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This chapter examines the transformative measures implemented by policymakers and regulators to improve security and transparency in over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets following the 2009 G20 Pittsburgh Summit. Notably, these measures included mandating the central clearing of standardized OTC derivatives, which were previously traded without the involvement of clearing houses. The chapter argues that these regulatory efforts significantly increased the “infrastructural authority” of central clearing counterparties (CCPs). This concept refers to the ability of CCPs, as private organizations, to influence derivatives trading through their clearing and settlement operations. Traditionally, CCPs held infrastructural authority over exchange-traded derivatives, a smaller segment of global derivatives markets. As policymakers and regulators pushed for the central clearing of OTC derivatives, CCPs expanded their influence, encompassing the majority of global derivatives trading. While this process enhanced the transparency and safety of derivatives markets, it also transformed CCPs into potential factors of financial instability, due to risk concentration and the impact of clearing margins on market liquidity. Both dimensions have the potential to make the infrastructural authority of CCPs more visible to the wider financial system and economy, potentially resulting in state actors reining in their authority.
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