To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge-org.demo.remotlog.com
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Part I of this article reviews major differences in definitions of the transaction concept by leading authors and some of the difficulties involved in its usage. Part II takes steps towards a new approach, starting with the legal notion of a contract. This identifies a narrower and more specific type of transaction, empowered by both legal forces and non-legal or cultural norms or rules. The sharper and more specific concept of contracting cost is derived. Contracting costs are the costs of obtaining, formulating, negotiating, and administering legal contracts. They do not include the costs of the work and other inputs required to fulfil a specific contractual agreement. Legal contracts are historically specific phenomena, applying only to modern societies with developed legal institutions. By making the analysis more specific, we emphasise factors of greater relevance in modern market economies. In addition to legal sanctions, the law engenders other forms of motivation based on what is perceived to be legitimate legal authority.
Prominent scholars have complained of inadequate clarity and agreement on what transactions are, and how their costs are measured. This two-part article explores this topic and suggests an alternative approach. This part examines different meanings of transaction cost used by leading scholars in this area, including John R. Commons, Ronald H. Coase, Oliver E. Williamson, Douglas C. North, Douglas W. Allen, and Yoram Barzel. It reveals prominent usages of the term that differ in several important respects. A sharper approach might focus on legal contracts and exchanges of legal titles, as suggested by Harold Demsetz. That option is explored further in Part II.
Cannabis is the most commonly used illicit drug worldwide. In countries with repressive drug policies, the costs of its prohibition plausibly outweigh the benefits. We conduct a cost–benefit analysis of cannabis legalization and regulation in the Czech Republic, taking into consideration alternative scenarios designed using parameters from the known effects of cannabis legalization in selected U.S. states, Canada, and Uruguay. Our analysis focuses on tax revenues, law enforcement costs, the cost of treatment and harm reduction, and the value of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). Under all the projected scenarios, the identified benefits of legalizing cannabis for personal use exceed the potential costs. The estimated net social benefit of legalization is in the range of 34.4 to 107.6 million EUR per year (or between 3.2 and 10.1 EUR per capita), depending on the size of the cannabis market and the development of cannabis prices after legalization.
Taking inspiration from the work of Douglass North, much institutional research attempts a distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions. North often associated ‘formal institutions’ with rules enforced through a legal system. It is suggested here that this lead should be followed and refined. In which case ‘legal system’ and ‘law’ require definitions. An alternative claim, that ‘formal’ basically means ‘written down’, is arguably less useful. Stressing the importance of clear definitions in this area, this paper considers a case where slight modifications yield strikingly different results. Some options concerning the meanings of ‘culture’ and their relation to institutions are briefly noted. Changes in, and interactions between, ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions are considered, with illustrative examples. Contrary to some authors, informal institutions can sometimes change rapidly, in some cases in response to state legislation.
Collusive agreements in the form of corporate cartels are complex structures. The involved firms need to agree on terms that are legally not enforceable. However, the interplay between the involved firms in a collusive agreement, i.e., the governance dimension within a cartel, has received surprisingly low attention. Using a comprehensive OECD dataset of 191 cartels from 2012 to 2018, this paper empirically demonstrates how polycentric governance within a cartel may possibly contribute to understanding its stability. It may be beneficial for the duration and lower sanctions imposed by competition authorities, especially for large cartels. By that, the paper sheds new light on two aspects: the entangled governance structures of corporate cartels and the relevance of the concept of polycentricity beyond public administration.
This JOIE symposium features some of the most influential papers presented in the seventh version of the conference on The shadow economy, tax behaviour, and institutions. Accordingly, it brings together contributions from several disciplines and schools of thought in the social sciences and the humanities exploring such issues as the role of formal and informal institutions in understanding the shadow economy, the importance of social aversion in the motivations for tax compliance, and the dual nature of corruption. This introduction lays out the scope of the symposium, summarises the preceding literature on the topic, and provides a brief outline of each contributing article, noting that, although each paper focuses on a different economic and cultural context, they share several elements in common with alternative theories addressing the institutional, psychological, and sociological aspects of tax law compliance and other appropriate behaviours.
The IT industry has been portrayed as instrumental to India’s transition to a high-growth economy. But critics argue that it has delivered few benefits to the wider population. In this context, industry advocates have drawn attention to the direct and indirect impact of IT on output and employment. This article critically explores these claims by locating them in the conventional (neoliberal) narrative of India’s recent economic development. It finds that industry claims are exaggerated and that IT industry demand is often linked to the creation of employment in industries dominated by informal employment arrangements. The prevalence of informal employment highlights problems of low pay and poor or hazardous working conditions. The IT industry’s rise to prominence has traversed a deeply ingrained process of labour market informalisation. In exaggerating the employment-generating capacity of the IT industry, its supporters have largely ignored problems relating to the quality of employment.
Incorporation of the informal sector in the general Kaleckian framework of agriculture–industry linkage is the primary target of this article. We show that the agriculture–informal sector interaction is distinctly different from the agriculture–formal sector relationship. Although agriculture supports the formal sector only from the supply-side, it helps the informal sector by providing both demand- and supply-side inducements. Next, contrary to the general perception of formal–informal complementarities, we rather propose a fundamental conflict. This conflict arises in the presence of the food supply-constraint or the generic resource-constraint. Subsequently, with these theoretical perspectives, we show that policies that are beneficial for the formal sector, in fact, constrict the informal economy.
Youth unemployment remains a major political and socioeconomic challenge in Africa despite the recent strong growth performance of many African countries. The study undertakes an empirical assessment of the main sources of youth unemployment in Africa. Based on panel data of 41 African countries covering the period 2000–2010, the study finds a demographic youth bulge and poor economic growth from both supply and demand sides of the market to be key drivers of youth unemployment in Africa. Employment-to-population ratio as a measure of country’s job creation ability and vulnerable employment as a proxy for informality are observed to have had a decreasing effect on youth unemployment. The empirical findings also suggest higher youth employment rates among females than males and a higher concentration in urban than rural areas. Investment in the high labour absorption sectors of agriculture and manufacturing is advocated as job creation strategies, along with population control measures to slow the growing youth population in Africa. High growth in the low employment sectors of mining and extractive industries could serve as resource generating avenues to promote investment in education and skill training, along with infrastructure to facilitate growth in high labour absorption sectors.
The ambiguous phenomenon of corruption has long been the cause of great theoretical debate in economics. By using Structural Equation Modelling, with the two types of corruption as a latent variable, this paper employs causal and indicative variables to the Latin American region to test for rent seeking and systemic corruption during 1980–2018. The findings provide evidence for two types of corruption, one generated by greed, and the other a solution to market failures. Such results support the view that corruption encompasses a complex set of social behaviours that may require a stronger definitional approach.
The vulnerability of small firms to price shocks may partly explain why fossil fuel subsidy removals in developing countries are so difficult to implement. This paper analyzes the effects of fuel and electricity price increases on profits of micro- and small-sized enterprises in Mexico. Using representative cross-sectional data, simulations of profit losses hint at potentially large short-term effects. First-order profit losses of a 1 per cent price increase are 0.2 per cent for fuels and 0.07 per cent for electricity, but are higher than 1 per cent for fuels in the transport sector. These effects are larger for formal than for informal firms, with energy-using low-profit firms being most vulnerable. Second-order impacts – predicted using estimated input-demand elasticities – indicate that firms react to price shocks by substituting labor for energy, while the self-employed appear to increase their own labor input. Reduced-form regressions show that some firms pass on higher fuel costs to customers.
This paper documents the patterns and correlates of retirement in China using a nationally representative survey, the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study. After documenting stark differences in retirement ages between urban and rural residents, the paper shows that China's urban residents retire earlier than workers in many Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries and that rural residents continue to work until advanced ages. Differences in access to generous pensions and economic resources explain much of the urban–rural difference in retirement rates. The paper suggests that reducing disincentives created by China's Urban Employee Pension system, improving health status, providing childcare and elder care support may all facilitate longer working lives. Given spouse preferences for joint retirement, creating incentives for women to retire later may facilitate longer working lives for both men and women.
Many years ago, Emmanuel Todd came up with a classification of family types and argued that the historically prevalent family types in a society have important consequences for its economic, political, and social development. Here, we evaluate Todd's most important predictions empirically. Relying on a parsimonious model with exogenous covariates, we find mixed results. On the one hand, authoritarian family types are, in stark contrast to Todd's predictions, associated with increased levels of the rule of law and innovation. On the other hand, and in line with Todd's expectations, communitarian family types are linked to racism, low levels of the rule of law, and late industrialization. Countries in which endogamy is frequently practiced also display an expectedly high level of state fragility and weak civil society organizations.
Several existing studies have documented a negative relationship between firm financial constraint and export activities but do not attempt to examine factors that could attenuate this relationship in Africa. In this paper, we examine the effect of financial constraint on exports in Africa and explore how the level of trust in countries where firms are located shapes this relationship. We combine the World Bank Enterprise Surveys with different measures of country-level personal and interpersonal trust computed from the Afrobarometer surveys of 19 African countries. Our results show that financial constraints negatively affect export activities. However, this negative effect is attenuated for firms that are located in trust-intensive societies. These findings are robust to different specifications. Interestingly, we find that small and medium-sized enterprises in Africa are more likely to be affected by financial constraints but also more likely to benefit from a higher level of both personal and interpersonal trust, while for larger firms only interpersonal trust matters.
Using the panel data of 89 economies from 1995–2012, this study examines the major drivers of agricultural emissions while considering affluence, energy intensity, agriculture value added and economic integration. We find long-run cointegration among the variables. Furthermore, our empirical results based on a dynamic fixed effects autoregressive distributed lag model show that the increases in income and economic integration – proxied by trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) – are the major contributors to higher greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from agriculture in the short run. Additionally, the increases in income, agriculture value added and energy consumption are the major drivers of agricultural emissions in the long run. Notably, trade openness and FDI inflows have significantly negative effects on GHG emissions from agriculture in the long run. These results apply to methane and nitrous oxide emissions. The empirical findings vary across three subsamples of countries at different development stages.
This paper examines two potential mechanisms – access to credit and reduction in relational risks – through which social trust can affect R&D investments. Social trust can increase R&D investments by expanding firms' access to external finance with which they can use to fund promising R&D projects. It can also increase R&D investments by reducing relational risks that expose firms to ex-ante and ex-post holdups or expropriation risks. Using industry-level data on R&D investment intensities in 20 OECD countries, I test these mechanisms by evaluating whether more external finance dependent and relational risk vulnerable industries exhibit disproportional higher R&D investment intensities in trust intensive countries. The results indicate that external finance dependent industries and relational risks vulnerable industries experience relatively higher R&D investment intensities in trust-intensive countries. Therefore, the results underline access to external finance and reduction in relational risks as causal pathways linking social trust and R&D investments.
In many modern nation states, both rich and poor, traditional law to this day plays an important role. Given the almost universal prevalence of traditional law, it is surprising how little we know about it. This is the first study that tries to take stock of traditional law from a cross-country perspective. We are also interested in the compatibility of traditional law with state-enforced law and, in particular, with the basic traits of the rule of law. Based on a sample of up to 134 countries, we find that no ‘typical’ traditional law exists, but that traditional law varies in many dimensions such as its timely enforcement, its impartiality, and its protection of basic human rights. Societies that rely extensively on traditional law score low regarding both the rule of law and per capita income. Historical and geographical factors are important predictors of the contemporaneous reliance on traditional law. State antiquity, for example, reduces the prevalence of traditional law, as does a high share of descendants from European populations.
Interest payments based on income flows are a common feature of informal loans. Such so-called ’interlinked loans’ can be seen as insurance against very low disposable incomes, as interest payments are lowest when income turns out to be low. This paper examines whether interlinked loans indeed contain an insurance premium and how those premia are determined. A simple theoretical model predicts that interest rates of interlinked loans increase with income volatility when insurance premia exist. Based on data from a small-scale fishery in India, calculations show that, on average, lenders receive 25 per cent of the income, which corresponds to an average interest rate of 49 per cent p.a. A panel data analysis confirms theoretical predictions that interlinked loans contain an insurance component paid by the borrowers.
Institutions are the formal or informal 'rules of the game' that facilitate economic, social, and political interactions. These include such things as legal rules, property rights, constitutions, political structures, and norms and customs. The main theoretical insights from Austrian economics regarding private property rights and prices, entrepreneurship, and spontaneous order mechanisms play a key role in advancing institutional economics. The Austrian economics framework provides an understanding for which institutions matter for growth, how they matter, and how they emerge and can change over time. Specifically, Austrians have contributed significantly to the areas of institutional stickiness and informal institutions, self-governance and self-enforcing contracts, institutional entrepreneurship, and the political infrastructure for development.
This paper presents a multidimensional indicator of institutional quality in Argentina for the period 1862-2008. Initially, it describes a set of variables that aim to measure issues related to the legal framework prevailing in Argentina and its implementation, such as changes in the Constitution and the provincial Constitutions, declarations of state of siege and federal interventions, freedom of press, central bank independence. The indicator is then constructed through the principal component analysis.
The results suggest that periods of high institutional quality in Argentina coincided with the most expansion and relative progress. In other words, poor institutional quality would not only be reflected in lower growth rates but also compromises the ability to follow those countries with the best performace.