This chapter mainly concerns the shuttle diplomacy of the US secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, in 1976. Kissinger made two trips to Africa in 1976, hoping to influence Cold War conflicts in southern Africa. Kissinger succeeded, with South African help, to force the Rhodesian prime minister, Ian Smith, to concede to the concept of majority rule in two years. Plans were then put in motion for an all-parties conference in Geneva, run by the British. This chapter examines the pre-conference diplomacy, including attempts by Mugabe and Nkomo to have those military leaders from ZANLA who were accused of the murder of Herbert Chitepo released by the Zambians. This chapter includes coverage of discussions between Kissinger and the South Africans, the British, and with Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere. There is also discussion of a letter by Bishop Muzorewa charging Nyerere and Mozambique’s Samora Machel of keeping him and Reverend Sithole from reaching the liberation forces in Mozambique and Tanzania.

This chapter mainly concerns the shuttle diplomacy of the US secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, in 1976. Kissinger made two trips to Africa in 1976, hoping to influence Cold War conflicts in southern Africa. Kissinger succeeded, with South African help, to force the Rhodesian prime minister, Ian Smith, to concede to the concept of majority rule in two years. Plans were then put in motion for an all-parties conference in Geneva, run by the British. This chapter examines the pre-conference diplomacy, including attempts by Mugabe and Nkomo to have those military leaders from ZANLA who were accused of the murder of Herbert Chitepo released by the Zambians. This chapter includes coverage of discussions between Kissinger and the South Africans, the British, and with Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere. There is also discussion of a letter by Bishop Muzorewa charging Nyerere and Mozambique’s Samora Machel of keeping him and Reverend Sithole from reaching the liberation forces in Mozambique and Tanzania.

This chapter focuses on Mujuru’s contribution to the creation of ZIPA, which was a union of ZANLA and ZIPRA. It describes Mujuru’s role in securing a new primary host (Mozambique’s FRELIMO government), from where ZIPA launched guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia. The chapter deepens the book’s exploration of the intricate relations between host governments and liberation movements and contributes to the limited scholarship on the workings of transnational political partnerships, through its examination of the relationship between the FRELIMO government, Tanzania (subsidiary host) and ZIPA. The chapter also explains why ZIPA eventually collapsed. Many scholars have debated, in inconclusive terms, Robert Mugabe’s 1977 rise to power in Mozambique. The chapter argues Mujuru played a pivotal part in convincing FRELIMO leader Samora Machel to back Mugabe’s leadership bid. Mujuru played the role of kingmaker in Mugabe’s rise to the helm of ZANU PF because of his respect for party and military hierarchy and for the secret reason that Mugabe was his nephew.