This chapter briefly summarizes the central argument of the book: states do not tie hands to make commitments to go to war more credible. It shows how the argument sheds light on the causes of war, that the risks of crises inadvertently escalating to war are much lower than many fear, suggesting a complete reassessment of crisis stability. It also discusses how states communicate with each other, if they do not tie hands. Next, it applies the argument to the Ukraine War, demonstrating how the insight that states do not tie hands helps explain several aspects of the Ukraine War, including why the war has not escalated, Ukraine is not a NATO member, the US withdrew advisors from Ukraine just prior to the war, and others. Last, the chapter considers this puzzle: If these tying hands ideas first developed by Thomas Schelling lack even anecdotal empirical support, why have they endured in scholarly and policy discussions for decades? Why do any ideas endure, past the point when the weight of evidence suggested they should be discarded?

When a commitment is challenged, a state might choose to back down rather than follow through on a promise to go to war. This prospect makes the commitment not credible. One way to solve this problem is to remove choice from the committing state, to create a risk of inadvertent, uncontrolled escalation to war. This technique has been labeled brinkmanship. This chapter proposes that states do not engage in brinkmanship. To the contrary, they seek to control inadvertent escalation risks in order to retain the ability to choose whether or not to go to war. The chapter demonstrates this proposition empirically. It shows that inadvertent escalation to war since 1945 almost never happens, suggesting that states are not deliberately creating such risks. Further, in the small number of instances that inadvertent escalation did occur, it was not because a state was deliberately creating such risks in order to make a commitment more credible. The chapter also demonstrates the lack of brinkmanship in the Berlin, Taiwan Straits, and Cuban Missile Crises, showing that contra conventional wisdom, states and leaders have the motivation and ability to control carefully escalation risks. States do not engage in brinkmanship, they do not play Russian Roulette.