At the turn of the twentieth century, few philosophical ideas in Marx’s work gained as much attention as his account of history. Orthodox Marxists made it their programme to closely follow Marx’s development thesis, which posits that the productive forces determine the course of history. The Austromarxist Max Adler (1873–1937), influenced by neo-Kantianism, took more liberties in interpreting – or, perhaps more accurately, ‘reinventing’ – the law of history in practical terms. This article reconstructs Adler’s neo-Kantian ‘reinvention’ of Marx’s account of history. According to Adler, the notion of ‘necessity’ that underpins critical judgements is not grounded in the regularity of history but rather in the moral judgements we make about how history should develop. More specifically, I defend two claims. First, by interpreting human progress as a possibility that presents itself as a necessity from the standpoint of practical rationality, I show that Adler laid the foundation for a critique of the Marxist development thesis that only later gained traction. Second, while Marxists may fear that Kantian formalism cannot address misguided ideological beliefs, I argue that Adler’s neo-Kantian formalism is robustly anti-ideological, emphasising the ideology-emancipating transformation we undergo when we recognise exploitative structures.

Enlightenment era optimism that technological and educational developments offer a progressive path to plenty and liberation supports a hope that human toil may be progressively reduced. The Development Thesis defended by G. A. Cohen is a piece of that Enlightenment optimism. The Development Thesis holds that productive forces tend to develop throughout history. The tendency for such an increase in productive forces to occur is, according to Cohen’s argument, due to persistent facts about human nature. If Cohen is correct, there is a tendency toward progress of an important sort, and this progress is due in significant part to human nature. But the development of productive forces also destroys nonhuman natural value. In the era of the Anthropocene this is occurring on a planetary scale. The simultaneous development and destruction entails that claims of progress must rely on an all-things-considered judgment. But due to the plurality of the relevant values, which cannot be compared according to a common metric, rational disagreement about the existence of progress and our progressive nature can be expected to persist.