This Element brings together the problems of economic calculation, institutional diversity, and institutional feasibility, arguing that these themes are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Building on recent developments in institutional theory, political economy, social philosophy, and logical analysis, the Element revisits the classic debates surrounding alternative economic and governance systems. The discussion is organized around three core elements: (1) an overview of recent developments in institutional theory and social philosophy, that driven by technological advances have revitalized debates on alternative economic and governance systems; (2) a reexamination of the economic calculation debate, tracing its evolution from Austrian economics to a broader theoretical synthesis incorporating institutional political economy and conflict theory; and (3) a discussion of the formal, logical, and philosophical foundations for thinking about feasibility and realizability, offering analytical tools for evaluating the plausibility of institutional alternatives within specific historical and social contexts.

Institutions are the formal or informal 'rules of the game' that facilitate economic, social, and political interactions. These include such things as legal rules, property rights, constitutions, political structures, and norms and customs. The main theoretical insights from Austrian economics regarding private property rights and prices, entrepreneurship, and spontaneous order mechanisms play a key role in advancing institutional economics. The Austrian economics framework provides an understanding for which institutions matter for growth, how they matter, and how they emerge and can change over time. Specifically, Austrians have contributed significantly to the areas of institutional stickiness and informal institutions, self-governance and self-enforcing contracts, institutional entrepreneurship, and the political infrastructure for development.