This chapter explores the question of whether the epistemology of the secret of international law and the necessities it puts in place can be resisted. No definite answer to that question is sought here and only tentative reflections on the possibility of resisting the epistemology of the secret are provided in the following paragraphs. This chapter proceeds as follows. This chapter starts by elaborating on why it matters to spare no effort to resist the epistemology of the secret and rein in its consequences. The chapter then recalls that a mere termination or discontinuation of the epistemology of the secret, of its necessities, and of all the literary, hermeneutical, critical, economic, and ideological attitudes it entails is an impossibility. Resistance, it is subsequently argued, can only take the form of an act of obnubilation, a notion whose concrete implications for international legal thought and practice are subsequently spelled out.

This notebook contains some of the ideas, ambitions, hopes, anxieties, interrogations, and fears that randomly or expectingly came to punctuate the writing of the previous chapters.

This chapter spells out the notion of the espistemology of the secret. It unpacks the two main components of the epistemology of the secret of international law: the necessary presence of hidden, unknown, invisible content in the texts, practices, actors, effects, representations, past, etc. of international law (what is called in this book the necessity of secret content) and the necessity for international lawyers to reveal such hidden, unknown, invisible content (what is called in this book the necessity of revelation). The chapter distinguishes the epistemology of the secret of international law from the hermeneutics of suspicion, the idea of an ideology of secretism and the idea of an economy of secrets.

This chapter draws the attention to systems of thought other than international law and that are similarly articulated around a postulation of the necessary presence of some content or substance deemed to be hidden in some way (what is called here the necessity of secret content) and/or the necessary performance of an act of revelation of some content or substance previously unknown (what is called here the necessity of revelation). The attention is drawn on the epistemologies of the secrets at work in Greek logocentric thought, in the Christian governance of the mind, in modern thought, in the idea of critique inherited from modern thought, in bourgeois literature, in Freudian psychoanalysis, in structuralist thought, and in poststructuralist thought.

This chapter exposes some concrete and contemporary manifestations of the epistemology of the secret of international law. It particularly sheds light on the way in which the postulation of a hidden, unknown, invisible content as well as the experience of the necessity to reveal such content play out in international legal thought and practice, for the sake of ordering what can be said, thought, perceived and actioned through international law. The chapter then illustrates how such two necessities come to enable a mass production of speech materials which, in turn, determines what can possibly be said, thought, perceived and actioned through international law.