Two states can have several bilateral agreements between them, some of which are legally binding and others are not. Is there a discernible pattern to how states structure the chronological sequence of binding and non-binding agreements governing a specific issue area? For example, do states prioritise a framework treaty to establish the foundation of their cooperation and let bureaucrats iron out details in non-binding instruments? Or do they first experiment with low-commitment agreements before eventually settling on a more permanent treaty? This paper explores these questions using the example of space governance, which is characterised by a high number of bilateral agreements. Examining space agreements between 287 state dyads, it argues that a combination of power asymmetry and trust levels influences the likelihood of certain types of sequences of binding and non-binding agreements. These findings are particularly relevant to the literature on informal governance, regime complexes, and space politics.

Human rights — Right to an effective remedy — Treaties — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 — United Nations Principles –– Human rights violations committed in the Philippines during dictatorship –– Victims of gross human rights violations –– Victims’ right to “full” and “effective” reparation –– Decision to have remains of former President Marcos interred at Heroes’ Cemetery –– Victims filing petitions to challenge decision –– Whether proposed interment of former dictator at Heroes’ Cemetery violating international law

Relationship of international law and municipal law — Treaties — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 — United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 2005 — United Nations Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, 2005 — Effect in the law of the Philippines

Treaties — Human rights –– Human rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other international laws — International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 — United Nations principles on Reparation and to Combat Impunity –– Rights of victims of human rights violations to “full” and “effective” reparation — Proposed interment of former President Marcos at Heroes’ Cemetery –– Whether the Philippines complying with its obligations under international law

Damages –– Reparations — Right to “full” and “effective” reparation — Victims of human rights violations in the Philippines –– Whether proposed interment of former President Marcos at Heroes’ Cemetery violating Constitution of the Philippines, domestic law and international law — Whether heroes’ burial for former dictator legal and just — The law of the Philippines

International Court of Justice — Jurisdiction — Jurisdiction ratione materiae — Whether Bank Markazi a company under Article III(1) of Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, 1955 — Whether Bank Markazi’s activities commercial — Purpose of Bank Markazi’s activities — Link between Bank Markazi’s activities and its sovereign functions — Admissibility — Whether Iranian entities exhausting local remedies in the United States — Whether remedies in United States’ legal system effective — Defences on the merits — “Clean hands” doctrine — Whether sufficient connection between wrongful acts imputed to Iran and Iran’s claims — Abuse of rights — Whether Iran invoking rights for purpose other than that for which rights created — Article XX(1)(c) and (d) of 1955 Treaty — Whether United States’ measures seeking to regulate production or traffic in arms — Whether United States’ measures necessary to protect essential security interests

Treaties — Interpretation — Application — Alleged violations of Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, 1955 — Article III(1) of 1955 Treaty — Article IV(1) of 1955 Treaty — Link between provisions — Scope of duty to recognize juridical status of entities under Article III(1) — Whether question being existence of company rather than company’s separateness — Meaning of “fair and equitable treatment” — Denial of justice — Whether provisions removing separateness of companies amounting to denial of justice — Whether United States’ measures “unreasonable” or “discriminatory” — Whether measures manifestly excessive — Article III(2) of 1955 Treaty — Whether Article III(2) conferring procedural and substantive rights or merely access to courts — Whether Iranian companies’ access to United States’ courts limited — Article IV(2) of 1955 Treaty — Whether United States’ measures expropriatory — Illegality — Whether “most constant protection and security” protecting against both physical and legal harm — Article V(1) of 1955 Treaty — Whether Article V(1) applying to cases of expropriation — Article VII(1) of 1955 Treaty — Meaning of “restrictions” — Whether Iran’s claims relating to exchange restrictions — Article X(1) of 1955 Treaty — Whether financial transactions falling within meaning of “commerce” — Whether commerce taking place between the territories of United States and Iran — Whether United States’ measures actual impediments to commerce — Remedies — Cessation — Compensation — Satisfaction

International organizations — Russia’s Accession to the World Trade Organization — Constitutional scrutiny of Protocol on the Accession of Russia to the Marrakesh Agreement, 2011 — Whether Protocol conforming with the Constitution of Russia 1993 — Whether Russian sovereignty infringed — Whether national security threatened

Relationship of international law and municipal law — Treaties — Signature — Ratification — Application — Russia’s Accession to the Marrakesh Agreement — Protocol — Whether in conformity with the Constitution of Russia — Role of the Russian Constitutional Court — Extent of review

Treaties — Signature — Ratification — Application — Constitutional scrutiny of treaties — Extent of constitutional review by Russian Constitutional Court — Constitutional Court reviewing specifically indicated provisions and not the treaty in its entirety — Constitutional Court not reviewing compliance with procedure for ratification — The law of the Russian Federation

Legal scholars continue to revisit historical treaties between Western and non-Western nations to challenge long-standing accounts of non-Western peoples’ engagement with international law. Following this trend, new scholarship has stressed African agency in Euro-African treaty-making. However, legal scholars have generally overlooked African perspectives, pointing to a lack of sources. Focusing on nineteenth-century treaty-making between France and the polities of the Western Sudan in West Africa, this article excavates African perspectives through a novel reading of Euro-African treaties in an African context. This reading analyses treaties within the Western Sudan’s broader diplomatic corpus in both French and Arabic. By focusing on markers of translation, transcription, and negotiation left on different copies of treaties, this method brings to light arguments and practices that have been obscured in published European-language versions. Reading Franco-Sudanian treaties in a Sudanian context reveals that different norms governed the ratification of treaties in the Western Sudan and Europe. Treaties that scholars have long considered unratified were in fact ratified according to Western Sudanian norms, which designated the governor of French Senegal rather than the French president as the official competent to ratify treaties for France. However, when French officials sought to use treaties to claim sovereign rights in West Africa against Great Britain, they pressed the president to ratify them again. Presidential ratification thus served to transpose Franco-Sudanian treaties from an African to a Western normative order. Uncovering the African origins of Euro-African treaties thus reveals their differential operation across autonomous inter-polity orders.

Do recent increases in women’s representation around the world have implications for international relations? We argue that greater representation of women in legislatures increases the likelihood of human rights treaty ratification for two reasons. First, given their shared gendered experiences of exclusion and discrimination, women legislators will advocate on behalf of marginalized groups on an international scale as transnational surrogate representatives. Second, women legislators may be more inclined to prioritize the ratification of human rights treaties because these treaties align with their domestic policy preferences, which aim to support marginalized groups. We contend that, in countries where ratification depends upon legislative approval, legislatures are more likely to ratify human rights treaties as women’s presence increases. Using an original dataset of 201 multilateral treaties, we find that countries become more likely to ratify human rights treaties as levels of women’s legislative representation increase.

The violent and competitive context in which trade relations between the states of Senegambia and Europeans evolved required moments of calm and stability, which were decisive and important factors in the cohabitation of trade actors. Diplomacy was a fundamental political lever for European trade in Senegambia. It had become a major stake in the daily lives of the actors. Diplomacy was generally reserved for field actors from different political cultures and with different political and economic ambitions. Diplomacy took the form of negotiations, and took the form of simple agreements of principle, notably in the context of palavers, or the conclusion of trade and peace treaties. The aim of diplomacy, for example, was to establish strong, peaceful commercial relations between trade players and to regularize the tax system, which was the fundamental basis of trade and the expression of the sovereignty of local chiefs towards the Europeans.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is one of the most important mega-regional trade agreements signed to date. Yet, it failed to include an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism in its investment chapter. What explains this omission? To unpack this, we examine international negotiations as a two-step process. In the first stage, we theorize that initial preferences towards ISDS are based on countries’ orientation toward foreign direct investment (FDI), experience with ISDS, and past treaty practice. Second, we theorize that during protracted negotiations, adverse regime developments and domestic politics can have a profound impact on treaty design. To test our framework, we examine the RCEP negotiations. Our analysis shows that mounting cases as well as the eroding norm of ISDS in other treaties lowered support for ISDS as the negotiations progressed. Then, a change of government in Malaysia shifted that country’s position dramatically, which tipped the balance against ISDS in the final round of negotiations. Our findings have important implications for the international investment regime. They highlight the factors that determine countries’ initial preferences while also demonstrating the importance of developments during the negotiations, which can lead to the abandonment of the institutional status quo.