Chapter 3 focuses on Hegel’s critique of liberalism. It starts by discussing the preface to the Philosophy of Right in order to challenge the widespread assumption that Hegel is averse to robust social criticism. Afterwards, the chapter considers two main causes for the limited recognition of his work’s critical dimension. The first is the tendency to read Hegel’s book as a horizontal progression, fuelled by the accumulation of different aspects or layers of freedom. This kind of approach misrepresents the qualitative transformation that is at stake in the transition from civil society to the state, which only a vertical reading can adequately convey. Second, the Philosophy of Right’s critical import has also been obfuscated by some of Hegel’s own philosophical positions. Despite his intended sublation of the stage of civil society, his account of the state remains wedded, in important ways, to the former’s underlying logic. As the chapter seeks to show, if we accept Hegel’s claim that a rational state must synthesize the particular and the universal dimensions of human freedom, we must reject some of his political options as partly or wholly un-Hegelian.

Chapter 2 discusses Hegel’s understanding of the relationship between philosophy and reality, as well as the much-debated issue of whether the Philosophy of Right should be read as a normative enterprise. Focusing on the methodological argument outlined in the work’s preface and introduction, the chapter argues that Hegel is committed to a critical reconstruction of received reality, aimed at revealing the norms and institutions that best embody and promote human freedom. Moreover, it is claimed that this critical effort comprises a conceptual and a temporal dimension, corresponding to two different argumentative moments: the progression leading from the stage of ‘abstract right’ to that of the state, which deals with the immanent development of the concept of freedom, and the book’s final section, ‘world history’, which charts the historical actualization of the concept of freedom. While most interpreters tend to focus on the former dimension, the chapter shows that the latter is just as important to understand Hegel’s overall position.

Chapter 1 retraces the history of the critical reception of Hegel’s social and political thought, from the publication of the Philosophy of Right to the present. The chapter discusses the charges of conservatism raised by Hegel’s first critics, the liberal rehabilitation of his work in the second half of the twentieth century and the communitarian interpretation introduced in British and American debates from the 1980s. Finally, the chapter focuses on the ‘middle ground’ approach favoured today by most Hegelian scholars, based on a compromise between the liberal and the communitarian positions. This kind of interpretation is undoubtedly a step forward from the one-sided approach of many previous readings. However, by favouring the practical dimension of Hegel’s arguments over their logical or metaphysical foundations (an attitude referred to as methodological pragmatism) and by regarding the social dimension of freedom as an adjective rather than a substantive component of his position (an attitude referred to as structural individualism), this interpretative trend ends up reiterating the liberal framework Hegel seeks to transcend.

The Introduction reflects on Hegel’s unique approach to social and political philosophy, the distance that separates him from other modern thinkers and the contemporary reception of his ideas. Although the charges of conservatism and intolerance raised by Hegel’s early critics have since been discredited, the current tendency to regard him as a social-minded liberal fails to capture the true depth of his political thought. And this failure follows, it is argued, from the tendency to read the Philosophy of Right in a linear or horizontal manner, as a progression in which each dialectical stage is merely completed or expanded by subsequent ones. Introducing the book’s main thesis, the chapter claims that only a vertical reading, which recognizes the progression’s transformative nature, can do justice to Hegel’s overall argument. Moreover, anticipating the critical reconstruction of the Philosophy of Right undertaken in the book’s second part, it is claimed that such a reading leads beyond Hegel’s own political and economic views, towards a more progressive vision of modern society.

The Conclusion offers a brief recapitulation of the book’s main argument, highlighting its critical and reconstructive components. First, the criticism of the liberal reading that has come to dominate Hegelian scholarship is reiterated. The rational state envisioned in the Philosophy of Right, grounded in a dialectical synthesis of the particular and the universal dimensions of human freedom, is irreducible to the liberal state found today in most democratic nations. Second, the chapter insists on the need to move beyond Hegel’s own political and economic choices in order to bring out the true implications of his views. As argued throughout the book, only a fully democratic state, in which political and economic power are shared among all the citizens, can be deemed rational, in Hegelian terms. Finally, it is suggested that this alternative reading is not only more faithful to Hegel’s philosophical vision, but also more relevant for contemporary critical theory.

Chapter 4 reassesses Hegel’s views on property and its role within a rational state. In the Philosophy of Right’s initial stage, devoted to ‘abstract right’, each person is defined as an independent legal agent, with the right to own and exchange property. From this standpoint, the political sphere is but a prolongation of the legal sphere and the state is reduced to an external authority, charged with regulating existing property relations. As the progression unfolds, however, this legalistic framework is called into question: it turns out that individual rights are not the true foundation of the state, but a part thereof, subordinated to a wider commitment to the common good. Yet while this commitment is clearly affirmed by Hegel, it is at odds with the priority he accords to private property, in the progression’s later stages, over other forms of ownership. Taking a different path, the chapter argues that a Hegelian theory of property entails a critical revision of Hegel’s actual treatment of property rights. If the state is to bring together the citizens’ particular interests and the common good, the ownership of society’s productive resources must be shared by all of its members.

History for German idealism is the expression of practical reason, the process of gradually bringing about the accord of subject and object. In Hegel’s conception of the history of freedom, different configurations of ethical life embody changing assessments of the self and the world, and contain essential contradictions whose resolution is the key to progress towards new and more complex forms. The dialectic of the will in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is an exposition of the idea of spontaneity, endowing itself with concrete content as it moves through its dimensions of universality, particularity, and singularity. Hegel demonstrates that modern institutions are not mere limitations, but legitimate conditions for the exercise of freedom. The rationality of the real, however, does not preclude a critical engagement. Close examination of current relations and institutions as exemplifying ideas of freedom reveals nodal points where practical interventions are likely to be fruitful in effecting change. An implicit, historicised ‘ought’ in Hegel, arising from his reworking of the logical categories, marks his place within post-Kantian perfectionism.

Although this chapter recognises the key role of Piedmont in the Italian unification process, it challenges the historiography that tends to overshadow the work of Southern Italian political representatives in the new Parliament. This chapter explores the contribution of the political thought and political praxis of Italian Hegelians, most of whom were from the South, to the building of the new Italian State. Many of them had first served the Kingdom of Italy in the Southern provinces during the delicate transition period, then in the central government and parliament in the early years of state-building, between 1861 and the 1880s, serving as representatives in both of the main parties, the Historical Right (Destra Storica) and the Historical Left (Sinistra Storica). It also explores the reshaping of the Hegelian theory of the State, reinterpreted as it was by Italian Hegelians, and how it served the new Italian political context and contributed to the understanding and designing of the new Italian State.

Hegel’s Groundwork for a Philosophy of Right has become, perhaps, the most widely read of the books he published in his lifetime. Many regard it as a work that stands alongside a handful of others as classics of modern political philosophy. Hegel, of course, did not conceive this work as a stand-alone piece of social and political theorizing, as it was effectively an expansion of the section “Objective Spirit” from the “Philosophy of Spirit”, forming Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. As such, in structure and content, it was meant to be understood as giving further determination to a conceptually articulated edifice presented in Part One of the Encyclopaedia, “The Science of Logic”. But more than this, as the presentation the Encyclopaedia follows a pattern in which subsequent sections reveal the “truth” of earlier ones, the “truth” of the determinations of Objective Spirit should further be illuminated in the later Encyclopaedia sections on “Absolute Spirit”, treating Art, Religion and Philosophy. This chapter attempts to illuminate Hegel’s ideas concerning objective spirit by examining them in this broader context.

In his Encyclopaedia, Hegel’s section “Objective Spirit” is crucial for our understanding his more elaborated ethical and political philosophy in the Philosophy of Right. The latter assumes a familiarity with key ideas found only in the Encyclopaedia, including (a) a proof of the free will and the need to develop a philosophical account for distinguishing between a free will and an arbitrary will, (b) the wider context of how ethical and political philosophy sits within his philosophical system and (c) its link beyond itself to other parts of Hegel’s philosophy. Unlike other philosophers, Hegel’s work is systematic, and a deeper appreciation of Objective Spirit and its place within the system – made clear in the Encyclopaedia – illuminates crucial ideas in his Philosophy of Right.

This chapter explores the problem of public opinion in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. I argue that for Hegel, the problem of public opinion is closely related to the problem of ideology critique, representing a departure from the Kantian approach to publicity as a path to enlightenment, and the development of a nascent critical theory. First, I provide an overview of Hegel’s understanding of public opinion by taking up its positive and negative aspects. Hegel’s departure from Kantian themes is clearly discerned in his understanding of the formation and function of public opinion, which traces its origins to the estates, leading to a conflict between private interests based on social status and the public good. With Hegel’s understanding in view, I then assess the extent to which this represents the development of a concept of ideology by drawing on Raymond Geuss’ definition. I show that public opinion has certain epistemic, functional, and genetic features that are connected with ideology, and further, that Hegel’s account of social practices helpfully contributes to contemporary debates. Finally, I turn to the Natural Law essay and argue that Hegel’s objections against empiricism and formalism in political theorizing share important affinities with critical theory.

The Introduction discusses why, to draw out a genuinely critical social theory from Hegel’s thought, we must turn away from his official social and political philosophy in the Philosophy of Right, and instead use the logic of essence in the Science of Logic. The logic of essence, I suggest, does not present a historically invariant ontology, but sets out an ontology that is specific to capitalism. Finally, I introduce the central thesis of the book, namely, that the categories of the logic of essence give expression to the general structure of social domination in capitalism.