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This chapter traces trajectories of counterrevolutions following six revolutions, which exhibit the full range of counterrevolutionary outcomes and offer useful comparisons to Egypt. First, it examines two revolutions that never experienced counterrevolutions: Tunisia’s and Libya’s 2011 revolutions. Both occurred in the same Arab Spring wave as Egypt’s revolution, but in Tunisia the new government faced a military whose interests were not deeply threatened by civilian rule and in Libya the coercive capacity of the former regime was largely destroyed in the brief civil war. Next, it examines two Latin American revolutions that demonstrate the two ways in which revolutionaries can maintain their capacity and defeat counterrevolutionary threats. Following Cuba’s 1959 revolution, Fidel Castro’s regime put down multiple counterrevolutions using its loyal revolutionary army. In Venezuela, following the 1958 democratic revolution, the government enjoyed none of these coercive resources, yet managed to thwart multiple counterrevolutionary coup attempts through a preservation of revolutionary unity and a return to mass mobilization. Finally, in two cases that are otherwise quite different to Egypt – Thailand’s 1973 democratic uprising and Hungary’s 1919 communist revolution – a very similar set of mechanisms undermined the capacity of the new governments and created opportunities for counterrevolutionaries to return to power.
Modernity has been the idée fixe of law and society scholarship from the very beginning. It is impossible to imagine our field without its roots in the rather different theories of Weber, Marx, and Durkheim about the defining characteristics of a modern legal system; and their theories still resonate in the work of 21st-century researchers. Moreover, pre-modern law and post-modern law, as their names suggest, are also defined and analysed by law and society scholars in relation to the central concept of modernity. Modernity and its pre- and post-incarnations are the very bedrock of the law and society field.
Over the last few decades, the concept of Indigeneity has gained traction in Cambodia and Thailand, partially because of its potential to assist Indigenous Peoples in gaining more control over contested lands and forests. The Cambodian government recognizes Indigenous Peoples and their communal land titles. Since 2009, when a sub-decree was issued for registering Indigenous communities and their lands, dozens of villages in northeastern Cambodia have obtained communal land titles. The government of Thailand, however, does not officially recognize the existence of Indigenous Peoples. Nevertheless, the concept of Indigenous Peoples is gaining support in Thailand. Over the last few years, Indigenous activists in both countries have increasingly engaged in electoral politics. The Cambodia Indigenous Peoples’ Democracy Party (CIPDP) contested the commune and national elections of 2017 and 2018, respectively. In Thailand, Indigenous activists have also become more involved in electoral politics, especially during the 2019 national elections, when the first ethnic Hmong person was elected to Parliament. This Indigenous engagement in electoral politics represents a new strategy to gain more cultural and language rights at the legislative level, as well as tenure over land and other natural resources.
This paper argues that security cooperation among neighbouring countries in the Global South is often hampered by domestic instability and fragmented territorial control resulting from state failures. Geographical proximity, characterised by porous borders and high levels of cross-border human mobility, directly impacts the security of neighbouring states. This creates a dilemma for security cooperation when one state lacks the capacity for effective governance. Empirically, the paper examines the evolution of Thailand’s security relations with Myanmar over recent decades, highlighting the profound impact of Myanmar’s political instability on Thailand. It analyses how the 2021 military coup and the subsequent collapse of Myanmar’s domestic political order have shaped Thailand’s securitisation of non-traditional security threats. By focusing on issues such as irregular migration, public health issues, drug trafficking, and transboundary pollution, the paper explores how these challenges have been securitised in Thailand and how they have complicated security cooperation between the two countries. The paper contends that the limited territorial control and legitimacy of Myanmar’s military government have significantly hindered Thailand’s ability to address its security concerns effectively. It further calls for security cooperation in the Global South beyond the conventional state-to-state level.
The Cold War is often depicted in binary terms: communists against anti-communists, the left against the right, or the free world versus the communist world. However, during the latter part of the Cold War, particularly following the 1979 war between China and Vietnam, earlier Cold War binaries no longer applied, and new alliances were established. These alliances often brought people with the same enemies together, despite having little in common ideologically. This article examines the historical circumstances and Cold War geographies of ethnic Khmu anti-Lao PDR and anti-Vietnamese insurgents, including their alliances with right-wing governments in Thailand and the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC). As neutralists, these Khmu occupied a political space rarely discussed in relation to the Cold War. Although the PRC provided training, weapons, and supplies to the neutralist Khmu between 1979 and 1983, later their political leader, General Kong Le, had a falling out with the Chinese, and the PRC stopped supporting his largely ethnic minority soldiers. However, up until 1989, the Thai government continued to allow the Khmu to maintain bases in Thailand for launching military operations inside Laos, until the Thai government adopted the “Battlefield to Marketplace” policy. Some Khmu continued resisting inside northwestern Laos during the early 1990s, but with declining numbers of soldiers and decreased outside support, armed resistance ended in 2003. It is critical that the geographies and alliances of the later Cold War be differentiated from those of the earlier years of the Cold War. This transnational insurgency deserves attention.
This chapter analyses the international science collaboration between scientists in Chulalongkorn University (CU) in Bangkok and scientists and managers from Kawasaki Heavy Industry (KHI), Japan. The Chapter argues, first, that the integrity of national regulations is violated through international science collaborations, including by the governments whose regulations are violated. As there is no credible regulatory mandate on a global level, such violations receive little attention. Second, in contrast with notions of science collaboration that view collaboration as a bond between two or more partners to attain a shared goal by pooling resources, the chapter’s examination of the collaborative project shows that its goals are shared in different, often incompatible ways. And, third, observing how regulation in international science collaboration is treated as a form of ‘regulatory capital’, the chapter argues that international collaboration and competition form part of the same process. This study of regulatory capital explains why the examination of science collaborations does not just pertain to exchanges of scientific know-how and technological expertise; it also requires the investigation of the ways in which socio-economic, political and regulatory conditions enable available resources to be used to satisfy a range of goals, many of which are mutually incompatible.
Chapter 8 asks how various forms of regulatory brokerage (informal; with state-support; deregulation; international; and, global) are interrelated, and how they have emerged across time in the field of regenerative medicine. A distinction between opportunistic (profiting from discrepancies between jurisdictions to forge collaborations) and active forms of regulatory brokerage (involving activities directed at the creation of regulations) helps to show how awareness of regulation as capital has spread. Extending from individual science-entrepreneurs to larger organisations, including universities, companies, state institutions and international organisations, regulatory brokerage has become part of the entrepreneurial culture of science management. To remain competitive, countries strategically follow the regulatory reforms of competitors, culminating in a cascade of regulatory adjustments and accompanied by the proliferation of regulatory violence. National discussions on regulatory trends in regenerative medicine, suggest that, though differently expressed, competitive desire tends to be an important driver of regulatory reform. But, at the same time, in some countries trends emerge that do not centre on competitive desire but on solidarity and concern for care.
This analysis explores the impact of the Myanmar earthquake on March 28, 2025 and its subsequent effects on Thailand and Myanmar by collecting and synthesizing data on immediate casualties, infrastructural damage, humanitarian needs, disaster preparedness in both countries, and relevant theoretical concepts. The earthquake in Myanmar has created a major humanitarian crisis, compounded by existing weaknesses, while the effects in Thailand have highlighted significant gaps in urban safety protocols. Differences in preparedness and societal awareness have influenced the outcomes in each country, emphasizing the urgent need to strengthen resilience capacities across the affected region.
This paper explores the politics of Asia-Pacific War memory and memorialization in Southeast Asia, evident in the production context and visual semiotic resources of Thailand's Victory Monument, a generic memorial to Thai war heroes, and the Philippines' Shrine of Valor, a historical shrine complex dedicated to Filipino and US soldiers of the Asia-Pacific War. These heritage structures represent two divergent memorialization practices that demonstrate how the commemoration or suppression of war memory is influenced by politics, agendas, and the benefits it brings to the state. In Thailand, the inward justification and outward restraint stem from the difficult choices the state had to make during the war. In the Philippines, while war memorialization was pronounced and served state aims, it was initially undermined by President Ferdinand Marcos, who wanted to bolster his fraudulent war heroism claims. The cases illustrate how diverging national memorial practices surrounding the war's contested past achieved similar aims and how memorial sites become repositories of meaning potentials through which we could make sense of the nation and its international entanglements.
In 2021, the 44th session of the World Heritage Committee Meeting voted to list the Kaeng Krachan Forest Complex as a Natural World Heritage Site, seven years after it was first nominated for consideration by Thailand. A central point to the debate was concerns raised over human rights abuses relating to the Indigenous Karen people living inside the park boundaries. This paper undertakes an analysis of the World Heritage Committee discussion, unpacking key themes of Outstanding Universal Value, human rights, and the role of local communities to illustrate the impact that World Heritage – and the subsequent Authorized Heritage Discourse (AHD) it creates – can have on Indigenous communities.
Transnational marriage is a controversial topic in Hmong communities in the United States, Laos, and Thailand, and has sometimes led to intra-ethnic disputes and conflicts. Initially, many of the Hmong American men who travelled overseas to marry Hmong Lao or Thai women were already married. Furthermore, the Hmong American community has frequently come to believe that economic gain is the primary motivation for Hmong Lao/Thai women to marry Hmong American men. On the other hand, some activists have referred to these marriages generally as “abusive transnational marriages.” The association of economic resources with transnational marriage, including remittances, increased bride prices, and opportunities for migration to the United States, has perpetuated negative stereotypes that frequently overshadow the personal stories of many Hmong Lao/Thai women who do not fit with the stereotypes. For these women, marrying a Hmong American man signifies not only personal gain but also economic advancement for their families. This paper reviews the intricacies related to the topic of Hmong transnational marriage between Hmong American men and their Hmong Lao and Hmong Thai brides. In doing so, we argue that it is important to consider the complexity and nuances associated with Hmong transnational marriages, as they take on various forms that go beyond standard stereotypes.
How do different regime types execute a security response during a pandemic? We interrogate the politics of monopolistic securitization which we argue to have significantly directed and influenced the COVID-19 policy strategies adopted in the ‘democratic’ United Kingdom (UK) and ‘authoritarian’ Thailand. Despite their stark political differences, we contend that the British and Thai states’ parallel resort to monopolistic securitization as an overarching pandemic approach effectively made them ‘functionally similar’ by producing security responses that differed only in magnitude and scale but not in kind. Integrating securitization and democratic standards violations frameworks, we find out that the British and Thai authorities’ monopolistic securitization of COVID-19 initially constrained the intersubjective process required to socially construct the pandemic as a primary existential threat endangering both countries. This significantly diminished their public audiences’ individual/agential and collective/institutional capacity to deliberate the immediate emergency measures they unilaterally deployed, particularly during the pandemic’s early stages. Consequently, whether it was in the UK with a supposedly robust democracy or in Thailand with at best a hybrid regime if not outright authoritarian, the security responses that emerged constituted varying types and degrees of violations within the illiberal-authoritarian spectrum. Nevertheless, as the pandemic progressed, the fundamental deliberative-iterative mechanism underpinning securitization enabled the British and Thai public audiences to gradually reclaim their role and space, allowing them to challenge the appropriateness and legitimacy of the existing emergency measures, thereby weakening the states’ monopolistic control over the process.
One endearing image of the Thai-American Cold War diplomacy features an image of two ‘kings’ – Bhumibol Adulyadej, the king of Thailand, and Elvis Presley, the king of rock and roll, on the set of the movie musical G.I. Blues. The meeting took place during King Bhumibol’s state visit to the United States in 1960. His stopover in California was often described as an extended family holiday, therefore being denied its significance as an ingenious diplomatic spectacle. It was this image of the two kings inside the soundstage of Paramount Studios that helped to secure Thailand’s diplomatic allegiance and the future of its monarchy. This chapter traces historical accounts and different perspectives presented in the visual documents of the royal tour of the United States. It focuses on an image captured by a Hollywood photographer, Nat Dallinger, to illustrate how the Thai-US post-war diplomatic event relied on the Hollywood’s ‘dream machine’ to establish itself as an epicentre of goodwill, prosperity, and power. The chapter also proposes that the 1960 diplomatic event, despite its internationalist outlook, was meant for the Thai audience, and its image of diplomacy formulated a ‘mirror stage’ of the Thailand’s post–Second World War identity.
This chapter explores the impact of conflict on the issue of statelessness in Asia using a case study centred on the Kuomingtang (KMT) soldiers and their descendants in northern Thailand. The case study examines the historical background of the KMT Secret Army and conducts legal and policy analysis on relevant countries including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (RoC) and Thailand. These analyses shed light on how the group became stateless. The chapter scrutinizes the nationality laws of each country linked to the case study and the practical implementation of these laws and offers observations on the statelessness phenomenon. The case study demonstrates that violent conflicts may lead to de jure statelessness or place people at risk of statelessness due to the loss of a sense of national belonging and legal identity documents as by-products of violent conflict; that (re)gaining citizenship of a country might not be easy as relevant laws change and the operation of laws become too difficult for vulnerable groups to manage; and that the long-lasting political consequences of conflict continue to influence state practice in the case of both PRC and RoC, regardless of the group’s rights under their respective nationality laws.
Childhood statelessness is an urgent global human rights issue. Yet, there is limited ethnographic data on the everyday and varied experiences of stateless children and youth, whose representations in mainstream media and campaign materials tend to transmute them into generalized subjects with an ostensibly universal experience of total abjection. Drawing on thirteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in northern Thailand, this chapter examines the process of ‘learning to be stateless’ among Shan youth participants and the impact of statelessness during their various life stages. The chapter argues that statelessness is not necessarily a fully and actively internalized status since birth but a dynamic condition that constantly undergoes re-interpretation by the affected youth at punctuated moments and at various life stages. By examining the contemporary regime of statelessness in a country such as Thailand, where stateless persons have access to certain rights as children but not as adults, this chapter calls attention to the intersection of life stages and statelessness and the complex ways in which such regimes of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion place the emotional and practical burdens on stateless persons as they transition from childhood into adolescence and adulthood.
In June 2020, the largest democracy movement in a generation emerged in Thailand. The movement began with three demands: the current PM must resign, a new constitution must be drafted, and the state must stop threatening dissidents. In August 2020, a fourth demand was added: the monarchy must be reformed. This demand is where the transformative power of the movement came from, but also led to a swift crackdown in the form of police violence and prosecutions. This may appear to be a particularly egregious illustration of the rule-by-law regimes favored by autocrats, but close examination indicates that the law is being used to criminalize peaceful dissent and the mere questioning of how power is exercised. By examining several key cases, this chapter shows how the Thai regime aims to reshape both the rule of law and the polity through the arbitrary exercise of repressive power.
In this chapter, the focus shifts to how language policies are enforced, a term which I use instead of the more traditional ‘implementation’ to highlight the need to focus on action in specific policy contexts and accept the messiness and asymmetry inherent to such a focus. I argue in particular for greater attention to how policies impact the individual by codifying emotional responses and structuring the linguistic habitus. The case study looks at how English language learning is enforced as a moral imperative in Thai mass media through emotive references to the English Proficiency Index published annually by Education First.
During the Third Indochina War (1979-1991), the ideological alignments of involved parties differed from those during the Second Indochina War, also known as the Vietnam War. Whereas the Second Indochina War pitted communists squarely against non-communists and anti-communists, the Third Indochina War was more complicated and less ideological or political, with communists often fighting against other communists due to the Sino-Soviet ideological split. The enemy of one's enemy was frequently viewed as a friend, often leading to unlikely alliances not rooted in ideological or political similarities. In this article, I argue that it is important to consider the unlikely alliances that emerged during the Third Indochina War by focusing on the particular cross-border interactions and conflicts between communists and non-communists that occurred in the Emerald Triangle, the tri-border region between Laos, Cambodia and Thailand. Focusing particularly on the Lao insurgent perspective, I consider how Lao anti-communist insurgents, the Khmer Rouge, the Communist Party of Thailand, other armed groups, and the Thai military participated in transnational collaboration in this region during the Third Indochina War. In particular, based largely on Lao-language interviews with key figures in the Lao insurgency conducted for over a decade, I examine how Lao insurgents interacted with Khmer Rouge to oppose a common enemy, communist Vietnam and their allies, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and how the Thai military supported them, but only insofar as it enabled them to maintain control over security inside Thailand.
Chapter 5 turns to attempts by French missionaries and envoys to convert the ruler of the most powerful state in Southeast Asia, King Narai of Ayutthaya, in the 1680s. It first lays out the setting into which these proselytisers arrived, playing particularly close attention to the elevation of the king in both divinised and righteous modes and his relationship with the sangha. It then shows how the commercial and administrative functioning of the kingdom pulled in sources of outside strength, which promoted the relevance of religious diplomacy. In the 1680s, a Greek adventurer, Constantine Phaulkon, became the most powerful officer at court, and he fashioned an image to the French of a ruler ripe for conversion, giving rise to a series of embassies received in Versailles and Ayutthaya. The French sought to enhance their prestige through the use of astronomical–astrological science and had a chance at a healing miracle in the 1660s. If this failed the French could take comfort from the fact that Narai was somewhat restless within his ceremonialised role, had tense relations with the Buddhist monkhood, was a cosmopolitan attracted to French culture, and was concerned to maintain the good will of Louis XIV. Some even portrayed him (mistakenly) as moving towards deism.
This chapter revisits the efforts mostly spearheaded by ASEAN to bring the Third Indochina War to an end. As ASEAN is the sum of its parts, the chapter describes the perspectives of the various ASEAN member states as well as how they arrived at a collective decision.