This chapter describes the immutable characteristics of capital punishment, which kills people and uses death threats by state actors. Death threats are ordinarily treated as unlawful acts, with threats of impending death treated as psychological torture where a person is helpless to prevent death. The chapter discusses how mock executions and various corporal punishments are already treated as torturous acts, including by laws and legal commentators. After discussing the duty of government officials to protect people, including inmates, from harm, as well as how jurists in multiple jurisdictions have recognized the death row phenomenon (i.e., the suffering associated with prolonged stays on death row), the chapter describes how countries have refused to extradite individuals without assurances that the death penalty will not be sought. The U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment contains a "lawful sanctions" carve-out to the definition of torture, but case law makes clear that lawful sanctions cannot themselves amount to torture. The chapter argues death sentences inflict severe pain and suffering amounting to torture.

The Conclusion summarizes the book's major themes and arguments, concluding that the death penalty has the immutable characteristics and indicia of torture. The Conclusion asserts that capital punishment violates fundamental human rights, including the right to be free from torture. Non-lethal corporal punishments and mock executions have already been prohibited by law, and the Conclusion asserts that capital punishment should be barred by an existing jus cogens norm--the peremptory norm of international law absolutely prohibiting torture--to stigmatize the practice of capital punishment as a torturous one that has no place in the twenty-first century or in law.

Artificial intelligence technologies have brought to humanity benefits and challenges. Some AI products can be used to threaten non-trade values including fundamental rights and national security. “Data-sharing policies”, through which governments “feed” data into their AI industry, further raise fair competition concerns. At present, economic sanctions taken by trade powers play an important role in deterring the controversial use of AI policies. In this chapter, it is argued that the WTO law can offer some aid in disciplining AI policies. First, some “data-sharing” mechanisms may be challenged as actionable subsidies under the WTO law. Second, sanctions against AI policies that undermine fundamental rights or national security may not be found inconsistent with WTO law due to, inter alia, the “public morals” exception, the security exception and the “maintenance of international peace and security” exception. Accordingly, it is argued that WTO law can provide some assistance in the disciplining of “data-sharing” mechanisms and AI policies that undermine fundamental rights or national security.

The chapter considers the inter-relationship between the right to life and other fundamental human rights, in particular the right to freedom from torture, to family life, to fair trial, to liberty and to security, to privacy, to peaceful assembly, and to food. While the remedy of a survivor of unlawful State action is likely to exist under the right to freedom from inhumane treatment, where the intent of State agents was to kill, a violation of the right to life may also have occurred.