This chapter examines the complex diplomacy between the United States and Israel during the administration of President George H. W. Bush and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, with a particular focus on the road to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. It argues that US Secretary of State James Baker ultimately played a pivotal role in shaping the negotiations. Drawing on newly available archival materials from the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, the Israel State Archives, and the American Jewish Archives, the chapter presents a detailed account of the tensions that characterized the period. It explores how emotions - alongside interests and strategy - shaped diplomatic behavior, particularly over the peace process and the request for US loan guarantees to support the absorption of Soviet Jewish immigrants in Israel. The chapter also investigates the parallel strains in US relations with American Jewish organizations. In contrast to accounts that treat this period as an aberration in the U.S.-Israel "special relationship," the chapter shows how it encapsulated the recurring frictions and deep-rooted affinities that have long defined the alliance. It also reflects on the broader historiographical and methodological implications of using newly declassified sources to reassess well-known diplomatic episodes.1

The 1991 Madrid Conference marked a turning point in US-Israel relations and the broader Middle East peace process. After the Gulf War, the Bush administration, led by Secretary of State James Baker, pushed for direct talks between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Co-sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union, the conference aimed to establish a peace framework based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, emphasizing land for peace. Tensions emerged between the US and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, especially over Israeli settlement policy and the makeup of the Palestinian delegation. The Bush administration linked US loan guarantees for absorbing Soviet Jewish immigrants to a freeze on settlement expansion, increasing pressure on Israel. The conference also exposed divisions within the American Jewish community over US policy and its implications for Israel’s future. This chapter explores the diplomatic maneuvering before Madrid, the negotiations over participation, and the conference’s impact on US-Israel relations. It places Madrid within the broader realignment of US Middle East policy under Bush and assesses its long-term legacy.

The Oslo Accords were signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) granting the Palestinians elements of self-government for an interim period leading to negotiations on the final status of the West bank and Gaza. The Accords have been subject to intense criticism. However, for the first time the Arab Palestinians had their own, freely elected, administration, albeit subject to restrictions. The word autonomy, implying that the area is part of an existing State, was used in the 1978 Camp David Accords but was omitted from the Oslo Accords. Jerusalem and Israel settlements were excluded from the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority but it was agreed that their status would be part of the negotiations on the final status of the West Bank. The Accords had very broad international support and, although there are mutual claims that the Accords have been violated, neither part has formally abrogated them.