Public authorities often enforce pollution abatement through monitoring and penalties. However, monitoring is costly and only a small percentage of firms are monitored. Inspectors may be corrupt and permit evasion for a bribe. For firms in developing countries, it is expensive to enter formally and install costly abatement technologies, which are accessible only to formal firms. This paper studies a framework where firms, depending on abatement cost, the probability of inspection, the likelihood of a corrupt inspector and the bribe, choose whether to organize formally or informally and whether to abate before inspection. Firms that do not abate beforehand are liable to either pay a penalty and abate or close down post-inspection. Greater monitoring and lower abatement costs encourage firms to move towards formal organization, while excessively high penalties may discourage entry.

To examine the bribing behavior of firms, we developed a cross-level moderation model using agency theory at the firm level and anomie theory at the societal level to investigate the relationship between manager control of firms and firm bribery activity. The results of this cross-cultural analysis using a sample of 1,799 firms from 38 nations showed that at the firm level, manager-controlled firms (MCFs) have a higher propensity to bribe than shareholder-controlled firms. At the country level, bribery is higher in MCFs (relative to shareholder-controlled firms) in societies with a low level of institutional collectivism, a high level of uncertainty avoidance, economic change, and income inequality. Contrary to the hypothesis, the relationship between bribery and manager control is stronger rather than weaker in societies with press freedom. Implications for future research and practices are discussed.