Redistricting is often a hotly contested affair within states as the party in power attempts to maximize its chances for electoral success through injecting partisanship into the process. Previous works have evaluated how different redistricting practices can influence elections, but little is known about how redistricting can impact citizen attitudes toward government. Using an original survey with a unique experiment, we evaluate the relationship between how redistricting is performed and how satisfied citizens are with the state of democracy in the United States. We find that the mere perception of redistricting being done in a partisan manner leads to decreased levels of system support. Furthermore, our models show that independent redistricting commissions tend to reduce the perceived prevalence of gerrymandering and boost citizens’ evaluations of the democratic process.

While political opposition to economic globalisation has increased, several governments have adopted stricter unilateral interventions in global supply chains in the name of sustainability, despite their potentially significant economic costs. We argue that these policy choices are partly driven by politicians’ incentives to align with domestic public opinion. In particular, new information disclosure rules enable governments to implement market access restrictions compliant with binding trade liberalisation commitments while (a priori) obscuring their costs to voters. We assess the latter argument with original survey data and experiments with representative samples from the twelve major OECD importing economies (N = 24,000). Indeed, citizens expect substantive benefits while discounting costs from these new regulations, resulting in majority support for rather stringent standards. We further observe that these relationships are muted in countries with high trade exposure. These findings suggest that governments may strategically implement unilateral policies with high-cost obfuscation to garner domestic voter support, driving regulatory proliferation in international economic relations.

Rising inequalities have been described as fertile ground for populist parties across the world. In this article, we investigate the role that inequality perception plays in strengthening populist attitudes and increasing support for populist parties. Using data from the International Social Survey Programme, we find that those who perceive greater inequality in society are more likely to support populist parties. To explore the causal relationship, we also conduct a survey experiment in Denmark, Germany, and Italy, randomly exposing participants to factual information about the wealth distribution. The results show that the perception of inequality can increase populist attitudes, but does not immediately affect the likelihood of voting for populist parties in this context. The findings speak to current debates on how inequalities and their perception became a pre-condition for the rise of populist parties all over Europe.

Commemorations of the Confederacy remain pervasive throughout the Southern U.S. Historians have long established that many of these symbols were erected during the Jim Crow era to reinforce white political dominance in public spaces. Yet, little is known about how these enduring symbols shape perceptions among people of different racial identities today. This study examines Confederate monuments where they are most prominently placed: courthouse grounds. Using an original survey experiment of Black, white, and Latino Southerners, it investigates whether the presence of a Confederate monument in front of a courthouse influences feelings of personal safety and welcomeness, as well as perceptions of the fairness of the court system. Findings reveal that a Confederate monument made Black and Latino Southerners feel less safe and welcome at the courthouse and led Black Southerners to perceive the court system as less fair toward people like them. In contrast, Confederate monuments had no overall effect on white Southerners’ perceptions of courthouses or the judicial system. These results underscore the role of contentious symbols in reinforcing inequalities in public spaces.

Solar geoengineering offers a speculative means to cool the planet by reflecting solar radiation into space. While some research suggests that awareness of solar geoengineering could reduce public support for decarbonization through a moral hazard mechanism, other studies indicate that it could serve as a “clarion call” that motivates further action. Using a pre-registered factorial design, we assess how sharing balanced information on solar geoengineering affects attitudes toward decarbonization policies and climate attitudes among 2,509 US residents. We do not find that solar geoengineering information affects support for decarbonization on average, though it may increase support among initially less supportive subgroups; moreover, this information tends to increase the perception that climate change is a daunting problem that cannot be resolved without decarbonization. Our results suggest that concerns about moral hazard should not discourage research on solar geoengineering – as long as the public encounters realistic messages about solar geoengineering’s role.

This paper examines the effectiveness of media literacy interventions in countering misinformation among in-transit migrants in Mexico and Colombia. We conducted experiments to assess whether well-known strategies for fighting misinformation are effective for this understudied yet particularly vulnerable population. We evaluate the impact of digital media literacy tips on migrants’ ability to identify false information and their intentions to share migration-related content. We find that these interventions can effectively decrease migrants’ intentions to share misinformation. We also find suggestive evidence that asking participants to consider accuracy may inadvertently influence their sharing behavior by acting as a behavioral nudge, rather than simply eliciting their sharing intentions. Additionally, the interventions reduced trust in social media as an information source while maintaining trust in official channels. The findings suggest that incorporating digital literacy tips into official websites could be a cost-effective strategy to reduce misinformation circulation among migrant populations.

This study examines whether Americans are more supportive of immigration when migrants share their partisan preferences. To address this question, we embedded a preregistered experiment in a nationally representative survey that was fielded the week before the 2024 US Presidential Election. The main experimental treatment provided information that some immigrant groups tend to favor Donald Trump and the Republican Party. This information reduced support for immigration among Democrats and increased support for immigration among Republicans. Our findings suggest that immigrants’ political identities impact public support for immigration. They also suggest that Trump’s apparent gains among immigrant voters in the 2024 election have the potential to reduce partisan polarization over immigration in the future.

Scholarship has identified key determinants of people’s belief in misinformation predominantly from English-language contexts. However, multilingual citizens often consume news media in multiple languages. We study how the language of consumption affects belief in misinformation and true news articles in multilingual environments. We suggest that language may pass on specific cues affecting how bilinguals evaluate information. In a ten-week survey experiment with bilingual adults in Ukraine, we measured if subjects evaluating information in their less-preferred language were less likely to believe it. We find those who prefer Ukrainian are less likely to believe both false and true stories written in Russian by approximately 0.2 standard deviation units. Conversely, those who prefer Russian show increased belief in false stories in Ukrainian, though this effect is less robust. A secondary digital media literacy intervention does not increase discernment as it reduces belief in both true and false stories equally.

While individuals are expected to perceive similarly identical quantities, regardless of the used units (e.g., 1 ton or 1000 kg), several scholars suggest that consumers over-infer quantities when they are presented in bigger and phonetically longer numbers. In two experimental studies, we examine this numerosity bias in the context of household food waste. Unlike previous scholars, manipulating numerosity revealed no effect: perceptions of food waste volume and likelihood to reduce it are not influenced by the used numeric value (2500 g vs. 2.5 kg; Study 1) nor the number of syllables (two kilos eight hundred seventy-five grams vs. three kilograms; Study 2).

Globally, prejudicial attitudes toward women persist. By taking anti-discriminatory stances, value-oriented organizations – e.g., political parties and religious denominations – can tap into group identities to shape their members’ attitudes. We know much less about the role of organizations that are not inherently value-oriented – such as sports teams – in accomplishing the same. Yet, as various campaigns by sports teams worldwide indicate, this is precisely what non-value-oriented organizations increasingly attempt to do. Can football team fandom be leveraged to promote gender-egalitarian attitudes? We address this question with data from a national survey in Brazil and a survey experiment conducted in partnership with a major Brazilian football club. We find that while football team identity is salient and may be leveraged to change displayed social attitudes, the Club’s anti-sexism campaign inadvertently increased men’s expressed prejudice toward women in football – although it may have also improved institutional trust among women.

An explosion of survey experimental research shows that public support for nuclear use is alarmingly high and malleable. Thus, nuclear nonuse may depend on elite restraint. Can elites be counted on to resist nuclear use? How do national security elites think about nuclear weapons, and what does this imply for potential nuclear use and our understanding of public–elite gaps in political behavior? Drawing on the literature on public opinion formation, I argue that two features of public attitudes toward nuclear weapons help explain elite–public gaps on nuclear weapons: low salience and low knowledge. I then test this explanation using parallel preregistered survey experiments assessing support for nuclear use across three samples: the US public before the Ukraine conflict; the US public after the Ukraine conflict began; and a highly elite sample of US military officers and strategists, also after the Ukraine conflict began. While the US public is willing to support nuclear use, US national security elites are significantly more reluctant. Among the public, respondents for whom nuclear weapons are a high-knowledge or high-salience issue behave more like elites: they are less likely to support nuclear use. The findings have important implications for survey experimental research, scholarship on nuclear weapons, public opinion formation, and elite–public gaps in political behavior.

While often described as a unified process imposed by external actors on weak, conflict-ridden countries, international state building increasingly comprises a variety of actors involved in different ways in (re)building a diverse set of institutions. Civilian preferences are often excluded from this fragmented environment. We identify and explicate three dimensions along which postconflict state building meaningfully varies: the actor involved, the type of institution targeted, and the form of involvement. We then examine how variation along each dimension impacts civilians’ state-building preferences with two rounds of original survey experiments fielded in Liberia. We find that Liberians largely prefer state-building processes overseen by a subset of international actors; that they prefer state building focused on security-oriented institutions over non-security-oriented institutions; and that different forms of involvement in the process meaningfully influence their preferences. We also find that these preferences depend on civilians’ characteristics. Ultimately, we provide an initial, conceptual mapping of the diversified landscape of international state building, as well as an empirical “unpacking” of the conditions that may shape civilians’ preferences toward the process.

Radical right behavior and support for radical right parties have increased across many countries in recent decades. A growing body of research has argued that, similar to the spread of other extremist behaviors, this is due to an erosion of political norms. This suggests that re-stigmatizing radical right parties might be an effective way of countering their growth. We use a survey experiment in Spain that compares the effectiveness of three theory-driven interventions aimed at increasing political stigma against a radical right party. Contrary to expectations, we fail to validate the efficacy of vignette-based attempts at stigmatization, instead identifying some backlash effects. Methodologically, our findings underscore the importance of validating treatments, as we show that simple attempts at re-stigmatization can produce null or opposing effects to their intended purpose. Theoretically, our results support the idea that normalization is a “one-way street,” in that re-stigmatizing parties is difficult after a party has become normalized.

Despite consensus that quality of life (QoL) in later adulthood is multi-dimensional, scholars’ perceptions of the dimensions the construct comprises differ. Under the premise that models and measures of QoL should correspond with lay perspectives to have relevance to the targeted population, we investigated the constituents of QoL in later adulthood as perceived by middle-aged and older laypersons. We fielded a factorial design vignette experiment among 2,544 respondents aged 50+ participating in the Dutch Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences panel to assess how 11 dimensions identified from four established QoL instruments designed for older people (WHOQOL-OLD, CASP-19, OPQOL, ICECAP-O) influence QoL evaluations. The study extends prior work on lay perspectives on QoL by combining the internal validity of an experiment with the external validity of a true population sample. All dimensions considered significantly impacted the QoL ratings in the expected direction. Enjoyment and social participation had a significantly larger contribution than the other dimensions. Models stratified by age group showed a strong degree of similarity, suggesting a high level of consensus across age groups about the constituents of QoL in later adulthood. The study highlights the necessity of capturing a broad range of dimensions when conceptualizing QoL in later adulthood. Our finding that dimensions that were omitted in selected established instruments still contributed substantially to QoL evaluations arguably implies that these instruments may have suboptimal content validity. The insights gained from this study are important for developing and evaluating policies aimed at improving QoL for the ageing population.

When and why do wealthy individuals support redistribution? Under standard political economy models, preferences for redistribution are a function of material conditions. The partisanship literature, on the contrary, argues that partisan identification determines redistributive preferences. We move beyond this dichotomy to argue that the ideology of the government enacting redistribution is a key factor explaining support for redistribution among the wealthy. Through survey experiments during the 2022 Colombian election, we find that the wealthy are more likely to support redistribution under a right-wing government and expect redistribution under the Right to be more efficient and less economically disruptive. We find heterogeneous treatment effects across ideological groups. However, regardless of ideology, the wealthy do not expect macroeconomic instability from right-wing redistribution.

The boom in survey experiments in international relations has allowed researchers to make causal inferences on longstanding foreign policy debates such as democratic peace, and audience costs. However, most of these experiments rely on mass samples, whereas foreign policy is arguably more technocratically driven. We probe the validity of generalizing from mass to elite preferences by exploring preferences of ordinary U.S. citizens and foreign policy experts (employees of the U.S. Department of State) in two identical conjoint experiments on democratic peace. We find that experts are not only more opposed to military actions against other democracies than members of the public—but also that overall preferences about the matters of war and peace are stronger among foreign policy professionals.

Research on the political consequences of terrorism often finds a rally around the flag effect: terrorist attacks, as other types of threats, tend to produce spikes in popularity and support for the incumbent, as citizens turn to those in power seeking protection. Most research, however, is based on single case studies that analyze very salient attacks from international terrorist organizations. Even if these studies are well identified, the question of generalizability remains, as the studied attacks are often very idiosyncratic. In this paper, we explore the rally around the flag effect in an arguably difficult context: a sustained terrorist campaign held by domestic terrorist groups in a parliamentary democracy (Spain). To overcome the limitations of the single-attack studies, we use a multiple unexpected event approach: we developed a systematic process of matching the occurrence of terror attacks during the fieldwork of official public opinion surveys in Spain, through which we identified 142 valid attack-survey pairs. We find that in the attacked region support for the incumbent increases, on average, around 4 percentage points right after an attack, while support for the opposition decreases in a similar amount. These effects seem to occur mostly for the conservative incumbent and are especially relevant for the attacks that target civilians. We use a survey experiment to provide additional evidence in support for our interpretation of the findings.

How can states credibly commit to peace and assure other countries? One source of credible assurance identified in previous studies is the cost to a state’s international reputation. When a state violates a prior commitment to peace, it suffers reputational damage, which can be costly in various ways. These reputational costs, in turn, serve as a tying-hands signal that enhances the credibility of peaceful commitments. Nonetheless, empirical research on whether and under what conditions such reputation costs arise remains limited. To address this gap, this study conducts a preregistered survey experiment in the United States, using a hypothetical scenario involving military buildups by China and Japan. The results indicate that violating commitments to peace undermines the credibility of future commitments, particularly when the violator is a rival country. These findings suggest that, with some limitations, international reputation costs can serve as a reliable mechanism for ensuring the credibility of assurances.