On what basis may the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) exercise its jurisdiction over States that have withdrawn from the Rome Statute? Is it enough that the alleged crimes occurred before the State withdrew from the treaty? When acting proprio motu, does the Prosecutor have to seek authorization from a Pre-Trial Chamber before they are allowed to proceed with the criminal investigation post-State withdrawal? This issue has received only cursory attention from the ICC and the academic community but the lack of clarity around the Court’s post-withdrawal jurisdiction is a serious concern, and not only for States that have withdrawn their membership (such as the Philippines). It is important because, as things stand, and given what the Court has said so far, States parties cannot be sure of the parameters of the Court’s temporal jurisdiction, nor of the legal effects of a State’s withdrawal.

This article delves into the doctrine of inherent powers within the Sudanese Civil Procedure Code, with a specific focus on its origin, nature and scope. It posits that this doctrine empowers the courts to undertake actions essential for fulfilling their duties and ensuring the pursuit of justice, even in instances where such powers are not explicitly granted to them under statutory provisions. Additionally, the article examines the potential advantages and disadvantages associated with inherent powers and contemplates whether their exercise might pose a threat to the rule of law. It also explores the arguments both in favour of and against the possibility of rule-making within the framework of these powers and the potential impact of such regulations on the administration of justice. The article asserts that while a court's inherent powers are indispensable for the efficient dispensation of justice, it is imperative that they are not wielded capriciously or arbitrarily. Instead, their exercise should be guided by the principles of equity and good conscience.