we learn about IOs’ visions for world improvement by focusing on the legal technicalities and material forms that define their operations. I propose that, instead of a hindrance or distraction, these forms embody ‘standards for a better world’ that are an essential component of IOs’ civilising mission.
Global crises constitute challenges for social policy. While social policy is predominantly a national concern, international organisations (IOs) contribute frames of reference for state decisions. In this article, we explore whether the COVID-19 pandemic led to changes in IOs’ social policy ideas and recommendations in health care, labour market, and social protection policies due to how IOs perceived the crisis’ specific nature, severity, and global scope. We focus on four IOs regarded as key actors in global social policy, namely the ILO, OECD, WHO, and the World Bank. Theoretically, we employ a framework of ideational policy change combining different levels (recommendations – including parameters and instruments – and paradigmatic ideas) with different types of change (layering, conversion, dismantlement, and displacement). We find that IOs have not fundamentally reimagined their pre-pandemic stances during the pandemic. The IOs’ perceptions of the crisis do not undermine IOs’ ideas and recommendations but highlight their appropriateness.
In this article, I reconceptualise the League of Nations as an Imperial Assemblage that embeds and is embedded by coloniality. Relying on the return to the League’s historisisation by Third World Approaches to International Law, I argue that we can understand the League as a governance body that works across scales of international, transnational and local actors, processes and structures to reiterate coloniality within the mandated territories. I utilise Deleuzian notions of assemblage alongside the concept of ‘coloniality’ within the literature of decolonial theory within International Relations and Sociology to show how the work of the League’s various actors, processes and structures across different scales made, actualised and evolved the laws on Forced Labour and Slavery from 1925 to 1932 in the inter-war era with a particular focus on Mandate Territories B and C.
In 2015, UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty Philip Alston stated that the World Bank treats “human rights more like an infectious disease than universal values and obligations” because of its understanding of what constitutes political interference. The World Bank’s interpretation, replicated by the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in the development finance regime complex, has shaped how activists hold the Banks to account. This chapter examines how the international accountability norm emerged through contestation with the World Bank and spread to be taken as given for the MDBs, as distinct from international human rights and environmental elemental regimes. It then documents how activists seek to protect human and environmental rights through the banks’ international accountability mechanisms as quasi-legal processes with implications for the banks’ culpability. Although there is an increasing recognition of some rights such as free, prior and informed consent and labour, the banks continue to view these as internal standards not legal obligations. The chapter then examines the extent to which the norm needs to be backed by hard law to be enforced, with efforts by the banks to maintain their international organisation immunity given legal claims as to their implication in human and environmental rights abuses.
Who is held responsible when international organisations (IOs) fall short of public expectations? Scholarship on IO blame avoidance assumes that member states can hide behind IOs. As clarity of responsibility is assumed to be lacking in IOs, public responsibility attributions (PRA) will usually target the IO rather than individual member states. We argue, by contrast, that even in complex IOs such as the European Union (EU), clarity of responsibility is not always lacking. Therefore, whether the IO in general or individual member states become the main target of public blame attributions depends on the type of IO policy failure. In cases of failures to act and failures to comply, the responsibility of individual member states is comparatively easy to identify, and they thus become the main blame target. Only in cases of failures to perform clarity of responsibility is lacking, and the IO will become the main target of public blame attributions. To assess the plausibility of this‘failure hypothesis’, we study public blame attributions in two cases of EU foreign policy failures and two cases of EU environmental policy failures.
This chapter re-inserts the (rethought) concept of territory into the legal-theoretical framework, offering a look at how this concept can be realised and might differently operationalise concepts such as sovereignty and jurisdiction. Taking the concept of sovereignty first, the chapter operationalises this concept as a bundle of legal rights, duties, etc. informed by legal realist methods and social constructivism. The chapter then turns to the concept of jurisdiction, problematising the ‘boundaries’ of and reterritorialising extraterritorial jurisdiction. The chapter offers an alternative to the ‘ownership’ and ‘exclusive’ model of legal rights, which otherwise has at its core a reified and flat territory. The final part explores actorhood, demonstrating how the spaces of international organisations can be understood as their territories. Taking as its starting point the possibility of territorial pluralism, multiplicity, and continuous (re)production, the chapter ends with an account of territories proliferating rather than diminishing. Taking the idea of reterritorialising seriously, it proposes a legal account of the relationship between actors and their spaces.
Chapter 2 provides an overview and critique of discourses about deterritorialisation in international law. The first sections sketch out three main strands to these discourses. The first strand contains accounts of a fundamental transition in the organising logic of international law; a shift from ordering competences on the basis of territory to functions. The second strand groups together accounts addressing the relocation of power but containing imprecise and undertheorised understandings of these spaces. The third strand includes accounts concerning the porosity of states. The chapter then problematises these discourses. Each strand applies a similar legal-spatial imaginary, and in so doing omits the resulting spaces produced by deterritorialisation. Common to all is a tendency to continue to applying a particular and unproblematised concept of territory, limiting theoretical insight, consistently producing deterritorialisation without reterritorialisation, and often conflating at an analytical level actors, spaces, and functions. The reason for this again lies in the continuing prioritisation of the stato-centric approach to territory in international law’s implicit geography.
Chapter 2 analyses the negotiation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC, 1998–2003). It illustrates that evidence was a key element of the negotiations and argues that the FCTC was developed as an evidence-based treaty to counteract the attacks on evidence by the tobacco industry. After a historical introduction, Section 2.2 outlines the theoretical background of the chapter, introducing the notion of ‘treaty entrepreneurs’. Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 proceed to delineate and analyse how the strategy on evidence unfolded during the FCTC negotiations. Section 2.3 illustrates how legal expertise from international environmental law was borrowed to build a treaty that could embed and develop evidence. Section 2.4 describes how evidence was mobilised to build the treaty. First, the treaty entrepreneurs relied on existing knowledge within the WHO; second, they served as a catalyst for the production of additional evidence from other relevant actors, most notably the World Bank. Section 2.5 reviews how the treaty entrepreneurs framed the available evidence and how the label ‘evidence-based’ started being used. Section 2.6, finally, draws some conclusions on the implications of adopting a strategy on evidence to push forward the negotiations of a treaty.
Weaponising Evidence provides the first analysis of the history of the international law on tobacco control. By relying on a vast set of empirical sources, it analyses the negotiation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the tobacco control disputes lodged before the WTO and international investment tribunals (Philip Morris v Uruguay and Australia – Plain Packaging). The investigation focuses on two main threads: the instrumental use of international law in the warlike confrontation between the tobacco control advocates and the tobacco industry, and the use of evidence as a weapon in the conflict. The book unveils important lessons on the functioning of international organizations, the role of corporate actors and civil society organizations, and the importance and limits of science in law-making and litigation.
Social protection has expanded unevenly across Africa because of variations in both the initial adoption of programmes and their subsequent ‘institutionalisation’ through government-funded expansions in coverage. The case of Zambia illustrates how policy coalitions promoting the institutionalisation of social protection compete with other claimants over prioritisation in public spending. Even when faced with competitive elections, incumbent governments may prioritise other programmes over social protection. In Zambia, the incumbent government announced and budgeted for a massive government-funded expansion of social protection but failed to allocate the necessary funding – with the result that benefits were not paid to registered beneficiaries. If ‘institutionalisation’ is understood as entailing the political irreversibility of expansion, then the rhetoric of institutionalisation belied the reality (for several years) of retrenchment. The weakened policy coalition supporting social protection was unable to prevent government defunding as scarce government resources were allocated to competing programmes.
In recent years, various crises such as the financial crisis, Brexit, and the Covid-19 pandemic have shed light on citizens’ (dis)satisfaction with international organisations (IOs). Yet, despite their crucial importance for the support of IOs, individual citizens’ connection to these organisations remains understudied. This article contributes to the literature on emotion research in International Relations (IR) by exploring the everyday emotions of ordinary individuals about IOs and their repercussions on world politics, moving beyond the state or community level to examine how citizens actually experience international politics. It does so by (i) theorising individuals’ emotional attachments to IOs and demonstrating how they shape perceptions and preferences that impact the future of organisations, and (ii) advocating for the use of focus groups as a research method to study emotions in IR. Contributing to the ‘everyday turn’ in emotion research in IR, it uses the European Union as a case study and analyses 21 focus groups with individuals from four different countries (Belgium, France, Italy, and Portugal). The article’s insights provide a deeper understanding of the micro-political foundation that enables and legitimises government action, and against whose background international relations are conducted.