This chapter explores an anticolonial critique of emerging postwar international jurisprudence particularly as it pertains to war, using the dissenting opinion of Indian jurist Radhabinod Pal during the Tokyo Trials as a case study. Pal’s critique of Allied uses of sovereignty and international law reflected a larger concern with the ongoing legacy of colonialism in the postwar era, with Pal’s concern being that both continuities and discontinuities in international law continued to maintain unequal relations of power that shape the international order. Pal challenged the conclusions of the other judges at the Tokyo Trials by asserting that the world had not yet become an international society that could truly adopt international criminal law in a just sense. While Pal’s approach to sovereignty and international law contains various challenges and is not a simple prescription that could be easily applied, his dynamic and ambitious vision aimed to equalize the world and therefore represents an aspirational anticolonialism that was lost in subsequent generations of Third World lawyering.

The chapter examines the application of intersectionality theory to feminist judgment writing at the International Criminal Court (ICC), questioning whose feminism is centered and which intersections matter. Drawing on Black feminist scholarship, Dawuni evaluates both the merits and limitations of intersectionality as a framework for judicial decision-making in international criminal law. The chapter argues that while intersectionality can illuminate how multiple identities shape experiences of victimisation and access to justice, careful attention must be paid to avoid reproducing marginalisation through oversimplified applications. It critiques the continued impact of coloniality on the ICC’s operations and questions the homogenisation of African experiences in international law. The analysis concludes with recommendations for judges, registry staff, and researchers, emphasising the need for continuous education on intersectionality, greater institutional diversity, and constant self-reflection about positionality and privilege. Dawuni argues that true intersectional justice requires transforming both the composition and operational culture of international criminal institutions.

The chapter reproduces Gopalan’s speech delivered at the International Criminal Court’s 20th anniversary conference at The Hague in 2022, examining intersectional approaches to investigating and prosecuting sexual and gender-based crimes in international criminal law. Gopalan explains intersectionality as an analytical framework that reveals how multiple identities and systems of oppression shape international crimes. Through case studies including Korean "comfort women," Srebrenica’s Muslim women, and Tamil male survivors in Sri Lanka, she demonstrates how factors like gender, colonialism, class, ethnicity, and religion intersect to create distinct patterns of harm and victimisation. Gopalan argues that while gender analysis has advanced understanding of sexual violence, examining gender alone is insufficient. Her analysis reveals how intersectional approaches can uncover overlooked structural inequalities and make visible what might otherwise remain unseen, enabling more comprehensive and survivor-responsive justice processes. The speech argues for expanding investigative and prosecutorial frameworks beyond single-axis analysis to better serve the complex realities of survivors.

The chapter presents a dialogue between Mudukuti and Chappell, examining critical challenges facing the International Criminal Court (ICC) through the lens of Mudukuti’s experience as practitioner, advocate, and trainer. Drawing on her work at the ICC, domestic courts, and civil society organizations, Mudukuti highlights the urgent need for greater intersectionality in international criminal justice. The conversation focuses on institutional reform at the ICC, addressing the Court’s problematic staff composition where over half of professional positions are held by individuals from Western European and Other Groups. Mudukuti argues a lack of geographic, racial, and gender diversity in leadership affects how cases are approached, evidence is interpreted, and justice is delivered. The dialogue examines the role of civil society in advancing reform and the importance of amicus curiae briefs in bringing diverse perspectives to ICC cases, particularly regarding sexual violence. Mudukuti emphasizes that intersectionality requires transforming both institutional composition and judicial understanding through continuous learning and openness to different disciplinary perspectives.

The chapter presents a dialogue between Sellers and Grey, exploring how "absent jurisprudence" from past international tribunals shapes contemporary international criminal law. Through a discussion of cases from Tokyo and Nuremberg to the ICC, Sellers demonstrates how opportunities for gendered analysis of crimes like enslavement were missed, creating enduring gaps in legal understanding. The conversation focuses on the overlooked cases of "comfort women" at the Tokyo Tribunal, women’s detention at the Ravensbrück camp during World War II, and the evolution of enslavement jurisprudence from the ICTY’s Kunarac case to recent ICC proceedings. Sellers argues that had early tribunals conducted deeper intersectional analyses of gender, race, and class in enslavement cases, contemporary courts would be better equipped to address similar crimes. The chapter suggests the Rome Statute’s bifurcation of "sexual slavery" from "enslavement" obscures how enslavement inherently involves control over victims’ sexuality and reproduction. The conversation reveals how jurisprudential gaps continue to constrain judges’ ability to fully recognize and address gendered dimensions of international crimes.

Chapter 6 starts from the insight that, despite international criminal law’s focus on individual responsibility, atrocity crimes are often a result of structural violence and ditto injustices: discrimination, social exclusion, exploitation, and so on. If the violence is structural, the suffering becomes social, that is, inherent in societal structures. The question remains how the legal order can respond to structural injustice and social suffering. The chapter argues that these forms of injustice register as ‘silent claims’ at the brink of the legal order, questioning its boundaries.

Chapter 2 delves into the constitution of humanity as a collective subject. Drawing on the debate between ICL scholars about the we-talk in relation to the ICC and their engagement with the work of Durkheim, I develop the thesis that humanity should be understood as a collective subject that is brought about as a symbolic order through a process of representation. Moreover, as with any order, the order of humanity emerges through a process of self-inclusion of a first-person plural. Finally, I turn to the case of Ongwen to show how this order is questioned by the inhuman.

This chapter explores the interaction between international human rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL), as well as international criminal law. It examines how IHRL influences the application and development of IHL and how human rights principles are integrated into international criminal procedures and substantive law. The chapter discusses the mutual reinforcement and potential conflicts between these branches of international law, highlighting the need for a coherent and integrated approach. It also explores the role of international courts and tribunals in applying and interpreting IHRL, IHL, and international criminal law, and the challenges in ensuring compliance and accountability.

Genocide is sometimes called the ’crime of crimes’. The word was coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944, then declared an international crime by the United Nations General Assembly. In 1948, the Genocide Convention was adopted. As the first human rights treaty of modern times, it constituted a significant intrusion into what had previously been a matter exclusively of domestic concern. This explains the narrow definition of the crime of genocide. It requires proof of an intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. Only a half century after its adoption did the Genocide Convention take on real significance with inter-State cases being filed at the International Court of Justice and many prosecutions at the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The Convention requires that States Parties punish genocide but they are also required to prevent it, even when it takes place outside their own territory. More than 150 States have ratified the Genocide Convention. Genocide is also prohibited under customary international law. It is generally agreed that the duty to punish genocide is a peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens).

This chapter explores the design of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) permanent premises and the politics of movement on its grounds. Drawing on literature in the field of critical international criminal law, law and architecture, legal design, and feminist courtroom geography, the chapter rethinks how the architecture of this particular international court is in constant conversation with its surroundings and its visitors, and how it is entangled with questions of international (criminal) law’s legitimacy and its appeal to humanity, dignity, truth, and justice. My starting point is the constant tension between inclusion and exclusion already inherently present in the design concept of Schmidt Hammer Lassen Architects, who aimed to design a building that was to be “a landmark that conveys the eminence and authority of the ICC, while at the same time relating on a human scale." By providing a deeper understanding of the politics of design at the ICC’s permanent premises, this chapter aims to contribute to an interdisciplinary conversation on international law’s opportunities, challenges, and possible alternatives.

The Conclusion draws on the findings of the book to analyse the main implications of a reciprocity-based understanding of belligerent reprisals. First, it distinguishes this formalization of belligerent reprisals from earlier theories stressing the law-making function of the measure. Then, it accounts for the continued relevance of belligerent reprisals even at a time when mechanisms monitoring and enforcing compliance with the laws of armed conflict gain momentum. Finally, it explains how a reciprocity-based interpretation of belligerent reprisals would affect follow-up reform of the mechanism – be it in the sense of fine-tuning its regulation, or in the sense of disposing of it altogether.

Chapter 6 describes how terrorism is punishable under international criminal law. This body of international law holds natural persons – individuals – criminally responsible for the perpetration of international crimes. Although views differ among scholars, as the chapter describes, the better view is that individual acts of terrorism that do not fall within the definitions of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide are not directly criminalized by international law. Particular attention is paid to the relevant caselaw of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).