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Edited by
Marietta Auer, Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory,Paul B. Miller, University of Notre Dame, Indiana,Henry E. Smith, Harvard Law School, Massachusetts,James Toomey, University of Iowa
Speech act theorists take a gift to be among the range of things we can do with words. They also disagree regarding the extent of the participation of the giftee in the act. Can a gift be made unbeknownst to its recipient? If not, is the latter required to accept the gift, in addition to hearing and understanding the utterance through which it is made? Because they give their insights about gifts in passing, speech act theorists also leave important aspects of the act in the dark. They hint at the power of gifts to modify the deontic status of its two parties, but leave to one’s guess the details of the related changes. The aim of the chapter is to reflect further on these quandaries and neglected sides of gifts in light of Reinach’s theory of social acts. The main result of the present Reinachian inquiry is that the puzzles raised by the illocutionary act of making gifts dissolve once attention is redirected from the thing that is gifted to the ownership over that thing.
In this chapter, we think about the different things that we do when we produce utterances. Communication is not only about the exchange of information. We also perform acts and, in some cases, change the world when we speak, sign, or write. Speech act theory emerged as a means of understanding and analysing the things we do when we use language. We track the development of speech act theory, focusing on the work of two influential thinkers in the field: Austin and Searle. We begin by looking at what Austin called performatives and discuss how their meaning can be understood in terms of felicity conditions. We then move on to explore Austin’s distinction between locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts. John R. Searle’s work responds to and develops the work of Austin. He identifies four categories of felicity condition and uses these to propose a classification system for illocutionary acts. We consider Searle’s discussion of indirect speech acts as a key contribution to speech act theory and pragmatics more widely. The chapter ends with a brief overview of how speech act theory has been applied and developed since the work of Austin and Searle.
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