Political philosophy appears to have recovered from its alleged death in themiddle of the last century, but now faces the realist charge that in the work ofJohn Rawls and those influenced by him it fails to be political in the rightway; it is merely “applied moral philosophy.” I dismissthe hyper-realist position of authors such as Raymond Geuss for taking animplausibly narrow view of politics. There is more merit in BernardWilliams’s claim that legitimacy, not justice, is the central problemof political philosophy. Yet we cannot understand the significance oflegitimation without referring to the moral values that are realized when itsucceeds. Thus, Williams fails to show that political normativity can bedetached entirely from ethics. Moreover the legitimacy requirements of a liberalstate, according to Williams, are substantively close to the requirements ofjustice according to Rawls. In light of the latter’s turn to“political liberalism,” they appear also to holdconvergent views about the status of the theories they are advancing. I concludeby suggesting that the “applied moral philosophy” chargewould apply only to philosophers who believe that general moral principles, likeutility or rights, can do all the work of political evaluation. Politics doesindeed have special features that impose distinctive justificatory requirementson its procedures and the outcomes they produce.
