This article examines the lived experiences of multiculturalism among the Indonesian migrant women living in South Korea through the lens of ‘everyday otherness’. The process experienced in this context is seen as part of a broader development of Korean multiculturalism. The article investigates how cultural encounters are perceived, interpreted, and negotiated by Indonesian migrant women. Drawing from qualitative research that dealt with migration narratives, the study aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion on Korean multiculturalism and identify areas for improvement. It argues that everyday otherness practices in Korea have become subtler, more nuanced, and multi-layered. It reveals that while everyday multicultural practices in Korea have become more welcoming the presence of foreigners, the daily experience of racism and otherness continues, and is even more confounding.

Existing research often interprets the limited impact of candidate gender on vote choice as evidence of minimal gender bias in politics. However, this overlooks the dual role of candidate gender, as both a heuristic for substantive representation and a trigger for sexism in voter decision-making. These competing mechanisms can diminish the effects of each other, obscuring the true influence of gender bias in electoral behavior. Using conjoint experiments in South Korea, a context where gender issues are highly politicized and sexism remains widespread, we examine how candidate gender affects voter evaluations in low- and high-information environments. Our findings reveal that in low-information settings, candidate gender serves as a cue for substantive representation, leading to co-sex voting among women, while simultaneously activating hostile sexism among male voters, reducing support for female candidates. In high-information settings, explicit candidate policy positions diminish the reliance on gender cues but do not eliminate gender bias. Instead, sexism manifests through opposition to gender-equity policies rather than direct discrimination against female candidates. These results suggest that information environments shape the expression of gender bias, rather than eliminating it, offering a more nuanced understanding of the conditions under which candidate gender influences electoral preferences.

Since the mid-2010s, conflicts at UNESCO over the interpretation of Japanese colonial rule and wartime actions in the first half of the twentieth century in Japan, South Korea, and China have been fierce. Contested nominations include the Meiji Industrial Revolution Sites for the World Heritage List (Japan), the Documents of Nanjing Massacre for the Memory of the World (MoW) Register (China), and two still pending applications on the Documents on the Comfort Women (South Korean and Japanese NGOs). This paper examines the recent “heritage war” negotiations at UNESCO as they unfolded in a changing political, economic, and security environment. Linking World Heritage and MoW nominations together for a holistic analysis, this paper clarifies the interests of State actors and of various non-State actors, such as NGOs, experts, and the UNESCO secretariat. We discuss the prospects for these contested nominations and recommend further involvement of non-State actors to ensure more constructive and inclusive heritage interpretation to enable a more comprehensive understanding of history.

The COVID-19 pandemic caused widespread disruption to early childhood education and care services worldwide, affecting children’s well-being and placing unprecedented caregiving burdens on families. This paper compares the childcare-related social policy responses in three countries representing distinct welfare regimes: South Korea (Productivist/East Asian), France (Conservative-Corporatist), and the UK (Liberal). Focusing on four key domains – ECEC services, family leave, work environment, and financial support – it examines how each country addressed childcare challenges during the pandemic. The findings show that, while some similarities emerged in responding to shared challenges, the policy responses diverged considerably. These differences were shaped not only by pandemic-specific health strategies but also by pre-existing welfare structures and childcare systems. France utilised its strong public infrastructure and introduced special childcare leave; Korea expanded temporary family leave and financial aid while relying heavily on informal care; and the UK prioritised employment protection with limited direct caregiving support. The study underscores the importance of institutional flexibility and multi-layered care systems in building crisis-resilient childcare policies.

This article examines the legal framework for offshore CO2 sequestration in South Korea, paying particular attention to how to ensure the protection of the marine environment from CO2 sequestration in sub-seabed geological formations. It analyses the relevant international regulatory framework, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1972 London Convention and the 1996 London Protocol. It then examines the Korean national legal framework relating to offshore CO2 sequestration. In the absence of detailed regulations on the process of CO2 sequestration in sub-seabed geological formations in South Korea, the article suggests detailed regulations regarding site selection, assessment of potential risks, monitoring and long-term liability to ensure environmental safety and security from offshore CO2 sequestration, which should comply with the 1996 Protocol and relevant guidelines. The development of detailed Korean national regulations ensuring compliance with international rules and standards could serve as best practices driving offshore CCS in the Asia-Pacific region.

Recent studies suggest that young individuals living in consolidated democracies are growing increasingly disillusioned with liberal democratic institutions and becoming more receptive to alternative forms of governance. This study investigates the democratic orientations of young individuals by examining support for different forms of leadership in South Korea. It argues that some young Koreans are following the global trend and are increasingly showing less faith in democracy. Specifically, they are showing more support for strongman leaders due to the way in which these leaders appeal to these voters. An original survey with an embedded experiment suggests that, while the general Korean public tends to support democratic leaders, young Koreans increasingly express a greater preference for strongman leaders due to their growing public anxieties and societal grievances along with the leaders’ painted image to resolve problems. These findings empirically challenge the long-held belief that young people inherently and undoubtedly prefer democracy and suggest that more needs to be done to overcome their diminishing faith in democratic leadership. The study thus prompts a reconsideration of how generational value changes may influence democracies in the future.

Throughout the twentieth century, Taiwan and South Korea underwent rapid economic development and successfully democratized without reversal to authoritarianism. Despite their similar trajectories, the two countries diverge significantly in political and public support for gender equality. Taiwan is widely seen as the most gender-equal country in Asia, while South Korea remains deeply polarized, with uneven progress in women’s representation. What accounts for this divergence between two democracies? This article advances a political institutions thesis, arguing that differences in democratic institution-building—particularly the actors and modes of democratization—have shaped the contour of gender politics of each country. Contrasting the histories of party-driven democratization in Taiwan and mass-driven democratization in South Korea, this article shows that the process of building democracy has had lasting effects on the institutionalization and sustainability of gender equality.

This paper examines the effect of the 2022 FIFA World Cup group matches on outgroup bias among South Koreans. Using a list experiment conducted in four rounds before and during the tournament, we investigate whether these matches promote social learning, enabling individuals to update their perceptions of outgroups directly involved in the match, or if they merely trigger emotional responses to match results, with defeats leading to increased outgroup bias regardless of match contact. Our findings suggest insufficient evidence to conclude that South Korean respondents generally modify their outgroup bias levels in response to these events. However, certain subgroups, particularly males, demonstrate strong reactions to losses, exhibiting heightened outgroup bias towards all outgroups. These results indicate that in the context of negative contact valence, high-stakes intergroup sports competitions can lead to an overgeneralized outgroup bias against various groups among highly engaged individuals. This study contributes to understanding the relationship between sports events and intergroup attitudes, highlighting the potential for negative outcomes to exacerbate biases among certain subpopulations.

23rd November 2011 was the first anniversary of the artillery exchange between the two Koreas around the island of Yeonpyeong off the west coast of Korea. The artillery battle in 2010 was the first such since the Korean War armistice and brought the peninsula to a state of heightened tension. With the Lee Myungbak administration mulling an invasion of the North in the event of a collapse of the DPRK, a local conflict could easily explode into war. The last year has seen a lopsided arms race with South Korea dramatically increasing its military capabilities on a scale the North cannot match. The South Korean military are under American ‘wartime’ control, and since for technical reasons as well they cannot engage in war without US support, the Americans would be automatically involved in any war. A US-ROK invasion of the DPRK would almost certainly force China to intervene, as it did in 1950. A second Sino-US war would have calamitous, consequences.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has made strengthening the alliance relationship with the United States a key part of his foreign policy positions. At the same time, South Korea continues to maintain a decent relationship with China, pursuing a precarious position to decide its role in the context of the growing US–China rivalry. The US has made the trilateral cooperation and close coordination among the US, South Korea, and Japan the centerpiece of its Indo-Pacific strategy, while South Korea and Japan have maintained their contentious relationship. The articles in this special issue address the challenges that South Korea faces today, focusing on two major themes in the contemporary era: first, how the US–China rivalry and power competition affect South Korea’s security and economic foreign policies, and second, how the bilateral tensions between South Korea and Japan affect regional security and alliance capabilities.

With a security alliance with the United States and deep economic relations with China, South Korea faces complex foreign policy choices amid US–China competition. A critical decision is whether to join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a US-led grouping widely viewed as aiming to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. The choice depends on its domestic politics as much as its relationships with both superpowers. Using a public opinion survey with a priming experiment, we investigate South Korean citizens’ preferences regarding the Quad. We find that, without additional information, nearly half of the respondents supported joining the Quad. Yet neither mentioning the security benefits of joining the Quad nor mentioning the potential economic costs associated with Chinese retaliation for joining the Quad changed their level of support. Nor did we detect any treatment heterogeneity. Beyond the experiment, we find that threat perceptions and party affiliation are strongly correlated with respondents’ preferences.

In this study, we examine South Korea's foreign policy strategy in the context of the increasing strategic rivalry between the United States and China. We ask why South Korea is relatively hesitant to actively balance against China, especially compared to other US allies like Japan. We present a theory that examines how the lack of territorial and maritime disputes between a US ally and China affects an ally's foreign policy strategy in the US–China rivalry, to explain the case of South Korea. In general, when a US ally is engaged in an ongoing, active territorial and/or maritime dispute with China, we expect the US ally to more actively help the US balance against China. Because bilateral relations between the US ally and China are already tense, the US ally can afford to side with the US without being as vulnerable to Chinese retaliation. On the other hand, when a US ally has no ongoing, active territorial and/or maritime dispute with China, the US ally is expected to be more cautious in siding with the US against China because doing so can provoke China to retaliate in ways more costly than if they already had ongoing disputes. We find that without ongoing, active disputes with China, South Korea is more vulnerable to retaliation by China through critical issues like North Korea and trade. As a result, it is difficult for South Korea to side with the US in actively balancing against China.