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This chapter traces trajectories of counterrevolutions following six revolutions, which exhibit the full range of counterrevolutionary outcomes and offer useful comparisons to Egypt. First, it examines two revolutions that never experienced counterrevolutions: Tunisia’s and Libya’s 2011 revolutions. Both occurred in the same Arab Spring wave as Egypt’s revolution, but in Tunisia the new government faced a military whose interests were not deeply threatened by civilian rule and in Libya the coercive capacity of the former regime was largely destroyed in the brief civil war. Next, it examines two Latin American revolutions that demonstrate the two ways in which revolutionaries can maintain their capacity and defeat counterrevolutionary threats. Following Cuba’s 1959 revolution, Fidel Castro’s regime put down multiple counterrevolutions using its loyal revolutionary army. In Venezuela, following the 1958 democratic revolution, the government enjoyed none of these coercive resources, yet managed to thwart multiple counterrevolutionary coup attempts through a preservation of revolutionary unity and a return to mass mobilization. Finally, in two cases that are otherwise quite different to Egypt – Thailand’s 1973 democratic uprising and Hungary’s 1919 communist revolution – a very similar set of mechanisms undermined the capacity of the new governments and created opportunities for counterrevolutionaries to return to power.
As gold prices have soared, the Amazon and its inhabitants have had to bear the brunt of a rampant, environmentally destructive gold-mining rush. Small and medium-sized illegal, informal, and other irregular forms of so-called artisanal gold mining, as well as large-scale corporate gold mines, cause major and multifaceted socioenvironmental–health–human rights crises. The dynamics of the gold-mining boom are important to understand the key political economic sectors behind forest degradation and deforestation and to highlight how RDPEs work. The overall situation in the Amazon is presented, analyzing the causes of gold mining and the violence, especially in Peru, Brazil, and other key regions. The triple frontier between Colombia, Venezuela, and Brazil is also analyzed as the irregular gold-mining RDPE is one of the most important drivers of deforestation. In this region, gold-mining operations are led by ex-guerilla groups in Venezuela, paramilitaries and other armed groups in Colombia, and, increasingly, by the First Capital Command and other drug factions from southeastern Brazil in Roraima’s Yanomami Indigenous lands.
Chapter 7 explores the reasons why Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela experienced relatively stable authoritarianism during the early twentieth century. All three countries professionalized their militaries during this period, which helped bring an end to the frequent revolts that had undermined their prospects for democracy in the nineteenth century. None of the three countries developed strong parties, however. The absence of strong parties impeded democratization in several ways. First, party weakness allowed presidents to concentrate authority and extend their hold on power in some cases. Second, and even more importantly, the weakness of opposition parties meant that the opposition had little chance of winning elections or enacting democratic reforms, particularly in the face of widespread government electoral manipulation. As a result, the opposition frequently abstained from elections, which only deepened authoritarian rule in these countries. In some instances, the opposition also encouraged the military to intervene to overthrow the president, which undermined otherwise mostly stable authoritarian regimes.
In 2012, at age 64, Anne desired to retire. She didn’t want to serve past her prime. If she retired, her lab space could go instead to a young investigator just starting a career. Anne was pleased with the search committee’s replacement – Merit Cudkowicz – a woman on Anne’s faculty who had established and directed their Program in Clinical Investigation. Her area of expertise was amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). She had also come down to Venezuela one year to work on the project. She went from ‘bench to bedside’ by assessing potential new therapies discovered at the laboratory bench in humans using the best clinical trial designs. To celebrate completing 21 years of service, Anne organized a trip to the Galapagos. She found an outfit with a boat and invited 20 of her best friends to go on the trip, including Nancy, her sister Alice, David Housman and his wife, Gill Bates and her husband, Alice Flaherty and her family, Anne’s daughter Ellen and her boyfriend and others. Anne became chair of the Scientific Advisory Board of Nancy’s HDF, which entailed assigning grant reviewers, reviewing grants and running meetings. She was appointed chair of the Scientific Advisory Board of the Collaborative Center for XDP.
Atrocity crimes and grand corruption: the chapter argues that adopting a “corruption lens” is useful to characterize and understand patterns of crimes against humanity, especially whether acts are widespread or systematic, whether there is a state or organizational policy, how high-ranking actors are tied to crimes by subordinates (“modes of liability”) and whether specific acts constitute crimes under the ICC’s Rome Statute. The chapter uses examples from Mexico and Venezuela to illustrate.
This article explores understandings of race, mestizaje, and criollismo among blind people in Chile and Venezuela. It demonstrates that visually perceived markers are not self-evidently constitutive of race as a social category. Participants show sound knowledge of racialized categories but also reveal significant differences in the identification of racial markers and in the way that race informs their understandings of mestizaje and criollismo in Chile and Venezuela. In Chile, where racial markers convey identity fixity and intersect overtly with social class categorizations, mestizaje and criollismo are conceptualized as separate elements of national identity. In Venezuela, where racial markers convey more identity porosity, mestizaje and criollismo are conceptualized as intertwined foundations of national identity. These social configurations counter naturalizing conceptualizations of race and enable a reconsideration of how different notions of admixture continue to permeate ideals of personhood and social relations in Latin American countries. They also erode academic conceptualizations of race that unwittingly contribute to legitimize the naturalization of race in public discourse—and potentially in governmental policy and practice.
This chapter analyzes the right in Venezuela under Chavismo. It argues that the main divide of Venezuelan politics is now between democracy and autocracy rather than the ideological left and right. As authoritarianism and repression have increased and Venezuela’s socioeconomic decline has worsened, right-wing movements and factions have prioritized competitiveness through a centrist approach over an emphasis on ideological purity.
This article investigates the effect of priming the existence of corrupt connections to the bureaucracy and of trusted references on the demand for intermediary services. We performed an experimental survey with undergraduate students in Caracas, Venezuela. Participants are presented with a hypothetical situation in which they need to obtain the apostille of their professional degrees in order to migrate and are considering whether to hire an intermediary (“gestor”) or not. The survey randomly reveals the existence of an illicit connection between the gestor and the bureaucracy and whether a trusted individual referred the intermediary. Our findings are not consistent with the “market maker” hypothesis that revealing the existence of illicit connections increases demand. Consistent with the view that trust is a key element in inherently opaque transactions, we find that the demand for intermediaries is price inelastic when gestores are referred by trusted individuals.
The presence of Al-bearing goethites has been unequivocally established in Venezuelan laterite sediments by means of infrared spectroscopy (IR), chemical dissolution, and X-ray powder diffraction (XRD) methods. The composition of these samples ranges from [Fe0.89Al0.11]O(OH) to [Fe0.76Al0.24]O(OH). The data of dissolution experiments using a modified dithionite (CDB) treatment suggest a parallel behavior between Fe and Al; the gradual dissolution of Al is associated with the destruction of the Al-containing goethite. The interpretation of the CDB dissolution results for SiO2/Fe2O3 is different; silica was only slightly extracted from phases other than goethite. Substitution of Fe3+ by Al3+ in these goethites was represented on the XRD patterns by a lowering of the (110) and (111) reflections corresponding to a reduction in size of the unit cell of goethite. IR spectroscopy showed the formation of such solid solutions by a shift of the 405 cm−1 absorption band, assigned to v (Fe-O) in synthetic goethite, to >460 cm−1 in the spectrum of Al-bearing natural goethite. Moreover, this spectrum shows a shift of the 3140 cm−1 absorption, due to v (OH), to higher frequencies, indicating a H-bond weakening in [FexAl(1−x)]O(OH) compared to FeO(OH).
Scholarship on the political economy of natural resources in the Global South has often relied on the concept of the “resource curse” to explain the negative features of extractive economies and their alleged tendency to promote rent capture at the expense of national sovereignty and development. Such theories link the behavior of social actors to an excess of “unearned income,” with little reference to the concrete forms of political and cultural mediation that reproduce this structure of growth. This article explores the role of the devil symbol in populist discourse in Venezuela and how this spectral figure comes to mediate subaltern consciousness. Tracing the origins of this image to colonialism and efforts to grasp the dynamics of the modern petrostate, the analysis shows how use of this symbol to mediate the forecast transition from a rentier to a productive economy has given workers in a state enterprise a potent set of signs to articulate opposition to unjust labor conditions. Venezuelan leaders have deployed figures drawn from local folklore to divide society into two competing power blocs. Yet, while these discourses are effective at forging coalitions and justifying specific reallocations of oil wealth, they do not obviate the tensions of this transition, and a counternarrative using these same figures has arisen in response. The article concludes with an analysis of parallels between global theories of the resource curse and local Venezuelan iterations of this discourse as well as a discussion of the role of translation in theories of culture and modernity.
This article traces the professional life of Rafael Almarza, the last royal escribano (notary) of Mérida in the captaincy of Venezuela, and his role in undermining monarchical authority among the enslaved community displaced in the plains region (Los Llanos) during the war of independence in 1814-18. Despite their status as minor officials within the Spanish imperial bureaucracy, notaries, through the records they made, helped to establish legally binding truths underlying everyday actions, making them influential agents of colonial rule in the community they served, particularly among those seeking notarial documents to obtain freedom. During the battles for independence, escribanos like Almarza facilitated the transition of sovereignty and created documents that fomented the independence cause among enslaved individuals during the years of total war. By examining the manumission documents found in the notarial book Almarza kept during exile, the author of this article shows the importance of enslaved people in granting legitimacy to the emerging leadership of José Antonio Páez and the Republican project. At the same time, this study aims to provide a new look at manumission during the early stages of nation-building and the involvement of underrepresented groups in this process.
To evaluate the factors associated with food insecurity (FI) among Venezuelan migrants residing in Peru. Secondarily, to evaluate the psychometric properties of the Food Insecurity Experience Scale (FIES).
Design:
A cross-sectional study based on secondary data analysis of the 2022 Venezuelan Population Residing in Peru Survey (ENPOVE-2022, from the Spanish acronym) was conducted. FI was measured with the FIES, whose properties were tested using the Rasch model. Multinomial logistic regression was performed to estimate relative prevalence ratios with their corresponding 95 % confidence intervals.
Setting:
This survey was conducted in February and March 2022 in the eight cities most populated by Venezuelan migrants and refugees in Peru.
Participants:
Venezuelan migrants and refugees over the age of 18 years living in Peru.
Results:
A total of 7727 participants were included. Rasch reliability was adequate (0·73). The prevalence of mild, moderate and severe FI was 36·71 %, 31·14 % and 10·48 %, respectively. Being aged 25–34 and 35–44 years, unemployed, uninsured, having no formal education or secondary, illegal status, living in a dwelling with 2–4 and more than 4 people, presenting one or more than one chronic disease, residing in Peru for 0–6 months and perceived discrimination were associated with a higher probability of moderate FI. Furthermore, having secondary education, being unemployed, uninsured, never married, illegal, residing in Tumbes, presenting one or more than one chronic disease and perceived discrimination were significantly associated with severe FI.
Conclusion:
Four out of ten Venezuelan migrants residing in Peru presented moderate to severe FI. The FIES showed adequate psychometric properties. Differences in the socio-demographic, health and migratory factors associated with FI levels were found. Inter-sectoral and multi-sectoral interventions are needed and should be focused on addressing the determinants of FI.
In this article, we argue that the speeches and policy documents from the later period of Hugo Chávez's presidency exemplify ‘transnational populism’, a form of populist discourse that defies the close association between populism and nationalism that frames the scholarly literatures on both populism and Chávez. We explain why Chávez's populism took this distinctive form by reference to the history of international political thought in Latin America and the political context surrounding the creation of the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, ALBA). We suggest that while transnational populism may actually amplify the threat that other scholars have argued populist leaders pose to democratic institutions, it also offers an important corrective to how scholars think about the relationship between populism, democracy and international politics, suggesting that international institutions capable of restraining powerful states are essential to stabilising democracies in the Global South.
This chapter expands on the previous chapter by presenting survey evidence from Morocco, Jordan, Venezuela, and the Ukraine using the same conjoint experiment of business political engagement. The chapter documents that Egypt's military has a higher level of penetration than even other Arab countries. In general, Arab countries seem to have more economically involved militaries than non-Arab countries. An additional pattern is that companies that have had to pay higher bribe costs in the past five years are more likely to engage in political action, suggesting that they are trying to protect their companies and their relationships with the government.
The third edition of U.S. and Latin American Relations offers detailed theoretical and historical analyses essential for understanding contemporary US-Latin American relations. Utilizing four different theories (realism, liberal institutionalism, dependency, and autonomy) as a framework, the text provides a succinct history of relations from Latin American independence through the Covid-19 era before then examining critical contemporary issues such as immigration, human rights, and challenges to US hegemony. Engaging pedagogical features such as timelines, research questions, and annotated resources appear throughout the text, along with relevant excerpts from primary source documents. The third edition features a new chapter on the role of extrahemispheric actors such as China and Russia, as well as a significantly revised chapter on citizen insecurity that examines crime, drug trafficking, and climate change. Instructor resources include a test bank, lecture slides, and discussion questions.
In the first half of the twentieth century, Latin America was a region of immigration, where people moved from one country to another and/or people came from other continents, mostly from Europe. But by the 1960s, when many Latin American countries were suffering economic downturns, and the 1970s and 1980s, when state repression intensified, immigration turned to emigration, and many began making their way to the United States. Today, Latin Americans continue to migrate to the United States; people from all over the globe migrate to Latin America; and people move within the region. It is one of the most complex challenges confronting the United States and Latin America, and remains a very divisive issue in most countries of the region, especially the United States. This chapter looks at the push and pull factors that lead people to move from their home countries to resettle elsewhere.
With the rise of Hugo Chávez and other presidents around the turn of the century, a new breed of leftist leaders challenged the postwar political and economic rules promoted by the United States. Many Latin American left-leaning governments openly used the language of dependency theory to depict their strategy. Joining together within both economic and political institutions that excluded the United States, they hoped that they could break the stranglehold of international capitalism and imperial designs. Strategies along these lines include trade agreements, the creation of international institutions, discussions of common currencies, and mutual aid. The ultimate goal of these various efforts is to establish political and economic autonomy from the United States. That would mean being freed from political interference, economic pressure, violations of sovereignty, or any other type of imposition from the hegemonic power. This chapter takes stock of the Latin American left’s ability to chart a course distinct from that preferred by the United States in the twenty-first century.
In the past two decades, democratically elected executives across the world have used their popularity to push for legislation that, over time, destroys systems of checks and balances, hinders free and fair elections, and undermines political rights and civil liberties. Using and abusing institutions and institutional reform, some executives have transformed their countries' democracies into competitive authoritarian regimes. Others, however, have failed to erode democracy. What explains these different outcomes? Resisting Backsliding answers this question. With a focus on the cases of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Alvaro Uribe in Colombia, the book shows that the strategies and goals of the opposition are key to understanding why some executives successfully erode democracy and others do not. By highlighting the role of the opposition, this book emphasizes the importance of agency for understanding democratic backsliding and shows that even weak oppositions can defeat strong potential autocrats.
Up until the 1990s, Venezuela was one of the longest-running and most stable uninterrupted liberal democracies in Latin America. Today, it is an authoritarian regime. In nineteen years, Hugo Chávez and his successor, Nicolás Maduro, managed to destroy the system of checks and balances, end free and fair elections, and terminate political rights and civil liberties. The government has delayed and canceled elections, circumvented the authority of the elected legislature, imprisoned political opponents without trial, used lethal force against protesters, and banned opposition parties. How is it that Venezuela, historically one of the most robust democracies in the region, turned into the second most authoritarian country in Latin America?
This article introduces the concept of international clientelism and discusses how this diplomatic tool was employed by Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro as a means to get political support from several Latin American and Caribbean countries. We operationalize the concept and apply it to assess Venezuelan practices put forth in the region. We argue that the reach of Caracas’s diplomatic strategy is broader and deeper than that of simple vote-buying tactics, as it implies the promotion of structural rather than contingent ties, shielding the country against unfavorable moves in international fora. An empirical test using data for all LAC countries for the years 1999–2015 confirms that clientelistic linkages produced political support for Venezuela at the United Nations General Assembly while also moving its partners away from the United States in that institution.