Shortly before midnight on 22 January 1973, Hussain Abu-Khair, the recently appointed PLO representative in Cyprus, went to sleep in his hotel room. Minutes after he turned off the light, six small bombs underneath his bed were activated remotely and ripped him to pieces. Chapter 5 analyses intelligence exchanges regarding this assassination. The chapter also discusses how Black September retaliated, especially its coup of killing a Mossad officer, Baruch Cohen, in Madrid. Intelligence agencies were further reporting about terrorist activities in Jordan and about Libya’s offer to sponsor Palestinian terrorist attacks. Comparing these reports with what is known about terrorist plans at the time, the agencies were often quite accurate in their assessments. While the agencies were tracking Palestinian-Libyan connections, Black September struck another unexpected extra-European location: the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, Sudan. This chapter also discusses an interesting case where Club de Berne cooperation thwarted an attack against the Jordanian and Israeli embassies in Paris.

Chapter 7 focuses on the assassination of Mohamed Boudia, who died in a car explosion in a fancy Parisian neighbourhood on 28 June 1973. The chapter discusses the cables sent by French intelligence updating Club de Berne members and Mossad about the police investigation (despite widespread rumours that Mossad was likely behind these killings). Boudia, a top Black September terrorist, was in charge of various terrorist attacks and this chapter details what intelligence agencies knew about these attacks and Boudia’s involvement. At the time, he was preparing an attack against the Schönau transit camp near Vienna, where Jewish migrants stayed on their way to Israel from the Soviet Union. The chapter highlights how Mossad used Club de Berne intelligence for Operation Wrath of God. In particular, the Schönau investigation was used by Mossad as a pretext to gather information on Boudia. In particular, intelligence provided by the Swiss intelligence agency was very useful for Mossad to organise the killing mission against Boudia.

Chapter 2 looks at intelligence exchanges right after the Munich Olympics attack. This was when the Israeli government decided to go ahead with preparing the killing mission against any Palestinian involved in the planning and execution of the Munich massacre. This chapter shows how European intelligence helped Mossad identify the perpetrators of the attack, including those who planned and managed the terrorist operation as well as those who helped with the implementation or provided logistical support. European intelligence also helped Mossad to get a better sense of Black September’s operational methods in Europe, an area where Mossad lacked intelligence at the time. During this period, Black September carried out an explosive letters campaign, and this chapter shows how intelligence-sharing helped agencies detect the letters before they were opened. Lastly, through Club de Berne intelligence reports, numerous tactical details come to light about how Black September had organised the Munich Olympics attack.

Chapter 4 looks at Mossad’s assassination of Mahmoud al-Hamshari, who was killed in an explosion in his home in Paris on 8 December 1972. The chapter analyses the cables sent by French intelligence that updated Club de Berne members (including Mossad) about the ongoing police investigation. The chapter also looks at Black September attacks that happened in December 1972, one of which was a major attack in Bangkok. Palestinian terrorists planned a simultaneous attack in Scandinavia, which is revealed here for the first time. Another attack targeted Israel’s prime minister via a surface-to-air missile at Rome Fiumicino Airport. If this attack had succeeded, it would probably have counted among the most spectacular terrorist events of the decade. Club de Berne reports about Black September’s preparations for its terrorist activities show that agencies were trying to be one step ahead of the group. A few warnings issued by Mossad at the time are interesting from a contemporary perspective: the agency warned that Palestinians could hijack a plane and crash it into an Israeli city. Mossad thought that a plane could serve as a weapon, as was the case forty years later during 9/11.

The book’s first chapter provides background information about Operation Wrath of God, the Black September organisation, and the Club de Berne. This sets the scene and provides an understanding of the historical and political context in which the events described in the book take place. For instance, understanding how Operation Wrath of God was organised will later help explain ways in which European intelligence was useful to Mossad to carry out its assassinations.

On 21 July 1973, in a small, quiet Norwegian vacation town called Lillehammer, Mossad committed two unforgivable mistakes: first, it killed the wrong man and, second, it got caught doing it. On the official diplomatic level, the Lillehammer affair and public trial of the six Mossad officers caused a mass outpouring of international outrage and hostile press towards Israel. On the secret intelligence level, as this chapter demonstrates, it was as if the Lillehammer affair never happened. Chapter 8 focuses on three cases where cooperation started before the killing in Lillehammer and lasted for several months after. The chapter also discusses Club de Berne reports from early 1973 about terrorist activities in Scandinavia, which explains why Mossad readily believed claims that Salameh, a top terrorist, would be in Norway.

The concluding chapter discusses how Mossad relied heavily on foreign intelligence agencies to organise its covert actions. This invites the reader to rethink the oft-presented image of Mossad as a near omnipotent and omniscient agency. Instead, it is clear that Mossad did not act alone, and that European intelligence was vital for the successful implementation of Operation Wrath of God. The book thus offers a more nuanced and realistic view of Mossad’s strengths and weaknesses. The conclusion also discusses the major themes of the book, including questions relating to the international relations of intelligence agencies and the effectiveness of covert actions. Lastly, it discusses the core dilemma that European intelligence agencies faced when Operation Wrath of God was exposed: should they criticise Mossad and risk losing it as a vital partner in the fight against terrorism, or keep quiet and continue cooperating with Israeli security? Obviously, they chose the latter because the intelligence exchanges were deemed very valuable and because it could be kept entirely secret – at least until this book, which has revealed the secret for the first time.

Chapter 3 starts with Operation Wrath of God’s first targeted assassination: the shooting of Wael Zwaiter in Rome on 16 October 1972. After the killing, Italian intelligence asked for help from its Club de Berne partners to find Zwaiter’s assassins. The absurdity of this, of course, is that one of the partners who was supposed to help identify the murderer, was the murderer. This chapter analyses intelligence cooperation around four attempted or perpetrated Black September terrorist attacks, some of which will be revealed for the first time in this book. The chapter further highlights that several cables also served a second purpose for intelligence agencies. For example, agencies wanted to appear as powerful, relevant, well networked, and knowledgeable as possible about Palestinian conspiratorial activities as a way to cultivate their image in the eyes of their partners. The chapter outlines a few cases of such covert diplomacy where, through intelligence-sharing, agencies tried to change how they and their governments were perceived by other governments.