The Stoics have sometimes been credited with concern for appropriately moral motivation, based on their distinction between those actions they classify as appropriate (kathēkonta) and those they characterize, in addition, as done on the basis of virtue (katorthōmata). This chapter argues that the Kantian and Stoic views closely resemble one another in this respect: just as Kant’s motive of duty requires a singular interest in the rightness of dutiful action, so the Stoics suppose that virtue and actions that originate in virtue are the only objects of fully rational desire. Both theories recognize, as well, that many of our cognitions are not transparent to ourselves, so that we are often unaware of our own motives. This recognition speaks to the depth and complexity of Stoic intellectualist psychology and underlies Kant’s claim that the effort to understand our own moral condition is a “wide” duty of virtue.

This chapter argues against a dominant reading of the Stoics according to which all appropriate actions (kathēkonta), whether drinking when thirsty or standing firm at a critical juncture in battle, count equally as “duties” (officia). All scholars interpret the Stoic Sage’s perfection to imply that absolutely every token action of the Sage counts as a (morally) perfect action (katorthōma), with the result that there is no category of actions constituted by the morally permissible. Appreciating the significance of the misunderstood Stoic category of “intermediate appropriate actions,” however, makes clear that there are actions that follow nature, but that are simply concerned with pursuing “promoted indifferents.” Thus, it is argued that the Stoic position recognizes a class of permissible actions – even for the Sage, whose perfection consists rather in never acting contrary to virtue. The Stoics are thus much closer to Kant and their Socratic heritage than has been previously recognized.

Kant’s account of the function of orientation vis-à-vis human agency has been the subject of a recent debate in the literature. On the reading this chapter puts forward, orientation consists in giving me a sense of myself and my activity in relation to the world so that I can reach the destination I have chosen. By contrast, Melissa Merritt has argued that orientating myself consists in having a sense of the direction I should follow in order to realize my rational vocation. This chapter revisits this debate by examining Kant’s notion of orientation through the prism of the Stoic notion of oikeiōsis. While Kant and the Stoics share the view that agency requires orientation and orientation requires a certain form of self-awareness, they disagree on the function of orientation, and locating the source of their disagreement will shed light on Kant’s account.

In this chapter the influence of Hellenistic philosophy on Roman law is continued in terms of method: from Hellenistic epistemology the Roman jurists, like the grammarians, took over the notion of rule: they started to use it initially as a mnemotechnical device in order to get to grips with their growing legal output.